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Preface 
This dissertation is about rethinking old results in welfare economics.  Each chapter 
revises previous understandings of normative analysis.    
In the interest of getting bad news out of the way, the first chapter is the most negative 
result.  Co-authored with Giacomo Brusco, it recalls the classic result that aggregate 
consumption data can identify the deadweight loss from a (sales) tax when that tax is fully 
salient.  However, we demonstrate that, when one cannot rule out heterogeneity in the 
salience of the tax rate, aggregate demand data no longer point identifies deadweight loss.  
Imposing structure yields bounds on the possible values of deadweight loss, but these bounds 
empirically appear to yield substantial uncertainty in the calculation of deadweight loss. 
The second chapter, co-authored with Joel Slemrod, provides a more positive result.  It 
is well-understood that the burden of a sales tax does not depend on whether the buyer or the 
seller is responsible for mailing the check.  We provide a far more general result in the same 
vein, where neither real economic activity nor welfare is affected by who must remit the taxes 
due to non-transfer activities.  In this way, we reinforce a traditional result in public finance.  
However, that one can impose the responsibility to remit taxes arbitrarily without any welfare 
impacts suggests substantial latitude for the government to decide how to assign this 
responsibility based on non-welfarist considerations.  Thus, our essay challenges previous 
results criticizing the consideration of horizontal equity in normative analysis. 
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The third chapter may be the most positive.  In the standard competitive model, if firms 
have unboundedly increasing returns to scale, then no Pareto-efficient allocation that requires 
production is sustainable in a competitive equilibrium with transfers.  However, I show that 
having agents make decisions about production, with an understanding that goods such as their 
own leisure cannot be purchased, allows for all Pareto-efficient allocations to be sustained in 
this variant of a competitive equilibrium with transfers.  Yet this mechanism for attaining 
efficient allocations via price-taking behavior requires abandoning the classical dichotomy 
between consumption and production.  Furthermore, now there is not generally a “profit” 
function that one can tax to obtain revenue without distorting behavior. 
These three essays are written to be self-contained, but they touch upon similar 
elements.  The first and third chapters both reinforce the difficulty of deadweight loss 
calculations.  While the first chapter highlights the problem of heterogeneous tax salience, the 
third chapter implies that supply curves may also be subject to income effects that one should 
consider when performing welfare calculations.  The first and second chapters imply that the 
government should be sensitive to how changing who remits taxes affects the salience of those 
taxes, even as the welfare impact of such a change in remittance responsibilities may be 
difficult to calculate.    The second chapter anticipates the third by having agents make 
production and consumption decisions jointly. 
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Abstract 
This dissertation addresses three distinct tax questions.  First, we address the 
identification of deadweight loss from non-salient taxes.  Second, we generalize the canonical 
result that the impact of a tax does not depend on who has the legal responsibility to remit the 
tax payment.  Finally, I extend the Walrasian equilibrium model to include unbounded 
increasing returns to scale production technology. 
 Taxes create deadweight loss by distorting consumer choice, so to the extent that 
consumers perceive taxes to be lower than they really are, deadweight loss declines.  
Deadweight loss is a convex function of perceived taxes, so its aggregate magnitude depends 
not only on the average tax misperception, but also on its heterogeneity among consumers.  
Aggregate data cannot reveal this heterogeneity, yet one can infer lower and upper bounds on 
deadweight loss relying solely on properties of aggregate demand.  Sufficiently rich individual-
level data permit identification of deadweight loss even with heterogeneous tax 
misperceptions.  Under strong assumptions on the joint distribution of tax salience and 
preferences, survey data illustrate that tax salience heterogeneity can yield deadweight loss 
twice as large as one would calculate under the assumption of a homogeneous perceived price.  
Relaxing these assumptions, even slightly, yields much more destructive results: the 
unconstrained upper bound of deadweight loss is more than fifty times larger than the lower 
bound one would compute assuming homogeneous perceptions of price. 
 
xi 
 
Conventional wisdom holds that the impact of a sales tax does not depend on whether 
the buyer or the seller remits the tax to the government.   We extend this result to a general 
setting.  Equilibrium non-transfer activity depends only on the total tax liability, regardless of 
who bears the statutory remittance liability.  In a competitive setting, this result applies when 
all agents must pay each other for sales and purchases.  However, changing the remittance 
obligation may transfer wealth lump-sum, depending on legal production and consumption 
rights.  Thus, the remittance neutrality of taxes is a variation on Coase’s Theorem. 
 A Walrasian equilibrium with production cannot exist when firms have unboundedly 
increasing returns to scale technology.  If any price-taking firm chooses to produce at all, then it 
could achieve infinite profit by producing an infinite amount.  Thus, the difficulty of increasing 
returns to scale in perfect competition results from firms acting without accounting for input 
supply constraints.   
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Chapter 1 
Attending to Inattention:  Identification of Deadweight Loss under Non-Salient Taxes 
by Giacomo Brusco and Benjamin Glass* 
Abstract 
Taxes create deadweight loss by distorting consumer choice, so to the extent that 
consumers perceive taxes to be lower than they really are, deadweight loss declines. 
Deadweight loss is a convex function of perceived taxes, so its aggregate magnitude 
depends not only on the average tax misperception, but also on its heterogeneity among 
consumers.  Aggregate data cannot reveal this heterogeneity, yet one can infer lower 
and upper bounds on deadweight loss relying solely on properties of aggregate demand. 
Sufficiently rich individual-level data permit identification of deadweight loss even with 
heterogeneous tax misperceptions.  Under strong assumptions on the joint distribution 
of tax salience and preferences, survey data illustrate that tax salience heterogeneity 
can yield deadweight loss twice as large as one would calculate under the assumption of 
a homogeneous perceived price.  Without these assumptions, the unconstrained upper bound 
of deadweight loss is more than fifty times larger than the lower bound. 
                                                          
* University of Michigan.  The work in the following pages would have been impossible without the thought-
provoking conversations we had with James Hines, Joel Slemrod, Dmitry Taubinsky, Alex Rees-Jones, Jeremy Fox, 
Tilman Börgers, Ying Fan, William Boning, Luis Alejos, Tejaswi Velayudhan, Aristos Hudson, the participants of 
the Public Finance and Theory seminars at the economics department of the University of Michigan, and 
the participants of the 2017 NTA conference.  We warmly thank all of them for their invaluable advice. 
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1. Introduction 
Taxing a good results in a loss of economic efficiency whenever it distorts equilibrium 
behavior away from the Pareto optimum.   If each person faced a different tax rate when 
buying a certain good, understanding the welfare effects of such a tax would require us to study 
not only aggregate demand responsiveness, but the demand responsiveness of every 
individual.  Surely, imposing a high tax on low elasticity individuals and a low tax on high 
elasticity individuals would have a very different effect on welfare than doing the opposite.   
A similar reasoning applies when all agents face the same tax rate, but perceive 
different tax rates, as noted in Chetty et al.  (2009).  Correctly assessing the welfare effects of 
taxation requires us to understand how each person reacts to the tax based on both their 
preferences and their perception of the tax.  The possibility of heterogeneous attention 
intrinsically changes the way we should estimate deadweight loss.  One can wildly miscalculate 
the magnitude of deadweight loss if they fail to account for the heterogeneous perception of 
taxes.    
Suppose, e.g., that aggregate tax responsiveness was half of sticker price 
responsiveness.  To a second order approximation, deadweight loss is quadratic in the 
perceived tax.  If all consumers noticed only half of the tax, deadweight loss would be 25% of 
what it would be under full attention; if instead half of consumers did not notice the tax at all, 
while the other half noticed it perfectly, deadweight loss would be 50% of what it would be 
under full attention.  Besides varying across individuals, attention may also endogenously co-
vary with the tax rate.  
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Tax non-salience leaves consumers even worse off because they fail to avoid the tax by 
reducing consumption.  Yet to what degree the tax does not distort consumer behavior, 
deadweight loss is reduced.  In fact, we find that increasing an existing tax, while still increasing 
deadweight loss, can make consumers better off when it discourages consumption that would 
already be avoided if agents paid full attention.   
Suppose the econometrician only has aggregate data:  that is, data on aggregate 
consumption of a good across several markets, differentiated by time or geographic location.  
These data may indicate average responsiveness to taxes and sticker prices but provide no 
information on the heterogeneity of demand responsiveness to taxes, nor about its correlation 
with sticker price responsiveness.  Thus, aggregate data cannot precisely identify deadweight 
loss.  However, we can provide bounds for dead-weight loss even with aggregate data.  These 
bounds are tight, in the sense that for each bound there is a distribution of salience under 
which that bound accurately describes deadweight loss.  
The lower bound for deadweight loss is the calculation one would perform in the case of 
a representative consumer.  Since the loss in efficiency is a convex function of the perceived tax 
rate, the calculation of deadweight loss from one perceived tax-inclusive price consistent with 
aggregate demand will generically underestimate deadweight loss. Intuitively, heterogeneity in 
tax salience creates heterogeneity in perceived net-of-tax prices.  This creates an allocative 
inefficiency across consumers: it is no longer true that the people who value the good the most 
are the ones who end up buying it.  As the calculation with a representative consumer only 
accounts for inefficiency from aggregate foregone consumption due to the tax, it will under-
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estimate excess burden.1  However, in the case in which all agents pay the same amount of 
attention to the tax, there is no allocative inefficiency between consumers, and so performing 
the calculation as with a representative consumer yields the correct value for deadweight loss. 
We obtain an upper bound for deadweight loss by assuming that tax salience has 
support on a known bounded non-negative interval. The upper bound comes from maximizing 
perceived price heterogeneity, again exploiting the convexity of deadweight loss with respect to 
the perceived tax.  In addition to assuming tax salience is either zero or maximal, a distribution 
yielding the upper bound for deadweight loss assigns high tax salience to those agents whose 
preferences yield maximal deadweight loss from that agent relative to the change in 
consumption of that agent.  In other words, this distribution allocates high tax salience to those 
agents who have more convex de-mand curves, keeping the aggregate change in quantity 
demanded constant.  Finally, any agents with multiple optimal decisions at the perceived price 
consume the highest amount consistent with their preferences when they perceive low prices, 
whereas they consume the lowest amount consistent with their preferences when they 
perceive high prices.  This last condition is need because heterogeneity in perceived prices 
permits different equilibria with the same sticker price, tax rate, and aggregate consumption, 
yet yielding different values of deadweight loss due to different distributions of consumption 
among individuals.  
To obtain an understanding of the possible magnitude of the uncertainty in deadweight 
loss estimated with aggregate data, we perform an empirical exercise with experimental data 
                                                          
1 While we came up with our lower bound independently, we thank Taubinsky and Rees-Jones (forthcoming) for 
inspiring this intuitive insight by making a related point as it pertained to their model.  They note in proposition 7 
of their appendix that deadweight loss can vary between lower and upper bounds when the choice set is binary. 
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from Taubinsky and Rees-Jones (forthcoming).  For the good we observe, we estimate an 
average deadweight loss from sales taxes on that good across the country of between 0.38 
cents and 20.79 cents per consumer.  This means the upper bound of deadweight loss is around 
55 times as large as the lower bound for deadweight loss. In fact, the upper bound for 
deadweight loss is substantially larger than if all agents were to perfectly account for the sales 
tax, in which case average deadweight loss would be 1.87 cents.   
When able to observe consumption choices at the individual level with long panel data, 
one can point-identify deadweight loss.  The easiest way to see this is to imagine one could 
observe the choice made by individual consumers for infinitely many periods, each time under 
a different tax and sticker price regime.  Then, one would be able to infer sticker price and tax 
responsiveness for everyone, and so would be able to compute deadweight loss for each single 
agent, and thus for the entire population. 
If we are willing to impose linear structure on the choice behavior of agents, then one 
need not observe each individual responsiveness to sticker prices and taxes:  it will suffice to 
know their distribution in the population.  For this, one need not follow the same agents across 
time; cross-sectional data with sufficiently rich variation in taxes and sticker prices will allow the 
identification of the distribution of responsiveness, which in turn would allow us to integrate 
for expected deadweight loss.2 
An alternative to observing individual choices is to restrict the choice set that the agent 
is facing.  Estimating random coefficients discrete choice models is common practice and can be 
                                                          
2 See for instance Beran and Hall (1992), Beran, Feuerverger, and Hall (1996), and Hoderlein, Klemelä, and 
Mammen (2010), all of which would require full support of sticker prices and sales taxes. 
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achieved with aggregate data on market shares.  The estimation of such a model allows the 
econometrician to then compute expected deadweight loss. This is because in the case of 
choices over a discrete set, aggregate data reveals the distribution of consumption on an 
individual level.  For instance, if the good in question is a house, and assuming everyone either 
buys one house or does not buy a house at all, knowing the number of houses purchased and 
the size of the population of perspective buyers allows us to calculate the probability that an 
agent buys a house.  However, the econometrician still requires linearity assumptions.  In this 
context, these assumptions are equivalent to assuming that tax salience is independent of both 
the tax rate and the sticker price.  
This paper complements a growing literature in public finance on non-salient taxes. 
Rosen (1976) does not find evidence of limited tax salience, but Chetty et al.  (2009), Finkelstein 
(2009), Gallagher & Muehlegger (2011), Goldin & Homonoff (2013), and Taubinsky & Rees-
Jones (forthcoming) all find strong evidence of dramatically limited tax salience.  For instance, 
Chetty et al.  (2009) provide a summary estimate that agents perceive six percent of sales tax 
variation using a log-log specification.  We estimate a linear specification using their data and 
find a summary estimate of 27 percent.  
Recent theoretical papers on the efficiency implications of non-salient taxes include 
Chetty et al.  (2007), Farhi and Gabaix (2015), and Taubinsky and Rees-Jones (forthcoming). Our 
theoretical model comes from Gabaix (2014), which differs slightly from Chetty et al.  (2009) in 
how it handles income effects.  In our model, a sales tax of any positive salience creates 
deadweight loss.3  In contrast, Goldin (2015) demonstrates that a model developed by Chetty et 
                                                          
3 This claim assumes an undistorted economy without perfectly inelastic supply or demand 
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al. (2009) generically yields zero deadweight loss for some positive sales tax on a normal good.4  
We show that the Gabaix (2014) model provides a general description of behavior when agents 
have convex preferences and proceed to use it for welfare analysis. 
Taubinsky and Rees-Jones (forthcoming) is most like this paper in spirit.  They make 
similar points about the inability to identify deadweight loss with aggregate data due to the role 
played by heterogeneous attention.  They also find lower and upper bounds for a second order 
approximation to deadweight loss with a binary choice set.  We find similar bounds without 
imposing restrictions on the choice set.  
This paper proceeds as follows.  In section 2, we develop the decision theory model and 
theoretically derive deadweight loss.  In section 3, we illustrate how heterogeneity in attention 
prevents identification of deadweight loss with aggregate continuous choice data.  We then 
show how we can still identify lower and upper bounds to deadweight loss under weak 
assumptions.  We provide positive point identification results in section 4 using individual-level 
or binary choice data.5  We perform an empirical calculation in section 5 before concluding in 
section 6.  We relegate proofs and details of empirical work to the appendix. 
 
2. Theoretical Derivation of Deadweight Loss 
This section describes the theoretical model and results that underlie the rest of this 
paper. The main modeling challenge in dealing with misperceived prices is to allow for the 
                                                          
4 This result uses a two-good framework in which the untaxed good absorbs any budget shortfalls.  In contrast, 
Goldin’s (2015) result relies on using the ratio of uncompensated demand responses to tax and sticker price 
variation.  In our model, tax salience corresponds to a ratio of compensated demand responses. 
5 It may appear strange that Taubinsky and Rees-Jones (forthcoming) find a negative identification result with 
binary choice data, whereas we find a positive identification result.  The distinction comes from whether one 
assumes that tax salience does not depend on the sticker price or tax rate. 
8 
 
misperception of prices while keeping agents solvent. Chetty et al. (2009) get around this issue 
by having a single good “absorb'' all optimization mistakes. Gabaix (2014), instead, has agents 
conjecture themselves a certain income such that they end up consuming on their true budget 
constraint when presented with the relative prices they perceive. We begin with a general 
model of decision-making problem for a single agent that encompasses both the Chetty et al. 
(2007, 2009) and Gabaix (2014).  The choice behavior of the agent is modeled in a general 
manner, so that the agent correctly optimizes for the goods without non-salient taxes, but has 
an arbitrary (continuous) consumption function for the taxed good.  We then show that the 
choice behavior from such a model can be represented by the model from Gabaix (2014), which 
dramatically simplifies exposition. In the process, we define compensating variation and 
analytically characterize it using the Gabaix (2014) model.  Finally, we aggregate over agents 
and account for the change in government revenue to derive aggregate deadweight loss due to 
the tax. 
2.1 Choices under Misperceived Taxes 
We consider a decision problem over two goods, one with a non-salient sales tax. We 
generalize to multiple taxed and non-taxed goods in the appendix. The agent has closed 
consumption set  𝑋 =  𝑋𝑇 × ℝ+ ⊆ ℝ+
2 .  The agent has choice function for the taxed good 
𝑞(?̅?, 𝑝𝑁𝑇 , 𝜏,𝑊), with (?̅?, 𝑝𝑁𝑇) ∈ ℝ++
2 , where ?̅? and 𝑝𝑁𝑇 are the sticker price of the taxed and 
non-taxed good, respectively, 𝜏 ∈  ℝ is the sales tax on the taxed good, and 𝑊 is the income of 
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the agent.6  We express taxes as if they were specific, so that 𝑝 ̅ + 𝜏 is the tax-inclusive price of 
the taxed good.   
The agent has continuous and strictly monotonic preferences ≽ with continuous utility 
representation 𝑢(𝑞, 𝑞𝑁𝑇), where 𝑞 denotes generic consumption of the taxed good.  The choice 
vector function 𝒒(?̅?, 𝑝𝑁𝑇 , 𝜏,𝑊) =  (𝑞(?̅?, 𝑝𝑁𝑇 , 𝜏,𝑊), 𝑞𝑁𝑇(?̅?, 𝑝𝑁𝑇 , 𝜏,𝑊)) ∈ 𝑋 satisfies two 
requirements.  One, the agent always spends all available income: 
(?̅?  + 𝜏) ∗  𝑞(?̅?, 𝑝𝑁𝑇 , 𝜏,𝑊) + 𝑝𝑁𝑇 ∗  𝑞𝑁𝑇(?̅?, 𝑝𝑁𝑇 , 𝜏,𝑊)  =  𝑊 
In the appendix, we generalize so that agents optimally choose 𝑞𝑁𝑇 given their choice of 𝑞.  
Two, the agent correctly optimizes in the choice of all consumption bundles when there is no 
tax: 
𝒒(?̅?, 𝑝𝑁𝑇 , 0,𝑊) ∈ argmax
?̅?∗𝑞+𝑝𝑁𝑇∗𝑞𝑁𝑇≤𝑊
𝑢(𝑞, 𝑞𝑁𝑇) 
We want some measure of the incidence of the tax on the consumer.  For concreteness, 
we consider the compensating variation due to the tax with complete pass-through, defined 
as:7 
Δ𝐶𝑆 ≡ inf  {Δ𝑊| 𝑢(𝒒(?̅?, 𝑝𝑁𝑇 , 𝜏,𝑊 + Δ𝑊)) ≥ 𝑢(𝒒(?̅?, 𝑝𝑁𝑇 , 0,𝑊))} 
In words, the change in consumer surplus is the greatest lower bound of the amount of money 
we must provide the agent so that the agent achieves the utility from before the imposition of 
                                                          
6 We implicitly restrict consideration to sticker prices, taxes, and income such that 𝑞(?̅?, 𝜏,𝑊) is well-defined at 
those values. 
7 We impose assumptions in subsection 2.2 that would allow us to define compensating variation using a 
minimum, rather than an infimum. 
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the tax.  One can verify that compensating variation is always non-negative for any non-
negative tax when preferences are locally non-satiated.8 
2.2 Gabaix Representation of Choice Behavior 
We now provide sufficient conditions that permit one to write the above model in the 
framework of Gabaix (2014) without loss of generality.  In this model, the agent perceives price 
𝑝𝑠 for the non-saliently taxed good, correctly perceives price 𝑝𝑁𝑇 for the non-taxed goods, and 
conjectures an income 𝑊𝑠 so that the agent’s true budget constraint is satisfied while the 
agent optimizes subject to the perceived budget constraint.  Formally:9 
𝒒(?̅?, 𝑝𝑁𝑇 , 𝜏,𝑊 + Δ𝑊) ∈ argmax
𝑝𝑠𝑞+𝑝𝑁𝑇𝑞𝑁𝑇≤𝑊𝑠
𝑢(𝑞, 𝑞𝑁𝑇) 
(?̅? + 𝜏, 𝑝𝑁𝑇) ∗ 𝒒(?̅?, 𝑝𝑁𝑇 , 𝜏,𝑊𝑠) = 𝑊 
To find a Gabaix representation for a choice, we want to find a budget line through the 
consumption bundle such that all strictly preferred bundles lie strictly above this line.  This is 
analogous to finding an equilibrium to a single-agent endowment economy.  As in the Second 
Welfare Theorem, we require some sense of continuous convexity of preferences.  However, 
we do not want to assume that the choice set is convex, to later allow for treatment of discrete 
choice sets. Instead, we impose convexity via the utility representation.10 
 
 
                                                          
8 For any Δ𝑊 < 0, (𝑝 + 𝜏, 𝑝𝑁𝑇) ∗ 𝒒(?̅?, 𝑝𝑁𝑇 , 𝜏,𝑊 + 𝛥𝑊) = 𝑊 + Δ𝑊 < 𝑊 = (𝑝 + 𝜏, 𝑝𝑁𝑇) ∗ 𝒒(?̅?, 𝑝𝑁𝑇 , 0,𝑊), 
implying that 𝑢(𝒒(?̅?, 𝜏,𝑊 + 𝛥𝑊)) < 𝑢(𝒒(?̅?, 0,𝑊)). 
9 Technically, for the subjective price 𝑝𝑠, Gabaix (2014) also wanted to choose 𝑊𝑠 maximally amongst all values 
of 𝑊𝑠 that would satisfy these two equations.  The idea is for the agent to conjecture income to optimally satisfy 
the true budget constraint.  This addition is without loss of generality if the taxed good is weakly normal, since 
then there is at most one conjectured income that satisfies the true budget constraint. 
10 In the appendix, we generalize this result with a description of properties of the choice set and preferences.  The 
key idea is still that there is an open and convex set containing all the bundles strictly preferred to 𝒒(𝑝, 𝑝𝑁𝑇 , 𝜏,𝑊). 
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Figure 1.1 
 
Figure 1.1: Consumer’s decision under limited attention in Gabaix’s model.   The solid line represents the 
consumer’s real budget constraint.   For any chosen point 𝑐𝑠 on a convex indifference curve, one can always find a 
supporting hyperplane, represented by the dotted line, that rationalizes the point as a budget line.  Source for 
image:  Gabaix (2014). 
 
Proposition 1: Suppose we can extend 𝑢 to ℝ2 such that 𝑢 is continuous and quasi-concave.  
Then for any ?̅?, 𝑝𝑁𝑇, 𝜏, and 𝑊 on which 𝒒 is defined, there exist scalar values 𝑝𝑠 and 𝑊𝑠 such 
that: 
𝒒(𝑝, 𝑝𝑁𝑇 , 𝜏,𝑊) ∈ argmax
𝑝𝑠𝑞+𝑝𝑁𝑇𝑞𝑁𝑇≤𝑊𝑠
𝑢(𝑞, 𝑞𝑁𝑇) 
(?̅? + 𝜏, 𝑝𝑁𝑇) ∗ 𝒒(𝑝, 𝑝𝑁𝑇, 𝜏, 𝑊) = 𝑊 
The proof idea is that the set of points {𝒒′ ∈ ℝ2| 𝑢(𝒒′) > 𝑢(𝒒(𝑝, 𝑝𝑁𝑇, 𝜏, 𝑊))} is open 
and convex.  Since it’s convex, there is a budget line separating it from 𝒒(𝑝, 𝑝𝑁𝑇, 𝜏, 𝑊).  Since it is 
open, that set can never touch this budget line.  Finally, we can always shift the budget line down if need 
be so that it goes through the point 𝒒(𝑝, 𝑝𝑁𝑇 , 𝜏,𝑊).   
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Note that proposition 1 does not rule out alternate explanations for consumer behavior.  
For instance, Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) have a model in which 𝑊𝑠 = 𝑊.  The consumer 
first buys the taxed good knowing the available total income, then re-optimizes upon 
discovering how little income remains after purchasing the taxed good.  Instead, the 
proposition notes that any such model satisfying minimal conditions is observationally 
equivalent to the Gabaix model.  Intuitively, the model states that the agent doesn't notice 
some fraction of the tax-inclusive price, instead simply figuring that the extra amount spent on 
the taxed good was never in the bank in the first place.  This story may appear unlikely, but one 
need not take it literally.  Instead, it is a representation of consumer behavior from a general 
model.  Still, the intuition helps us understand our characterization of the compensating 
variation due to the tax.  In the following proposition, we introduce terminology with some 
arguments suppressed for ease of reference. 
Proposition 2: Let 𝑒(𝑝) and ℎ(𝑝) respectively denote the expenditure and compensated 
demand functions for the taxed good at price 𝑝 for the taxed good and price 𝑝𝑁𝑇  for the other 
good, so that the agent is minimally compensated to achieve utility of a least 
𝑢(𝒒(𝑝, 𝑝𝑁𝑇, 0, 𝑊)).11  Then compensating variation due to the tax satisfies: 
Δ𝐶𝑆 = (?̅? + 𝜏 − 𝑝𝑠) 𝑞(?̅?, 𝑝𝑁𝑇 , 𝜏,𝑊 + Δ𝐶𝑆) + 𝑒(𝑝𝑠) − 𝑒(?̅?) (1) 
where 𝑝𝑠  is a Gabaix representation of the perceived price with the tax.12 
Proof: Letting 𝑊𝑠 denote a Gabaix representation of conjectured wealth when facing tax 𝜏, 
local non-satiation of preferences implies that: 
                                                          
11 Formally, 𝑒(𝑝) ≡ min{𝑊′| 𝑢(𝑑(𝑝, 𝑝𝑁𝑇 ,𝑊′), 𝑑𝑁𝑇(𝑝, 𝑝𝑁𝑇 ,𝑊)) ≥ 𝑢(𝒒(𝑝, 𝑝𝑁𝑇 , 0,𝑊))}, which is well-defined 
because 𝑢 is continuous and the choice set is compact. 
12 The same choice model may have multiple Gabaix representations, particularly if the taxed good is inferior. 
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(𝑝𝑠, ?̅?𝑁𝑇) ∗ 𝒒(?̅?, 𝑝𝑁𝑇 , 𝜏,𝑊 + Δ𝐶𝑆) = 𝑊𝑠 = 𝑒(𝑝𝑠) 
In words, total perceived expenditures equal perceived wealth, which must be exactly the 
wealth the agent would need under perceived prices to achieve the utility from before the tax.  
Plugging in and using the fact that ℎ(𝑝𝑠) = 𝑞(?̅?, 𝑝𝑁𝑇 , 𝜏,𝑊 + Δ𝐶𝑆) yields: 
(?̅? + 𝜏 − 𝑝𝑠) 𝑞(?̅?, 𝑝𝑁𝑇 , 𝜏,𝑊 + Δ𝐶𝑆) = [(?̅? + 𝜏, 𝑝𝑁𝑇) − (𝑝𝑠, 𝑝𝑁𝑇)] ∗ 𝒒(?̅?, 𝜏,𝑊 + Δ𝐶𝑆) 
(?̅? + 𝜏 − 𝑝𝑠) 𝑞(?̅?, 𝑝𝑁𝑇 , 𝜏,𝑊 + Δ𝐶𝑆) = 𝑊 + Δ𝐶𝑆 − 𝑒(𝑝𝑠) 
Rearranging and again using local non-satiation yields: 
Δ𝐶𝑆 = 𝑒(𝑝𝑠) − 𝑊 + (?̅? + 𝜏 − 𝑝𝑠)ℎ(𝑝𝑠) =  𝑒(𝑝𝑠) − 𝑒(?̅?) + (?̅? + 𝜏 − 𝑝𝑠)ℎ(𝑝𝑠)        ∎ 
This result has a natural interpretation.  The difference in expenditure functions 𝑒(𝑝𝑠) − 𝑒(?̅?) 
represents the amount the consumer would have to be compensated if the tax-inclusive price 
were actually 𝑝𝑠.  But instead, the agent is paying an extra (?̅? + 𝜏 − 𝑝𝑠) per unit of the taxed 
good consumed, and so must be compensated for that “lost” income.  Furthermore, we can 
define ℎ(𝑝) as the compensated demand with income 𝑒(𝑝).  The expenditure function is 
concave, and so has well-defined derivatives almost everywhere.  By Shephard’s Lemma, these 
derivatives are Hicksian demand.  By the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus: 
𝑒(𝑝𝑠) − 𝑒(?̅?) = ∫ ℎ(𝑝)𝑑𝑝
𝑝𝑠
?̅?
 
Thus, if ℎ(𝑝𝑠) is well-defined, we can express the change in consumer surplus as: 
Δ𝐶𝑆 = [?̅? + 𝜏 − 𝑝𝑠] ∗  ℎ(𝑝𝑠) + ∫ ℎ(𝑝)𝑑𝑝
𝑝𝑠
?̅?
(2) 
 From the representation of deadweight loss, we can immediately derive a couple of 
insights.  First, suppose for a moment that 𝜏 > 0 and 𝑝𝑠 ∈ [?̅?, ?̅? + 𝜏], so that the agent does not 
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fully notice the increase in the tax-inclusive price.  We can then confirm that the non-salience of 
the tax weakly exacerbates the loss of consumer surplus: 
Δ𝐶𝑆 = [?̅? + 𝜏 − 𝑝𝑠] ∗ ℎ(𝑝𝑠) + ∫ ℎ(𝑝)𝑑𝑝
𝑝𝑠
?̅?
≥ ∫ ℎ(𝑝)𝑑𝑝
?̅?+𝜏
𝑝𝑠
+ ∫ ℎ(𝑝)𝑑𝑝
𝑝𝑠
?̅?
= ∫ ℎ(𝑝)𝑑𝑝
?̅?+𝜏
?̅?
 
This reflects the fact that consumers only partially respond to the tax.  If they completely 
understood how the tax was affected the tax-inclusive price, they would protect themselves 
from this tax burden by reducing consumption of the taxed good.  As they fail to fully account 
for the tax, they end up worse off. 
 Second, empirical work often uses linear demand functions.  We will also consider linear 
choice functions in section 3.  As in the standard decision-making model, the calculation of the 
change in consumer surplus calculated using sticker price and tax derivatives naively as if the 
choice function were linear in these arguments is a second order approximation to the true 
change in consumer surplus.  We now demonstrate this claim formally.  
 Assume that ℎ is continuously differentiable with respect to its own price.  Assume 𝑝𝑠 is 
continuously differentiable with respect to 𝜏, so that we can define 𝑚 ≡
𝜕𝑝𝑠
𝜕𝜏
|(?̅?,0).
13  Taking a 
second order approximation around 𝜏 = 0 then yields:14 
Δ𝐶𝑆 ≈ ℎ(?̅?) 𝜏 + [(1 − 𝑚)𝑚 
𝜕ℎ
𝜕𝑝
|?̅? + 𝑚 
𝜕ℎ
𝜕𝑝
|?̅?] 𝜏
2/2 
                                                          
13 Formally, the claim is that there is a Gabaix representation that has well-defined 
𝜕𝑝𝑠
𝜕𝜏
 for a neighborhood of tax 
rates around zero, where the derivative is taken while the consumer is being compensated.  If 
𝜕ℎ
𝜕𝑝
(?̅?) ≠ 0, then the 
Inverse Function Theorem implies that 
𝜕𝑝𝑠
𝜕𝜏
=
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝜏
+
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑊
𝜕Δ𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝜏
𝜕ℎ
𝜕𝑝
.  If 
𝜕ℎ
𝜕𝑝
= 0 in a neighborhood around ?̅?, then 
𝜕𝑝𝑠
𝜕𝜏
|𝜏=0 = 0 
and 
𝜕Δ𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝜏
= −
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝜏
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑊
. 
14 This derivation appears to generalize proposition 22 from Gabaix (2014). 
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Figure 1.2 
 
Figure 1.2: Welfare effects from the imposition of a non-salient tax. 
 
Rearranging yields: 
Δ𝐶𝑆 ≈ [ℎ(?̅?) 𝜏 + (𝑚 
𝜕ℎ
𝜕𝑝
|?̅?) 𝜏
2/2] + (1 − 𝑚)𝑚 
𝜕ℎ
𝜕𝑝
|?̅? 𝜏
2/2 
 The first term in this calculation, ℎ(?̅?) 𝜏 + (𝑚 
𝜕ℎ
𝜕𝑝
|?̅?)
𝜏2
2
, is the change in consumer 
surplus one would naively expect from using tax (compensated) responsiveness as if the agent 
were fully attentive to the tax.  But this evaluation does not account for the discrepancy 
between the tax rate and the true marginal value of the good to the consumer.  The second 
term, (1 − 𝑚)𝑚 
𝜕ℎ
𝜕𝑝
|?̅?
𝜏2
2
, reflects how the agent effectively loses income to the lump-sum 
portion of the tax (p̅  + τ − ps), so that further increasing the tax motivates the consumer to 
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reduce consumption and so mitigate the income lost to non-salient taxation.  More formally, 
note that the amount of income the agent loses to the tax without noticing is: 
(1 − 𝑚) 𝑞𝑠 𝜏 
When the tax marginally increases from zero, it causes demand to decrease marginally by 𝑚 
𝜕ℎ
𝜕𝑝
.  
Integrating (1 − 𝑚)𝑚 
𝜕ℎ
𝜕𝑝
 𝜏 from zero to 𝜏 yields the term (1 − 𝑚)𝑚 
𝜕ℎ
𝜕𝑝
𝜏2
2
 (when ignoring the 
curvature of Hicksian demand as in the second order approximation).  Thus, the second term is 
an approximation around 𝜏 = 0 of the income no longer “misplaced” due to the tax.  It is an 
internality in that it is a benefit to the consumer for which the consumer does not account.  This 
measure of the internality is generically substantial.  In fact, it can overwhelm the direct harm 
from the tax at the margin.  If the non-salient tax is already sufficiently large, then it is possible 
for a marginal increase in the tax to increase consumer welfare, as illustrated in Figure 3.15 
 To see this result formally, suppose for a moment that demand 𝑑 were linear and 
without income effects.  Still suppressing the price of the other good, the loss of consumer 
surplus is then: 
Δ𝐶𝑆 = 𝑑(?̅?,𝑊) 𝜏 + 𝑚 
𝜕𝑑
𝜕𝑝
𝜏2
2
+ (1 − 𝑚) 𝑚 
𝜕𝑑
𝜕𝑝
𝜏2
2
 
The rate of change of the loss of consumer surplus is: 
𝜕Δ𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝜏
= 𝑑(?̅?,𝑊) + 𝑚 
𝜕𝑑
𝜕𝑝
 𝜏 + (1 − 𝑚) 𝑚 
𝜕𝑑
𝜕𝑝
 𝜏 
 
                                                          
15 It may appear strange that we were previously discussing a second order approximation around 𝜏 = 0, but now 
discuss tax changes “sufficiently large”.  The possibility of a further tax increase benefitting a consumer holds 
without reference to any functional form, but we need not refer to second order approximations if 𝑞 is linear with 
respect to ?̅? and 𝜏. 
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Figure 1.3 
 
Figure 1.3: A higher tax improves consumer welfare.  The consumer is better off in (b) than (a) from the higher tax 
rate reducing consumption. 
 
Linear demand implies that quantity is positive whenever 𝑑(?̅?,𝑊) + 𝑚 
𝜕𝑑
𝜕𝜏
 𝜏 > 0.  So, from the 
Law of Demand and assuming 𝑚 ∈ (0,1): 
𝑑(?̅? + 𝑚𝜏,𝑊) = 0 ⇒
𝜕Δ𝐶𝑆
𝜕𝜏
< 0 
From continuity, we can conclude that the loss of consumer surplus decreases whenever the 
tax is sufficiently high such that consumption is sufficiently small (but positive).  In other words, 
once the tax is sufficiently large to make consumption sufficiently small, increasing the tax 
further benefits the consumer. 
 Given the potentially large and qualitatively important correction to welfare due to the 
internality from the tax, we do not recommend ignoring it.16  Instead, we calculate deadweight 
loss while accounting for this internality.  Deadweight loss from the tax is the difference 
                                                          
16 One might dismiss the internality as second-order.  But even with fully salient taxation, all efficiency loss is 
second-order. 
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between the income necessary to compensate the consumer from the tax and the revenue that 
would be raised from the tax (with the consumer compensated):17 
𝑑𝑤𝑙 ≡ Δ𝐶𝑆 − 𝜏 𝑞(?̅?, 𝑝𝑁𝑇 , 𝜏,𝑊 + Δ𝐶𝑆) = 𝑒(𝑝𝑠) − 𝑒(?̅?) − [𝑝𝑠 − ?̅?] 𝑞(?̅?, 𝑝𝑁𝑇 ,𝑊 + Δ𝐶𝑆) 
Note that one calculates deadweight loss as if with perceived tax 𝜏𝑠 ≡ 𝑝𝑠 − ?̅?.  With well-
defined and sufficiently smooth compensated demand: 
𝑑𝑤𝑙 = [𝑒(𝑝𝑠) − 𝑒(?̅?)] − [𝑝𝑠 − ?̅?] ℎ(𝑝𝑠) =  ∫ ℎ(𝑝)𝑑𝑝
𝑝𝑠
?̅?
− [𝑝𝑠 − ?̅?] ℎ(𝑝𝑠) (3) 
Taking a second order approximation around 𝑝𝑠 = ?̅? yields: 
𝑑𝑤𝑙 ≈ −
1
2
𝑚2  
𝜕ℎ
𝜕𝑝
 𝜏2 
2.3 Aggregate Deadweight Loss from a Non-Salient Tax 
In this subsection, we derive aggregate deadweight loss and discuss some of its 
properties.  Our principle message in this subsection is that, in a model of misperceived prices, 
different joint distributions of perceived prices and preferences can yield the same aggregate 
demand but result in extremely different deadweight loss.   
We start with a generic environment with a non-taxed good, priced at 𝑝𝑁𝑇, and a taxed 
good, with sticker price ?̅? and a (per-unit) tax 𝜏.  Let 𝑖 ∈ ℐ index consumers.  Each consumer is 
characterized by her perception of the price of the taxed good 𝑝𝑖
𝑠 and type 𝜃𝑖  for preferences 
≽𝜃𝑖  & income 𝑊𝜃𝑖.  In addition, consumers have tie-breaking parameters 𝜁𝑖, the importance of 
which we clarify momentarily.  The consumer-specific parameters have joint distribution 𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁
∗ .  
Each agent has a choice function for the taxed good, satisfying: 
                                                          
17 We maintain the convention that deadweight loss is generically positive. 
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𝑞(?̅?, 𝑝𝑁𝑇 , 𝜏,𝑊𝜃𝑖; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) ∈ 𝒬𝑝𝑖
𝑆,𝜃𝑖
≡ {
𝑞| ∃  𝑞𝑁𝑇 ∈  𝑋𝑁𝑇: 𝑝𝑖
𝑠  ∗  𝑞 +  𝑝𝑁𝑇  ∗  𝑞𝑁𝑇 ≤ 𝑊𝑖
𝑠 ,
     (𝑞, 𝑞𝑁𝑇) ≽𝜃𝑖 𝒒
′ ∀ 𝒒′ ∈  𝑋: (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝑝𝑁𝑇)  ∗ 𝒒′ ≤ 𝑊𝑠
} 
where 𝑊𝑖
𝑠  is endogenously determined as in the Gabaix model, with corresponding 
expenditure function 𝑒(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖). 
 The parameter 𝜁𝑖  breaks ties among bundles that could have been chosen: choices do 
not necessarily reflect true preferences when agents misperceive prices, and agents might 
appear indifferent between choices that do not yield the same (ex-post) utility.  This sharply 
differs from the neo-classical model, in which the actual choice that one selects among 
indifferent bundles has no impact on consumer surplus.   
 For example, suppose agents face the problem of spending a fixed income 𝑊 > 2 on a 
binary taxed good 𝑞 ∈ {0,1}, with a sticker price ?̅? = 1 & a tax of 𝜏 = 1, and a non-taxed good 
𝑞𝑁𝑇 ∈ ℝ+, priced at 𝑝
𝑁𝑇 = 1.  There are two types of agents.  Half of agents maximize 
utility 𝑢1(𝒒) = 𝑞 + 𝑞
𝑁𝑇, and perceive 𝑝1
𝑠 = 1, so they fail to see the tax and are indifferent 
about buying 𝑞 both before and after the imposition of the tax.  The other half maximize 
𝑢2(𝒒) = 2𝑞 + 𝑞
𝑁𝑇, and 𝑝2
𝑠 = 2, so agents of type 2 perfectly notice the tax, are indifferent to 
buying the good after the tax, and always buy 𝑞 without the tax.   
 Let us suppose for concreteness that everyone buys 𝑞 before the tax is imposed.18  
Consider two possible scenarios occurring after the imposition of the tax.  In the first scenario 
all agents of type 1 buy 𝑞 and no agents of type 2 buy 𝑞.  In the second scenario, no agents of 
type 1 buy 𝑞 and all agents of type 2 buy 𝑞.  We work out the details in the appendix, but we 
summarize results for aggregate deadweight loss in table (1), so that one can check that  
                                                          
18 The punchline of this example does not depend on this assumption, as either way consumers of type one obtain 
utility 𝑊 before the tax is imposed. 
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Table 1 
 Type 𝑞 pre-tax 𝒒 post-tax 𝑊𝑠 post-
tax 
Δ𝐶𝑆 Tax Revenue Total 
DWL 
Scenario 
1 
Type 1 (1,𝑊 − 1) (1,𝑊 − 2) 𝑊 − 1 1 1 0.5 
Type 2 (1,𝑊 − 1) (0,𝑊) 𝑊 1 0 
Scenario 
2 
Type 1 (1,𝑊 − 1) (0,𝑊) 𝑊 0 0 0 
Type 2 (1,𝑊 − 1) (1,𝑊 − 2) 𝑊 1 1 
Table 1: Compensating variation and tax revenue for each type in each scenario.  Total deadweight loss is the 
weighted average of compensating variation in excess of tax revenue. 
 
deadweight loss will differ depending on the final choices of agents who are “indifferent”.  This 
is because when agents misperceive prices, they can appear indifferent between choices that 
they value differently: in the example, agents of type 1 are happier when they don’t buy the 
good (as if they perceived the tax), but in the model their final choice depends on whether they 
either conjecture an income 𝑊1
𝑠 = 𝑊 while choosing 𝒒 = (0,𝑊) or conjecture 𝑊1
𝑠 = 𝑊 −
1 while choosing 𝒒 = (1,𝑊 − 2).  Which choice they make is governed by the parameter 𝜁𝑖. 
 Note that, although the Gabaix model does differ from the neoclassical consumption 
model in several ways, the introduction of this notation does not challenge our intuitive 
understanding of compensated demand.  Consider for instance two values 𝑙 and ℎ such that for 
any 𝑝𝑖
𝑠 and 𝜃𝑖: 
[𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑙), 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , ℎ)] ⊇ 𝒬𝑝𝑖
𝑆,𝜃𝑖
 
So 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑙) and 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , ℎ) are the smallest and largest amounts, respectively, of the taxed 
good that the agent could choose to consume.  With that in mind, lemma 1 shows that the Law 
of Compensated Demand holds in this framework. 
Lemma 1: For any agent 𝑖 with type 𝜃𝑖  and any two prices 𝑝 and 𝑝
′: 
𝑝 < 𝑝′ ⇒ 𝑞(𝑝′; 𝜃𝑖 , ℎ) ≤ 𝑞(𝑝; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑙) 
We prove this result in the appendix. 
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 For the rest of this section, we assume well-defined and sufficiently smooth 
compensated demand so that 𝒬𝑝𝑖
𝑆,𝜃𝑖
 is always single-valued.  Suppressing 𝜁, deadweight loss 
with complete pass-through takes the form: 
𝐷𝑊𝐿 = ∫ [[𝑒(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖) − 𝑒(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖)] − (𝑝𝑖
𝑠 − ?̅?) 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖)]𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃
∗ (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖
 
In line with most analysis of deadweight loss, we can now consider a second-order 
approximation, which allows us to characterize our object of interest in terms of first 
derivatives: 
𝐷𝑊𝐿 ≈ −
1
2
∫ 𝑚𝑖
2 𝜕ℎ
𝜕𝑝
(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖) 𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃
∗ (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖
𝜏2 
Note that neither aggregate price responsiveness ∫
𝜕ℎ
𝜕𝑝
(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖) 𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃
∗ (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖)𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖
 nor aggregate 
tax responsiveness ∫ 𝑚𝑖
𝜕ℎ
𝜕𝑝
(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖) 𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃
∗ (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖)𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖
 are sufficient statistics for deadweight loss 
as a function of the tax rate.  This illustrates the challenge of calculating deadweight loss from 
observable data. 
 Finally, we wish to consider the impact on aggregate deadweight loss of allocative 
inefficiency.  So far, we have considered perfectly elastic supply, so that the post-tax sticker 
price remains unchanged at ?̅?.  In the case of an arbitrary differentiable aggregate supply 
function 𝑄𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦, deadweight loss has second order approximation:19 
𝐷𝑊𝐿 ≈ −
1
2
[
 
 
 
∫ 𝑚𝑖
2  
𝜕ℎ
𝜕𝑝
|(?̅?;𝜃𝑖) −
(∫ 𝑚𝑖  
𝜕ℎ
𝜕𝑝 |(?̅?;𝜃𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑚,𝜃𝑚𝑖,𝜃𝑖
)
2
∫  
𝜕ℎ
𝜕𝑝 |(?̅?;𝜃𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑚,𝜃𝑚𝑖,𝜃𝑖
− 
𝜕𝑄𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦
𝜕𝑝
𝑚𝑖,𝜃𝑖
]
 
 
 
𝜏2 
                                                          
19 We formally demonstrate this result with a finite population in the appendix.  To make this result general, one 
need only assume that the price derivative of compensated demand is uniformly bounded on the support 
of (𝑝𝑠, 𝜃). 
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 The additional term from incomplete pass-through is entirely determined by aggregate 
(compensated) tax responsiveness, aggregate (compensated) price responsiveness, and 
aggregate price responsiveness of supply.  So, with appropriate aggregate data, the problem of 
calculating deadweight loss in a general setting reduces to the problem of calculating 
deadweight loss with complete pass-through.  This motivates our principal concern with 
determining deadweight loss from observable data while assuming complete pass-through. 
 However, consider for a moment the case of perfectly inelastic supply, i.e. 
𝜕𝑄𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦
𝜕𝑝
= 0.  
Then: 
𝐷𝑊𝐿 ≈ −
1
2
[
 
 
 
∫ 𝑚𝑖
2  
𝜕ℎ
𝜕𝑝
|(?̅?;𝜃𝑖) −
(∫ 𝑚𝑖  
𝜕ℎ
𝜕𝑝 |(?̅?;𝜃𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑚,𝜃𝑚𝑖,𝜃𝑖
)
2
∫  
𝜕ℎ
𝜕𝑝 |(?̅?;𝜃𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑚,𝜃𝑚𝑖,𝜃𝑖
𝑚𝑖,𝜃𝑖
]
 
 
 
≥ 0 
Note that deadweight loss is zero when 𝑚𝑖 = 𝑚 ∀𝑖.
20  The imposition of the tax forces the 
sticker price to decrease so that aggregate consumption remains constant.  If there is 
heterogeneity in attention, then different consumers perceive different prices even while facing 
the same tax.  Some agents perceive a higher price due to the tax, while others perceive a 
lower price as a result.   Those who perceive a higher price reduce their consumption, with that 
foregone consumption going to those perceiving a lower price.  This creates allocative 
inefficiency, as units of the good are not necessarily going in the hands of the people who value 
them the most.21 
                                                          
20 Technically, the previous expression only shows that the second order approximation for deadweight loss is zero 
in the case of homogeneous attention with perfectly inelastic supply.  We demonstrate in the appendix that 
deadweight loss is precisely zero in this case. 
21 While we believe this result to be novel as it pertains to our model, we credit Taubinsky and Rees-Jones 
(forthcoming) for the insight that taxation still generically yields allocative inefficiency even when supply is 
perfectly inelastic. 
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 Now that we have looked at how deadweight loss works in aggregate when taxes are 
misperceived, we next tackle the problem of identifying it with data. Section 3 deals with 
identification in the case where the econometrician can only observe aggregate demand across 
markets; we will find that while point-identification is impossible, one can still bound 
deadweight loss. In section 4 we instead deal with the case where the econometrician can 
observe demand across individuals and discuss under which assumptions one might be able to 
point-identify deadweight loss. 
3. Non-Identification with Aggregate Continuous Choice Data 
This section discusses to what degree one can infer deadweight loss from aggregate 
choice data.  Most of the results from this section apply generally.  For simplicity, we will 
assume that the econometrician has already determined the distribution of preference types.  
In this case, the econometrician can provide a lower bound for deadweight loss by assuming 
that all agents perceive the same tax-inclusive price, i.e. assume there is no attention 
heterogeneity.  Alternatively, one can derive an upper bound for deadweight loss by supposing 
maximal attention heterogeneity.  Since the data do not reveal the variance in tax salience, one 
cannot point identify deadweight loss from aggregate data.22  When the consumption function 
is linear in the sticker price and tax rate, deadweight loss can take on any value between the 
upper and lower bounds.  The results in this section are described as if all agents face the same 
sales tax, but none of our results depend on that assumption. 
Since we are considering the problem of identification with aggregate demand, we 
assume there are no income effects.  This is because even the standard model requires strong 
                                                          
22 This claim holds generically, with an exception if the tax does not alter aggregate consumption. 
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restrictions on income effects to achieve identification with aggregate data.  Suppressing 
income and price for the non-taxed good, we denote the consumption function for agent 𝑖 with 
type 𝜃𝑖  and perceived tax-inclusive price 𝑝𝑖
𝑠 for the taxed good by 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖).
23  To ensure 
integrability, we assume the econometrician knows that 𝐹𝑝𝑠
∗  has support bounded above zero, 
and so only considers marginal distributions of subjective prices bounded above zero.  The 
econometrician observes aggregate demand: 
∫ 𝑞 (𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁
∗  (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
  
Deadweight loss for an individual 𝑖 is a function of their expenditure function 𝑒(𝑝) and prices 
via: 
𝑑𝑤𝑙(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) = 𝑒(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖) − 𝑒(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖) − [𝑝𝑖
𝑠 − ?̅?] 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) 
We are interested in aggregate deadweight loss: 
𝐷𝑊𝐿 ≡ ∫ 𝑑𝑤𝑙 (𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁
∗  (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
  
The problem of identification is to find conditions for which any joint distribution 𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁  of 
(𝑝𝑠, 𝜃, 𝜁) satisfying these conditions (as a function of observable variables) such that: 
∫ 𝑞 (𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) 𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁  (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖 𝜁𝑖
  = ∫ 𝑞 (𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁
∗  (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
  
yields the same value for deadweight loss: 
∫ 𝑑𝑤𝑙 (𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁  (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
= 𝐷𝑊𝐿 
                                                          
23All results follow if one reinterprets 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) as the compensated choice of agent 𝑖. 
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The main message of this section will be the failure of such a result to obtain under plausible 
restrictions arising from aggregate data alone.   
 We will use the following lemma to derive bounds on the possible values of deadweight 
loss: 
Lemma 2: For any agent 𝑖 with type 𝜃𝑖  and any two pairs (𝑝, 𝜁𝑖) & (𝑝
′, 𝜁𝑖
′): 
𝑑𝑤𝑙(𝑝′; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖
′) ≥ 𝑑𝑤𝑙(𝑝; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) − [𝑝 − ?̅?] ∗ [𝑞(𝑝
′; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖
′) − 𝑞(𝑝; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)] 
This lemma comes entirely from the compensated law of demand (CLD), and can be confirmed 
with a simple graph, as we show in figure 1.4.   This lemma indicates the convexity of 
deadweight loss with respect to the perceived price. 
Proof: Note from the definition of the expenditure function and optimal compensated 
consumption vectors 𝒒 and 𝒒′ for price vectors (𝑝, 𝑝𝑁𝑇) and (𝑝′, 𝑝𝑁𝑇) respectively: 
𝑒(𝑝′) − 𝑒(𝑝) = (𝑝′, 𝑝𝑁𝑇) ∗ 𝒒′ − (𝑝, 𝑝𝑁𝑇) ∗ 𝒒 ≥ (𝑝′, 𝑝𝑁𝑇) ∗ 𝒒′ − (𝑝, 𝑝𝑁𝑇) ∗ 𝒒′
= [𝑝′ − 𝑝] ∗ 𝑞(𝑝′; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖
′) 
Plugging in yields: 
𝑑𝑤𝑙(𝑝′; 𝜃𝑖) = [𝑒(𝑝
′) − 𝑒(?̅?)] − [𝑝′ − ?̅?] ∗ 𝑞(𝑝′; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖
′)
= [𝑒(𝑝′) − 𝑒(𝑝)] + [𝑒(𝑝) − 𝑒(?̅?)] − [[𝑝′ − 𝑝] + [𝑝 − ?̅?]] ∗ 𝑞(𝑝′; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖
′)
≥ [𝑝′ − 𝑝] ∗ 𝑞(𝑝′; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖
′) + 𝑒(𝑝) − 𝑒(?̅?) − [[𝑝′ − 𝑝] + [𝑝 − ?̅?]] ∗ 𝑞(𝑝′; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖
′)
= 𝑒(𝑝) − 𝑒(?̅?) − [𝑝 − ?̅?] ∗ 𝑞(𝑝′; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖
′)
= 𝑑𝑤𝑙(𝑝) + [𝑝 − ?̅?] ∗ 𝑞(𝑝; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) − [𝑝 − ?̅?] ∗ 𝑞(𝑝
′; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖
′)
= 𝑑𝑤𝑙(𝑝; 𝜃𝑖) − [𝑝 − ?̅?] ∗ [𝑞(𝑝
′; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖
′) − 𝑞(𝑝; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)]        ∎ 
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Figure 1.4
 
Figure 1.4: A graphical illustration of lemma 2.  Since demand is weakly decreasing, dwl(p′) cannot be smaller 
than dwl(p) minus (plus) the orange rectangle. 
 
 Finally, we impose regularity conditions to rule out ill-defined integrals.  Formally, we 
insist that the econometrician only consider distributions that satisfy the integrability 
conditions, described below. 
Definition 1: A distribution 𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁  satisfies the integrability conditions if: 
1. 𝑞 and 𝑑𝑤𝑙 are integrable on any measurable set. 
2. 𝑞(𝑝; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑧) is integrable on any subset of the support of 𝜃 for any 𝑝 > 0 and any 𝑧 in the 
range of 𝜁. 
For instance, all distributions with support of (𝑝𝑠, 𝜃, 𝜁) on a finite set satisfy the above 
conditions. 
3.1 Lower Bound on Deadweight Loss 
Even though we cannot point identify deadweight loss with aggregate data, we can 
identify upper and lower bounds.  For the lower bound, consider arbitrary ?̅?, 𝑝𝑁𝑇, and 𝜏.  For 
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arbitrary 𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁  that could generate the data, we can choose a price ?̂?
𝑠 that could also 
rationalize the data if perceived by everyone. 
Proposition 3: For any 𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁  that yields integrable aggregate demand, there is a scalar ?̂?
𝑠 such 
that for some distribution 𝐹𝜃,𝜁
′  such that 𝐹𝜃
′ = 𝐹𝜃: 
∫ 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
= ∫ 𝑞(?̂?𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝜃,𝜁
′ (𝜃𝑖, 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜁𝑖
 
We can always rationalize the data with a joint distribution of (𝑝𝑠, 𝜃) in which 𝜃 has 
marginal distribution 𝐹𝜃
∗, whereas 𝑝𝑠 = ?̂?𝑠 with probability one.  We now show that such a joint 
distribution provides a (generic) underestimate to the possible values of deadweight loss. 
 
Theorem 1: Consider any joint distributions 𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁  and 𝐹𝜃,𝜁  with corresponding value ?̂?
𝑠 such 
that: 
∫ 𝑞(?̂?𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝜃,𝜁(𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜁𝑖
= ∫ 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
(4) 
Then the following inequality obtains: 
∫ 𝑑𝑤𝑙(?̂?𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝜃,𝜁(𝜃𝑖, 𝜁𝑖)
𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
≤ ∫ 𝑑𝑤𝑙(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
 
 
The intuition behind this result is that introducing heterogeneity in perceived prices 
facilitates gains from trade by having agents trade with each other after making their 
consumption decisions.  If one person perceives a higher price than another, then the two 
agents will have different marginal valuations of the good.  If they could exchange with each 
other, the one who perceived the higher price could purchase some of the good from the other  
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Figure 1.5
 
Figure 1.5: A graphical illustration of Theorem 1.  When one picks ?̂?𝑠 as to make the change in demand equal for 
the consumer in (a) and in (b), the (orange) decrease in 𝑑𝑤𝑙  for the consumer in (a) must be at least as large as the 
(green) increase in 𝑑𝑤𝑙 for the consumer in (b). 
 
agent, making both agents better off.  Thus, ruling out perceived price heterogeneity eliminates 
the possibility of an allocative inefficiency. 
Proof: From lemma 2: 
∫ [𝑑𝑤𝑙(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) + [?̂?
𝑠 − ?̅?] ∗ 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)] 𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁  (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
≥ ∫ [𝑑𝑤𝑙(?̂?𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) + [?̂?
𝑠 − ?̅?] ∗ 𝑞(?̂?𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)] 𝑑𝐹𝜃,𝜁  (𝜃𝑖, 𝜁𝑖)
𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
 
But note from the rationalizability of the data that: 
[?̂?𝑠 − ?̅?]∫ 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) 𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁  (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
= [?̂?𝑠 − ?̅?] ∫ 𝑞(?̂?𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) 𝑑𝐹𝜃,𝜁  (𝜃𝑖, 𝜁𝑖)
𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
 
Thus, we can conclude that: 
∫ 𝑑𝑤𝑙(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
≥ ∫ 𝑑𝑤𝑙(?̂?𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝜃,𝜁(𝜃𝑖, 𝜁𝑖)
𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
      ∎ 
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Theorem 1 points out that, for any distribution that rationalizes the data, one can 
alternatively rationalize the data with a homogeneous perceived price that yields(weakly) less 
deadweight loss.  From this, we can make two conclusions.  One, we generally cannot identify 
deadweight loss because we could always alternatively rationalize the data with a 
homogeneous perceived price.24  This holds even if we already knew the distribution of 
preference types 𝐹𝜃
∗.  Two, if there is a minimum value of deadweight loss that is consistent 
with the data, that value of deadweight loss comes from a distribution with no heterogeneity in 
tax salience.25  
3.2 Upper Bound on Deadweight Loss 
Supposing that the tax rate 𝜏 is positive, the upper bound comes from an assumption on 
the limits to tax salience: 
Assumption 1: There is some known value ?̅? ≥ 0 such that 𝐹𝑝𝑠
∗  yields 𝑝𝑠 with support 
contained entirely in 𝒫 ≡ [?̅?, ?̅? + 𝑚𝜏]. 
This assumption, made by the econometrician, says that agents must perceive a non-
negative tax 𝜏𝑠  no greater than ?̅? times the true tax.  For instance, setting ?̅? = 1 would mean 
assuming that agents never over-react to the tax.  Imposing that 𝜏𝑠 ≥ 0 already ensures that 
deadweight loss is no greater than the original consumer surplus.26  But the interval restriction 
implies that any distribution yields no more deadweight loss than a distribution with “binary” 
perceived prices, i.e. where 𝑝𝑠 can only take on values in 𝜕𝒫 ≡ {?̅?, ?̅? + ?̅? 𝜏}. 
                                                          
24 This claim holds generically, but would not hold, for instance, if there was no heterogeneity in tax salience. 
25 The existence of this lower bound is via an argument analogous to that of the upper bound. 
26 This is because deadweight loss equals its calculation as if 𝜏𝑠 was the true tax rate.  One can show that, if 𝜏𝑠 has 
support on negative values, total deadweight loss can be substantially greater than the original total consumer 
surplus. 
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Before formally stating this result in Theorem 2, we show that one can always construct 
a binary distribution that rationalizes the data.  Consider any 𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁  that rationalizes the data.  
If 𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁  puts no mass on 𝑖𝑛𝑡(𝒫) ≡ (?̅?, ?̅? + ?̅? 𝜏), then the claim holds trivially.  We now 
consider only distributions such that: 
lim
𝑚→?̅?−
𝐹𝑝𝑠(?̅? + 𝑚 𝜏) − 𝐹𝑝𝑠(?̅?) > 0 (5) 
Pick 𝑝𝑠 ∈ 𝜕𝒫 and a corresponding 𝑝𝑏(𝑝𝑖
𝑠) ≡ ?̅? + 𝕀(𝑝𝑖
𝑠 > 𝑝𝑠) ?̅? 𝜏 such that: 
∫ 𝑞(𝑝𝑏(𝑝𝑖
𝑠); 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑙)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃(𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠∈𝑖𝑛𝑡(𝒫),𝜃𝑖
≤ ∫ 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁(𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠∈𝑖𝑛𝑡(𝒫),𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
≤ ∫ 𝑞(𝑝𝑏(𝑝𝑖
𝑠); 𝜃𝑖 , ℎ)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃(𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠∈𝑖𝑛𝑡(𝒫),𝜃𝑖
 (6)
 
In words, for any distribution that puts mass on 𝑖𝑛𝑡(𝒫), we pick a value 𝑝𝑠 that acts as a divide: 
people below it get assigned to a group that does not perceive the tax at all, while people 
above it get assigned to a group that perceives it ``maximally''. Since demand is monotonic in 𝑝, 
and given our definitions of 𝑙 and ℎ, one can always pick 𝑝𝑠 such that the above inequalities 
hold weakly. 
 Thus, it is always possible to find 𝜆 ∈ [0,1] such that: 
𝜆 ∫ 𝑞(𝑝𝑏(𝑝𝑖
𝑠); 𝜃𝑖 , ℎ)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃(𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠∈𝑖𝑛𝑡𝒫,𝜃𝑖
+ (1 − 𝜆) ∫ 𝑞(𝑝𝑏(𝑝𝑖
𝑠); 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑙)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃(𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠∈𝑖𝑛𝑡(𝒫),𝜃𝑖
𝑑
=  ∫ 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁(𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠∈𝑖𝑛𝑡(𝒫),𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
 
Now, define the alternative distribution 𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁
′′  so that 𝐹
𝑝𝑏(𝑝𝑠),𝜃
′′ = 𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃, 𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁|𝑝𝑠∈𝜕𝒫
′′ =
𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁|𝑝𝑠∈𝜕𝒫, and, conditional on 𝑝
𝑠 ∈ 𝑖𝑛𝑡(𝒫), 𝜁 = ℎ with probability 𝜆, 𝜁 = 𝑙 with probability 
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1 − 𝜆, and (𝑝𝑠, 𝜃) ⊥ 𝜁.  In words, we propose no change to the distribution of preference types 
and propose no change at all when perceived prices are at the extremes.  When perceived 
prices are interior, the tie-breaking parameter is then independent of perceived price and 
preference type.  Note that 𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁
′′  rationalizes the data when agents perceive subjective 
prices 𝑝𝑏(𝑝𝑖
𝑠): 
∫ 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) 𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁  (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
= ∫ 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) 𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁  (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠∈𝑖𝑛𝑡(𝒫),𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
+ ∫ 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) 𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁  (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠∈𝜕𝒫,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
= ∫ [𝜆𝑞(𝑝𝑏(𝑝𝑖
𝑠); 𝜃𝑖 , ℎ) + (1 − 𝜆) 𝑞(𝑝
𝑏(𝑝𝑖
𝑠); 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑙)] 𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁  (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠∈𝑖𝑛𝑡(𝒫),𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
+ ∫ 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) 𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁
′′  (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠∈𝜕𝒫,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
= ∫ 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) 𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁
′′  (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
 
Furthermore, this new distribution providers a generically larger value of deadweight loss than 
does 𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁. 
 
Theorem 2: Under assumption 1, for any 𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁  and any corresponding 𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁
′′  as described 
above: 
∫ 𝑑𝑤𝑙(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) 𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁
′′  (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
≥ ∫ 𝑑𝑤𝑙(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) 𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁  (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
 
32 
 
Figure 1.6
 
Figure 1.6: A graphical illustration of Theorem 2. The watershed price 𝑝𝑠 is chosen to make the change in demand 
equal for the consumer in (a) and in (b). Since we are dealing with weakly decreasing demand functions, the 
increase in deadweight loss for (a) is at least as big as the green box, while the decrease in deadweight loss for (b) 
is at most as big as the orange box. By assigning a perceived price of ?̅? + ?̅?𝜏 to the consumer in (a) and ?̅? to the 
consumer in (b), we have increased aggregate deadweight loss holding aggregate demand constant. 
 
 We can obtain intuition in two ways.  One is to note that the method of forcing binary 
perceived prices increases heterogeneity of perceived prices compared to 𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁.  Another is by 
considering the case where ?̅? = 1 and 𝐹𝜃
∗ is known to be degenerate, so that all agents have 
the same preferences.  For a given aggregate demand, deadweight loss is maximized under 
these preferences when some perceive price 𝑝𝑖
𝑠 = ?̅?, while others correctly perceived the true 
tax rate 𝑝𝑖
𝑠 = ?̅? + 𝜏.  This is because for each individual agent, deadweight loss is convex in the 
perceived price. Hence, for a given aggregate demand, aggregate deadweight loss will be 
highest when it is as high as possible for some -- namely, those who fully perceive the tax -- 
while it is null for everybody else -- as those who don't perceive the tax at all are effectively 
subject to a lump-sum tax. 
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 The proof follows closely the proof of theorem 1.  Since we are using two separate 
perceived prices, ?̅? and ?̅? + ?̅?𝜏, instead of just one, ?̂?𝑠, the algebra is a bit more involved, so 
we relegate the proof to the appendix.  Nonetheless, the idea if the proof uses lemma 2 to 
obtain the inequality: 
∫ 𝑑𝑤𝑙(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) 𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁
′′  (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
≥ ∫ 𝑑𝑤𝑙(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) 𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁  (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
− ∫ [𝑝𝑖
𝑠 − ?̃?𝑠] 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) 𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁
′′  (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
+ ∫ [𝑝𝑖
𝑠 − ?̃?𝑠] 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) 𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁  (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
 
Then, we use the CLD to show that the last two lines cancel out; because 𝑝𝑏(𝑝𝑖
𝑠) can have two 
separate outputs, this is a bit more involved than in the proof of Theorem 1. 
 Theorem 2 illustrates that, for any distribution of (𝑝𝑠, 𝜃) that rationalizes the data, we 
can alternatively rationalize the data with a distribution with support for 𝑝𝑠  on {?̅?, ?̅? + ?̅?𝜏} that 
yields (weakly) greater deadweight loss. Again, we see that identification of deadweight loss is 
not generally possible even if we knew the distribution of 𝐹𝜃
∗, as different marginal distributions 
of 𝑝𝑠 and 𝜁 could have different implications for deadweight loss.  Also, any upper bound to the 
possible values of deadweight loss must be generated from a distribution with support of 
perceived prices on {?̅?, ?̅? + ?̅?𝜏}. 
 However, not all distributions that have 𝑝𝑠 ∈ 𝜕𝒫 with probability one yield the same 
value of deadweight loss, even when rationalizing the same data with the same distribution of 
preference types. We demonstrate this point in our example in table 1.  Intuitively, in a model 
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of price misperception, people can be seemingly indifferent between several choices even 
when they ex-post would prefer some choices over others. This is because people might 
conjecture themselves different incomes, leading them to believe they can't afford their most 
preferred bundle. This implies that when several agents can make different choices based on 
their tie-breaking type 𝜁 alone, we can increase deadweight loss by transferring some 
consumption from people who value it more to people who value it less, holding aggregate 
demand constant. Given aggregate demand and knowledge of the distribution of 𝜃, one can 
always find the distribution of 𝑝𝑠 and 𝜁 that maximizes deadweight loss. 
 
Theorem 3: There exists values Δ ∈ [0, ?̅?𝜏] and 𝛾 ∈ [0,1] such that: 
∫ ?̃?Δ,γ(𝜃𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃
∗
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖
= ∫ 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁
∗ (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
 
where:27 
?̃?Δ,γ(𝜃𝑖) = [𝕀(
𝑑𝑤𝑙(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖, 𝑙)
𝑞(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖, ℎ) − 𝑞(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖, 𝑙)
> Δ) + 𝛾𝕀(
𝑑𝑤𝑙(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖, 𝑙)
𝑞(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖, ℎ) − 𝑞(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖, 𝑙)
= Δ)]  𝑞(?̅?
+ ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖, 𝑙)
+ [𝕀(
𝑑𝑤𝑙(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖, 𝑙)
𝑞(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖, ℎ) − 𝑞(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖, 𝑙)
< Δ)
+ (1 − 𝛾)𝕀 (
𝑑𝑤𝑙(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖, 𝑙)
𝑞(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖, ℎ) − 𝑞(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖, 𝑙)
= Δ)]  𝑞(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖, ℎ) 
Furthermore, under assumption 1, for any 𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁  that rationalizes the data such that 𝐹𝜃 = 𝐹𝜃
∗:28 
                                                          
27 Of course, if 𝑞(?̅?; 𝜃, ℎ) = 𝑞(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃, 𝑙), then ?̃?Δ,γ(𝜃𝑖) = 𝑞(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖, ℎ). 
28 The integrand on the left-hand side is zero for any 𝜃𝑖  such that 𝑞(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖 , ℎ) = 𝑞(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑙). 
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∫
?̃?Δ,γ(𝜃𝑖) − 𝑞(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖 , ℎ)
𝑞(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑙) − 𝑞(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖 , ℎ)
𝑑𝑤𝑙(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑙)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃
∗ (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖
≥ ∫ 𝑑𝑤𝑙(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) 𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁  (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
 
 
 In words, theorem 3 says that the maximal value of deadweight loss consistent with the 
data and knowledge of 𝐹𝜃
∗ is given by having all agents perceive the highest possible price when 
doing so yields more than (and fraction 𝛾 of those for whom it's equal to) a certain value of 
deadweight loss per quantity reduced from the perceived price increase due to the tax.  We 
have these same agents choose the lowest quantity consistent with their preferences and 
perceived budget, whereas we have the other agents choose the largest quantity consistent 
with their preferences and perceived budget. 
 We relegate this proof to the appendix, but the intuition is straightforward.  The 
econometrician observes the reduction in aggregate demand due to the tax.  In searching for 
the explanation of that reduction in demand that maximizes deadweight loss, one should assign 
the reduction in quantity demanded to those for whom that allocation yields the greatest 
deadweight loss.  Following this procedure, there is a cutoff value Δ which describes the 
amount of deadweight loss obtained relative to the reduction in quantity demanded sufficient 
to warrant the assignment of subjective tax-inclusive price 𝑝𝑖
𝑠 = ?̅? + ?̅?𝜏 to that agent. 
3.3 Linear Special Case 
We conclude this section with a discussion of the special case in which 𝑞 is known to be 
a linear function of ?̅? and 𝜏 (for fixed 𝑝𝑁𝑇).  We focus on this example both because of how 
frequently economists estimate linear models and because of its relationship to the second 
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order approximation of deadweight loss.  As demonstrated in section 2.3, one can express a 
second order approximation to deadweight loss as a function of derivatives.  In the case where 
the choice function is linear in regressors ?̅? & 𝜏, the second order approximation is an exact 
calculation of deadweight loss, and our results from the previous subsections apply. 
Formally, each preference type 𝜃𝑖  takes the form 𝜃𝑖 = (𝛽𝑖, 𝜖𝑖) ∈ ℝ
2.29  To maintain 
linearity in regressors, we also assume that tax salience 𝑚 is constant with respect to 𝜏.  The 
choice function 𝑞 then takes the form: 
𝑞𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑖
𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖[?̅? + 𝑚𝑖 𝜏𝑖] + 𝜖𝑖 
We are suppressing tie-breaking parameter 𝜁 because 𝜃𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖, 𝑚𝑖 , and 𝜏𝑖 always uniquely 
determine consumption.  We have parameter 𝛼 so that we can assume without loss of 
generality that 𝔼[𝜖] = 0.  Defining 𝛽𝑖 ≡ 𝑚𝑖𝛽𝑖 yields: 
𝑞𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖?̅? + 𝛽𝑖𝜏𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 
with corresponding deadweight loss per agent from equation (3): 
𝑑𝑤𝑙𝑖 = ∫ [𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖𝑝 + 𝜖𝑖]𝑑𝑝
𝑝𝑠
?̅?
− [𝑝𝑠 − ?̅?] ∗ [𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖𝑝
𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖] = ∫ (𝑝 − 𝑝
𝑠)𝛽𝑖𝑑𝑝
𝑝𝑠
?̅?
 
𝑑𝑤𝑙𝑖 =
1
2
[
𝑝𝑠2 − ?̅?2
2
− [𝑝𝑠 − ?̅?] ∗ 𝑝𝑠] 𝛽𝑖 =
1
2
[𝑝𝑠 − ?̅?] ∗ [(𝑝𝑠 + ?̅?) − 2𝑝𝑠]𝛽𝑖 = −
1
2
𝜏𝑠2𝛽𝑖 
𝑑𝑤𝑙𝑖 = −
1
2
𝑚𝑖
2𝛽𝑖𝜏
2 
We assume that the joint distribution of parameters remains unaffected by the specific values 
of ?̅? and 𝜏.  The econometrician observes for various values of regressors: 
                                                          
29 Agents have quasi-linear utility 𝑢𝑖 =
𝑞𝑖
2
2
 −(𝛼+𝜖𝑖) 𝑞𝑖
ℶ𝑖
+ 𝑞𝑖
𝑁𝑇.  For a given 𝑝𝑁𝑇 , we define 𝛽𝑖 ≡
ℶ𝑖
𝑝𝑁𝑇
, yielding utility 
representation 𝑈𝑖 =
𝑞𝑖
2
2
 −(𝛼+𝜖𝑖) 𝑞𝑖
𝛽𝑖
+ 𝑝𝑁𝑇𝑞𝑖
𝑁𝑇. 
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𝔼[𝑞|?̅?, 𝜏] ≡ ∫ [𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖?̅? + 𝛽𝑖𝜏 + 𝜖𝑖]𝑑𝐹𝛽,?̃?,𝜖
∗ (𝛽𝑖, 𝛽𝑖, 𝜖)
𝛽𝑖,?̃?𝑖,𝜖𝑖
= 𝛼 + 𝔼[𝛽]?̅? + 𝔼[?̃?]𝜏 (7) 
where 𝐹𝛽,?̃?,𝜖
∗  is the true distribution of (𝛽,𝑚𝛽, 𝜖).  The challenge is to use the observed values 
of triplets (?̅?, 𝜏, 𝔼[𝑞|?̅?, 𝜏]) to infer aggregate deadweight loss, which is equivalent to its second 
order approximation around 𝜏 = 0: 
𝐷𝑊𝐿 = −
1
2
∫ 𝑚𝑖
2𝛽𝑖𝑑𝐹𝛽,𝑚(𝛽𝑖, 𝑚𝑖)
𝛽𝑖,𝑚𝑖
𝜏2 = −
1
2
𝔼[𝑚2𝛽]𝜏2 = −
1
2
𝔼[𝑚 𝛽]𝜏2 
The only restriction that the econometrician imposes on the distribution of tax salience 𝑚 is 
that the support of tax salience is contained within the interval [0, ?̅?].30  The econometrician 
can also use the CLD as in lemma 1, so that ℙ[𝛽 ≤ 0] = 1.  In fact, we can permit the 
econometrician to know the entire distribution of 𝜃 = (𝛽, 𝜖).  It will not affect our results. 
 First, we can find a homogeneous perceived price that rationalizes the data for any 𝜏.  A 
linear regression of aggregate demand on sticker prices and taxes may permit identification 
of ?̂? ≡ 𝔼[𝛽] and ?̂? ≡ 𝔼[𝛽], respectively.31  We define a measure of central tendency of tax 
salience:32 
?̂? ≡
?̂?
?̂?
 
Then the homogeneous perceived price that rationalizes the data is ?̂?𝑠 = ?̅? + ?̂?𝜏.  To see this, 
note that assuming all agents have tax salience 𝑚𝑖 = ?̂? yields aggregate demand as in equation 
(7): 
                                                          
30 We assume that ?̅? is sufficiently small so that 𝑞𝑖 ≥ 0 with probability one, ruling out instances of negative 
consumption. 
31 Such identification requires exogenous & non-collinear variation in sticker prices & taxes.  If the econometrician 
cannot identify these terms, so much the worse for identifying aggregate deadweight loss. 
32 If ?̂? = 0, then let ?̂? = 0. 
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∫ [𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖?̂?
𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖]𝑑𝐹𝛽,𝜖
∗ (𝛽𝑖, 𝜖𝑖)
𝛽𝑖,𝜖𝑖
= 𝛼 + ?̅? ∫ 𝛽𝑖𝑑𝐹𝛽
∗(𝛽𝑖)
𝛽𝑖,𝜖𝑖
+ ?̂?𝜏 ∫ 𝛽𝑖𝑑𝐹𝛽
∗(𝛽𝑖)
𝛽𝑖
= 𝛼 + ?̂??̅? + ?̂??̂̃?𝜏
= 𝛼 + ?̂??̅? + ?̂?𝜏 
Thus, the agent cannot rule out all agents perceiving the same price ?̂?𝑠, and so cannot rule 
out 𝑚𝑖 = ?̂? ∀𝑖.  For tax 𝜏, this would yield deadweight loss, which by Theorem 1 would be a 
lower bound: 
𝐷𝑊𝐿𝑙𝑜𝑤 = −
1
2
?̂??̂?𝜏2 
 Alternatively, the econometrician cannot rule out the perceived tax 𝜏𝑠 having support 
in {0, ?̅?𝜏}.  To see this, consider ℙ(𝑝𝑠 = ?̅? + ?̅?𝜏) =
?̂?
?̅?
 and ℙ(𝑝𝑠 = ?̅?) = 1 −
?̂?
?̅?
 independently 
of other parameters and regressors.33  This will rationalize aggregate demand: 
∫ [𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖?̅? +
?̂?
?̅?
 𝛽𝑖?̅?𝜏𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖] 𝑑𝐹𝛽,𝜖(𝛽𝑖 , 𝜖𝑖)
𝛽𝑖,𝜖𝑖
= 𝛼 + 𝔼[𝛽]?̅? + ?̂?𝔼[𝛽]𝜏 
This yields deadweight loss for tax 𝜏: 
𝐷𝑊𝐿ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ = −
1
2
?̂?
?̅?
𝔼[𝛽]?̅?2𝜏2 = −
1
2
?̂??̂?𝜏2 = −
1
2
?̅??̂?𝜏2 
For instance, if ?̅? = 1, then the value of deadweight loss under a homogeneous perceived price 
is fraction ?̂? of the above calculation of deadweight loss. 
 Proceeding from Theorem 2 in the previous subsection, we noted that there is a specific 
distribution of perceived prices on {?̅?, ?̅? + ?̅?𝜏} that maximizes deadweight loss.  We describe 
that distribution in Theorem 3, noting that it involves assigning high or low perceived prices 
                                                          
33 In the true distribution, it must be that ?̂? ∈ [0, ?̅?].  Alternatively, one could check whether ?̂? ∈ [0, ?̅?] as a 
weak test of the null hypothesis that the tax salience is bounded within that interval. 
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based on the ratio of per-person deadweight loss to the change in consumption for that 
individual.  But in this context: 
𝑑𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑞𝑖(?̅?) − 𝑞𝑖(𝑝𝑠)
=
𝜏𝑠
2
 
Thus, the distribution of tax salience independent of all other parameters and regressors in 
which ℙ(𝑚 = ?̅?) =
?̂?
?̅?
 and ℙ(𝑚 = 0) = 1 −
?̂?
?̅?
 maximizes deadweight loss. More generally, the 
econometrician cannot rule out this maximal value of deadweight loss so long as they cannot 
rule out the possibility of some distribution 𝐹 with 𝐹𝛽 = 𝐹𝛽
∗ such that 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝(𝑚) ∈ {0, ?̅?} with: 
ℙ𝐹(𝑚 = ?̅?)𝔼𝐹[𝛽|𝑚 = ?̅?] = ?̂??̂? = ?̂? 
Mathematically, one can check that such a distribution rationalizes the data and yields the 
maximal value of deadweight loss: 
𝛼 + 𝔼[𝛽]?̅? + 𝔼𝐹[𝛽]𝜏 = 𝛼 + ?̂??̅? + ℙ𝐹(𝑚 = ?̅?)𝔼𝐹[𝛽|𝑚 = ?̅?] 𝜏 = 𝛼 + ?̂??̅? + ?̂?𝜏 
−
1
2
𝔼𝐹[𝑚
2𝛽] = −
1
2
ℙ𝐹(𝑚 = ?̅?)?̅?𝔼𝐹[𝛽|𝑚 = ?̅?] 𝜏
2 = −
1
2
?̅??̂?𝜏2 = 𝐷𝑊𝐿ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 
More intuitively, once one knows ?̂? and ?̂?, one can rationalize the aggregate data.  Since the 
ratio of deadweight loss to the change in quantity is constant, the relationship between tax 
salience and preference doesn’t matter upon attaining the observed aggregate demand. 
 Finally, consider a distribution with 𝑚 ⊥ (𝛽, 𝜖) with 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝(𝑚) ⊆ {0, ?̂?, ?̅?}, 
ℙ(𝑚 = ?̂?) = 𝜆 and ℙ(𝑚 = ?̂?|𝑚 ≠ ?̂?) =
?̂?
?̅?
.  Varying 𝜆 from zero to one yields: 
𝐷𝑊𝐿 ∈ [−
1
2
?̂??̂?𝜏2, −
1
2
?̅??̂̃?𝜏2] 
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We can conclude from this result that one cannot even identify a second order approximation 
of deadweight loss with aggregate data alone.34  Imposing structure on preferences to facilitate 
identification of 𝐹𝜃
∗ still only permits interval identification. Nonetheless, we can use aggregate 
data to obtain bounds, or at least ?̂?, which gives us a sense of the uncertainty over the possible 
values of deadweight loss. 
 We showcase such an application in section B of the appendix, based on data on 
aggregate beer consumption from CLK (2009).  We replicate the regressions they ran to 
estimate tax salience, but using a linear (rather than log-log) specification to match this 
subsection. Taking the ratio of averages across regressions of measures of aggregate demand 
responses to sales and excise tax variation, we estimate ?̂? ≈ 0.27.  This estimate suggests that 
for ?̅? ≥ 1, the upper bound of deadweight loss is more than four times the lower bound. 
4. Point Identification with Individual-Level Data 
The previous section established that attention heterogeneity prevents point 
identification of deadweight loss using aggregate data, even if we already know the distribution 
of preferences.  To facilitate identification, we require more granular data.35  If we use 
(repeated) cross-sectional data, we also require additional structure on tax salience or the 
consumption set.  Alternatively, we can use (long) panel data to identify deadweight loss 
without any structural assumptions. 
  
                                                          
34 One can identify a first order approximation trivially; it is zero. 
35 Technically, one could simply impose a distribution of 𝑝𝑠.  For instance, one could assume homogeneous 
perceived tax-inclusive prices.  We do not recommend this. 
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4.1 Cross-Sectional Data 
We maintain the linear structure on preferences, as well as the assumption that 𝑚 is 
constant with respect to 𝜏, as in section 3.3.  Formally: 
𝑞 = 𝛼 + 𝛽?̅? + 𝛽𝜏 + 𝜖 
Here 𝛼 is a constant whose identification we generally assume.36  The econometrician observes 
the distribution of 𝑞 conditional on (?̅?, 𝜏) for all values in 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝(?̅?, 𝜏).  The data comes from an 
underlying data-generating process, which we assume yields a well-defined and finite value for 
deadweight loss.  The data identifies expected deadweight loss from a (non-zero) tax 𝜏 if any 
underlying distributions of(𝛽, 𝛽, 𝜖) across the population consistent with the observed 
distribution of(?̅?, 𝜏) and conditional distributions of 𝑞 yield the same value of𝔼 [
?̃?2
𝛽
]. One 
approach is to identify the joint distribution of (𝛽, 𝛽) across individuals, then integrate to 
obtain the desired expected value.  To that end, we can use the following lemma from Masten 
(2017): 
Lemma 3: If 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝(?̅?, 𝜏) contains an open ball in ℝ2, then the joint distribution of (𝛽, 𝛽, 𝜖) is 
identified if and only if: 
1. The joint distribution of (𝛽, 𝛽, 𝜖) is determined by its moments. 
2. All absolute moments of (𝛽, 𝛽, 𝜖) are finite. 
Proof: Apply lemma 2 from Masten (2017).  ∎ 
                                                          
36 It is identified if the econometrician observes ?̅? = 𝜏 = 0 or non-collinear variation in ?̅? and 𝜏. 
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 It follows as an immediate corollary that the conditions of the lemma also identify 
deadweight loss, since one can integrate out the marginal distribution of (𝛽, 𝛽) and then 
calculate 𝔼 [
?̃?2
𝛽
].  The intuition is that one can find the moments of the random coefficients by 
running increasingly higher-order regressions of the form: 
𝔼[𝑞𝑖
𝑛|?̅?, 𝜏] = ⋯+ 𝔼[𝛽𝑛]?̅?𝑛 + ⋯+ 𝔼[𝛽𝑛]𝜏𝑛 + ⋯ 
The enumerated conditions are satisfied, for instance, when (𝛽, 𝛽) has finite support.  
However, one might want to be able to identify deadweight loss without making assumptions 
on the distribution of (𝛽, 𝛽), beyond assuming that 𝔼 [
?̃?2
𝛽
] is well-defined and finite.  The 
following theorem does not impose such assumptions, but does require unbounded support in 
regressors. 
 
Theorem 4: Suppose that for every pair (𝜆1, 𝜆2) ∈ (ℝ ∖ {0}) × ℝ, there is a 
sequence (?̅?𝑘, 𝜏𝑘)𝑘=1
∞  contained within the support of (?̅?, 𝜏) such that: 
1. lim
𝑘→∞
‖(?̅?𝑘, 𝜏𝑘)‖ = ∞ 
2. lim
𝑘→∞
𝜏𝑘
?̅?𝑘
=
𝜆2
𝜆1
 
In addition, suppose that there is another sequence (?̅?𝑘, 𝜏𝑘)𝑘=1
∞  contained within the support of 
(?̅?, 𝜏) such that: 
1. lim
𝑘→∞
|?̅?𝑘| < ∞ 
2. lim
𝑘→∞
𝜏𝑘 = ∞ 
Then 𝔼[𝑑𝑤𝑙𝑖] is identified. 
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 We make note of a special case in which these results apply.  Consider a binary choice 
problem, so that 𝑋𝑇 = {0,1}.  Each agent 𝑖 has quasi-linear utility 𝑢𝑖1 fro consuming the good, 
so that for tax-inclusive price 𝑝: 
𝑢𝑖1 = 𝜖𝑖 − 𝑝 
This is an expression of the agent's preference for the taxed good scaled so that an additional 
dollar yields one unit of utility.  We do not assume that 𝔼[𝜖] = 0.  However, we normalize 
utility in the absence of the taxed good to zero: 
𝑢𝑖0 = 0 
For a price increase from ?̅? to 𝑝𝑠, the change in the expenditure function is: 
𝑒(𝑝𝑠) − 𝑒(?̅?) = {
0, 𝜖𝑖 − ?̅? ≤ 0
𝜖𝑖 − ?̅?, 𝑝
𝑠 ≥ 𝜖𝑖 > ?̅?
𝑝𝑠 − ?̅?, 𝜖𝑖 − 𝑝
𝑠 > 0
 
Each agent 𝑖 has a tax salience 𝑚𝑖 independent of the tax rate.  The agent perceives utility from 
buying the taxed good: 
𝑢𝑖1
𝑠 = 𝜖𝑖 − ?̅? − 𝑚𝑖𝜏 (8) 
They purchase the good if 𝑢𝑖1
𝑠 > 0.  This yields deadweight loss for that agent of: 
𝑑𝑤𝑙𝑖 = 𝑒(𝑝
𝑠) − 𝑒(?̅?) − [𝑝𝑠 − ?̅?]𝕀(𝛼 − 𝑝𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖 > 0) = {
0, 𝜖𝑖 − ?̅? ≤ 0
𝜖𝑖 − ?̅?, 𝑝
𝑠 ≥ 𝜖𝑖 > ?̅?
0, 𝜖𝑖 − 𝑝
𝑠 > 0
s 
Let 𝐹𝑚.𝜖
∗  denote the true distribution of (𝑚, 𝜖).  For simplicity, we assume that ℙ(𝑢1
𝑠 = 0) and 
ℙ(𝑢1 = 0) are always zero.  We assume the econometrician observes only aggregate data, so 
that the only values observed are triplets (?̅?, 𝜏, ℙ(𝑢1
𝑠 > 0|?̅?, 𝜏)).  The challenge is to infer 
deadweight loss, which takes the form: 
𝐷𝑊𝐿 = ∫ 𝕀(𝑢1 ≥ 0 > 𝑢1
𝑠)[𝜖𝑖 − ?̅?]𝑑𝐹𝑚,𝜖
∗ (𝑚𝑖, 𝜖𝑖)
𝑚𝑖,𝜖𝑖
(9) 
44 
 
 For (2017) shows that, if ?̅? has full support, then one can use aggregate demand to infer 
the CDF of 𝜖 − 𝑚𝜏, allowing one to apply Masten (2017).  Thus, we can identify deadweight loss 
even with aggregate data if we are willing to assume that tax salience does not depend on the 
tax rate and the choice set is binary. 
 One might hope that the assumption that 𝑚 ⊥ (?̅?, 𝜏) is not required for identification, 
as it is generally a rather strong assumption.  Unfortunately, one cannot do away entirely with 
this restriction.  For instance, consider a population in which ℙ(𝜖 = 2) = ℙ(𝜖 = 3) = 0.5 and 
ℙ(𝜁 = 𝑙) = 1.  Consider rationalizing the data in two ways.  In the first case, 𝑚 = 0.5 with 
probability one.  This yields aggregate demand: 
𝐷 = {
1, ?̅? + 0.5𝜏 ≤ 2
0.5, 3 ≥ ?̅? + 0.5𝜏 > 2̅
0, ?̅? + 0.5𝜏 > 3
 
Aggregate deadweight loss takes the form: 
𝐷𝑊𝐿 = {
0, ?̅? + 0.5𝜏 ≤ 2
0.5, 3 ≥ ?̅? + 0.5𝜏 > 2̅
1.5, ?̅? + 0.5𝜏 > 3
 
In the second case, suppose for a moment that ?̅? ∈ (0,1).  Then agents with 𝜖 = 2 have tax 
salience 𝑚2(?̅?) =
2−?̅?
6−2?̅?
, while agents with 𝜖 = 3 have tax salience 𝑚3(?̅?) =
3−?̅?
4−2?̅?
.  If ?̅? ∉ (0,1), 
then set 𝑚2(?̅?) = 𝑚3(?̅?) = 0.5.  One can check that this yields the same aggregate demand, 
yet aggregate deadweight loss with ?̅? ∈ (0,1) now takes the form: 
𝐷𝑊𝐿 = {
0, ?̅? + 0.5𝜏 ≤ 2
0.75, 3 ≥ ?̅? + 0.5𝜏 > 2̅
1.5, ?̅? + 0.5𝜏 > 3
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4.2 Panel Data 
Now suppose that one can follow specific individual for a long period of time.  For every 
individual 𝑖, the econometrician observes triplets (?̅?𝑖, 𝜏𝑖, 𝑞𝑖) with full support for ?̅? when 𝜏 = 0.  
Then the econometrician can identify the demand function 𝑞𝑖(𝑝; 0).  Assuming there are no 
income effects, deadweight loss for an individual 𝑖 with perceived price 𝑝𝑠 takes the form: 
𝑑𝑤𝑙𝑖 = ∫ 𝑞(𝑝; 0)𝑑𝑝
𝑝𝑠
?̅?
− 𝜏𝑑(𝑝𝑠) 
If one can observe tax 𝜏, then one can determine deadweight loss using the inferred demand 
function via:37 
𝑝𝑠 = 𝑑−1(𝑞𝑖(?̅?, 𝜏)) 
 For instance, with binary choice data, demand for agent 𝑖 is 𝕀(𝛼 − 𝑝𝑖
𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖).  This yields 
deadweight loss for agent 𝑖 of:38 
𝑑𝑤𝑙𝑖 = 𝕀(𝑝𝑖
𝑠 > 𝛼 + 𝜖𝑖 > ?̅?) [𝛼 − ?̅? 𝜖𝑖] 
This yields aggregate deadweight loss: 
𝐷𝑊𝐿 = ∫ 𝕀(𝑝𝑖
𝑠 > 𝛼 + 𝜖𝑖 > ?̅?) [𝛼 − ?̅? + 𝜖𝑖] 𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜖
∗ (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜖𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜖𝑖
 
5. Empirical Calculation 
We apply our theoretical results to experimental data from Taubinsky and Rees-Jones 
(forthcoming).  We use a subset of their data in which subjects are randomly divided into two 
groups of about 1,000 test subjects.  For each of twenty goods, one group reports their maximal 
willingness to pay for that good, while the other group reports the maximal sticker price at 
                                                          
37 If demand is a correspondence, then one can find 𝑝𝑠 as the price for which 𝑞𝑖(?̅?, 𝜏) is an element of the demand 
correspondence at 𝑝𝑠.  By lemma 1, this value is unique. 
38 We assume that demand is well-defined with probability one. 
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which they would be willing to purchase the good subject to the sales tax.  The test subjects' 
city of residence determines the size of the sales tax.39 
Data from the experiment allow us to infer aggregate demand for people in the sample. 
We compare the standard tax arm to the no-tax arm for a single good.40 The tax arm allows us 
to consider what aggregate demand is at a tax of 𝜏, equal to the sales tax in vigor in each 
subject's city of residence. Then we turn to the no-tax arm, which allows us to observe people's 
willingness to pay in the absence of taxation. We interpret this as the subjects' true willingness 
to pay, meaning that if their declared willingness to pay is 𝜖, then they will buy the good if the 
price they perceive is lower than 𝜖.  In turn, this allows us to find the perceived prices ?̂?𝑠 from 
equation (4) and 𝑝𝑠 from equation (6) that allow us to apply Theorems 1 and 3. 
Specifically, we compute aggregate demand under the tax, 𝑑∗, by finding the fraction of 
people in the tax arm who declare a higher willingness to pay than the true sticker price for the 
object (taken from Amazon). We then proceed to find the homogeneous perceived price that 
would equalize the demand for the no-tax arm to 𝑑∗.  Letting 𝜖𝑖 indicate the willingness to pay 
for subject 𝑖 in the no-tax arm, we then find (?̂?, ?̂?) that solves: 
𝑑∗ =
1
𝑁
∑𝕀(𝜖𝑖 > ?̂?) + ?̂?𝕀(𝜖𝑖 = ?̂?)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Where ?̂? is introduced to deal with edgewise cases and satisfy the equation with equality.  One 
could interpret ?̂? as the probability that 𝜁 = ℎ in the no-tax sample, or the fraction of 
                                                          
39 We describe only the data that we use, which is not all the data from the experiment.  For instance, Taubinsky 
and Rees-Jones (forthcoming) have a second module in which they ask both groups their willingness to pay in the 
absence of any sales taxes. 
40 The good we consider is RainStoppers 68-inch oversize windproof golf umbrella. 
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indifferent people who end up buying. This, in turn, allows us to find the lower bound of 
deadweight loss as in equation (9):41 
𝐷𝑊𝐿𝑙 =
1
𝑁
∑[𝕀(?̅? > 𝜖𝑖 < ?̂?) + (1 − ?̂?) 𝕀(𝜖𝑖 = ?̂?)] ∗ [𝜖𝑖 − ?̅?]
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Finding the upper bound of deadweight loss follows a similar procedure. The problem is then to 
find (?̃?, ?̃?) such that: 
𝑑∗ =
1
𝑁
∑(?̅? > 𝜖𝑖 < 𝑝) + ?̃? 𝕀(𝜖𝑖 = 𝑝)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Demand is rationalized by having all agents with 𝜖𝑖 less than 𝑝 perceive price ?̅? and all agents 
with 𝜖𝑖 > 𝑝 perceive a price equal t the supremal value of the support of 𝜖.  The upper bound 
for deadweight loss is then what we would obtain if all the subjects who value the good most 
perceived a price so high that it would dissuade them from buying the good: 
𝐷𝑊𝐿𝑢 =
1
𝑁
∑[𝕀(𝜖𝑖 > 𝑝) + (1 − ?̃?) 𝕀(𝜖𝑖 = 𝑝)] ∗ [𝜖𝑖 − ?̅?]
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
The calculations are very similar when we assume that $\bar{m}=1$, except in that case anyone 
with 𝜖𝑖 > 𝜏 is assumed to always buy, thus resulting in a smaller upper bound. We also 
compute the implied value of deadweight loss one would obtain if preferences and salience are 
independent. In the case where the econometrician does not impose any assumptions on what 
?̅? might be, so that anyone who perceives the high price will not buy the good, the problem 
reduces to picking 𝛼 so that: 
 
 
                                                          
41 We are calculating deadweight loss as if there were no other taxes in the economy. 
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Table 2 
 Full 
salience 
Naive Lower 
Bound 
UB1 UB2 UB3 UB4 
Dollar value 0.187 0.0266 0.0038 0.0068 0.0441 0.0100 0.2097 
Percent of 
revenue 
10.55% 15.01% 2.14% 3.84% 24.89% 5.64% 118.34% 
Table 2: Lower and upper bounds of deadweight loss, as inferred from the data in Taubinsky and Rees-Jones 
(forthcoming).  We consider one lower bound and four different upper bounds. UB1 is the upper bound one would 
obtain assuming that salience is independent of preferences and that maximal salience is 1 (that is, that people do 
not over-react to the tax). UB2 is the upper bound one would obtain only assuming that salience is independent of 
preferences. UB3 is the upper bound one would obtain assuming only that maximal salience is 1. UB4 is the highest 
possible upper bound. We also report what deadweight loss would be if we assumed that people in the non-taxed 
sample accounted for taxes perfectly, and the naive calculation the econometrician would obtain if they assumed 
the observed reaction to taxes in the taxed sample was induced by full salience. For comparison, the implied 
average tax revenue from demand under the tax is 0.1772, and the implied total pre-tax consumer surplus is 
0.4866. 
 
𝑑∗ =
1
𝑁
∑𝛼𝕀(𝜖𝑖 ≥ ?̅?)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
And the resulting upper bound on deadweight loss will be: 
𝐷𝑊𝐿𝑚⊥𝜖
𝑢 = (1 − 𝛼)
1
𝑁
∑𝕀(𝜖 ≥ ?̅?) [𝜖𝑖 − ?̅?]
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 We summarize our results in table 2.42 As we can see, the lower and upper bounds are 
quite far apart, implying that the exact co-distribution of preferences and perceived prices can 
have widely different implications for welfare.  One could find an analogue for ?̂? by dividing 
the lower bound by the upper bound in the case of $\bar m = 1$.  This would yield ?̂? = 0.38, 
similar to ?̂? ≈ 0.27 as in section 3.3.   
                                                          
42 One limitation of our result is that we treat the sample as if it was the population in question.  We conjecture 
that one could obtain standard errors for estimates by using asymptotic normality from the Generalized Method of 
Moments estimator.  We intend to prove this claim and include standard errors in future versions of this paper. 
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 Our empirical results suggest two takeaways.  One, we require strong assumptions to 
get an upper bound for deadweight loss close to the lower bound.  To rule out deadweight loss 
multiple times greater than the deadweight loss with a homogeneous perceived price, the 
econometrician must assume both that tax salience is bounded between zero and one, and is 
also distributed independently of the willingness to pay.  Two, comparing UB1 to UB2 and UB3 
suggests that that the potential dependent statistical relationship between tax salience and 
willingness to pay does not facilitate deadweight loss nearly as much as the possibility of agents 
perceiving a tax rate greater than the true tax rate. This motivates us to investigate how the 
upper bound of deadweight loss varies for different choices for maximal salience ?̅?, reported in 
figure 1.7. 
 The high variation in empirical estimates suggests that precisely inferring deadweight 
loss from aggregate data would require strong assumptions. On the other hand, for most 
reasonable values of ?̅?, deadweight loss seems relatively small. In turn, this suggests that 
attempting to raise the same revenue with a less distortive tax scheme might not be worth it, if 
it incurs high enough administrative costs.43 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we considered identification of deadweight loss with non-salient taxes, as 
in the Gabaix (2014) model.  We justify considering price misperception by demonstrating that 
a general model of consumer behavior with weak convexity and continuity assumptions on 
preferences is observationally equivalent to the Gabaix (2014) model.   
                                                          
43 Formally, if the administrative cost of implementing a more efficient tax that collected the same revenue was 
greater than around 32 cents per consumer in the market, one could conclude with high confidence that the 
change in tax regime could not yield a Pareto improvement with transfers. 
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Figure 1.7 
 
Figure 1.7: Upper bound depending on the econometrician’s choice of ?̅?.  Error bars are based on the 5th and 95th 
percentiles of 10,000 bootstrap replications. 
 
 We first consider identification of deadweight loss using aggregate data. We show that 
deadweight loss cannot be point-identified with aggregate demand data. Nonetheless, we 
provide bounds for deadweight loss consistent with aggregate demand and the distribution of 
preference parameters across individuals. The lower bound holds for any distribution; the 
upper bound relies on the assumption that tax salience has support contained in a known non-
negative interval.  If the econometrician could not infer the distribution of preference 
parameters or did not know a non-negative interval that contained the support of tax salience, 
then the interval of possible values of deadweight loss may be even larger. 
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 We provide context for these theoretical results with empirical findings using 
experimental data from Taubinsky and Rees-Jones (forthcoming).  We calculate the upper and 
lower bounds of deadweight loss due to sales taxes in the United States on a good with a binary 
choice set.  We find an upper bound approximately fifty-five times larger than the lower bound.  
Interestingly, this upper bound is substantially larger than the deadweight loss if all agents 
perfectly accounted for sales taxes.  In other words, deadweight loss with imperfectly perceived 
taxes can be greater than in the standard model of consumer behavior.  This result arises from 
the possibility that some agents that value the good a lot perceive a prohibitively high price, 
whereas other agents who value the good at barely more than the sticker price still purchase 
the good because they fail to notice the tax at all.  Thus, the behavioral model does not rule out 
deadweight loss greater than in the standard model even though aggregate consumption is less 
distorted in the behavioral model.  The allocative inefficiency swamps the distortion in 
aggregate consumption.  Indeed, even when no agents respond more to sales taxes than sticker 
price changes, we find for the binary and continuous choice settings we study that deadweight 
loss can be roughly as large as two & a half and four times as large as when assuming 
homogeneous tax salience, respectively. 
 With individual-level cross-sectional data, identification arises from assuming choice 
functions that are linear in sticker prices and taxes, and that tax salience is independent of 
sticker prices and taxes.  Under these assumptions, one can identify the joint distribution of 
parameters of demand responsiveness to sticker prices and taxes, and so compute aggregate 
deadweight loss.  With long panel data, we can identify deadweight loss without these 
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assumptions.  Identification then arises from direct calculation of the lost surplus from agents 
facing the tax compared to when there was no tax. 
 In future work, we will explore the performance of estimators of deadweight loss using 
individual-level cross-sectional data.  The assumptions on preferences and tax salience facilitate 
identification, but they leave open two questions.  One, our identification argument in Theorem 
4 does not inform us about rates of convergence.  Two, the structural assumptions may not 
hold in practice, and we would like to have some sense of the magnitude of the bias that these 
assumptions introduce. 
 We also hope to determine to what degree one can identify deadweight loss in the 
intermediate case of individual-level cross-sectional data in which tax salience depends 
arbitrarily on the tax rate and preferences, but does not depend on the sticker price.  This 
assumption of independence of the tax salience from the sticker price seems like the most 
reasonable non-trivial independence assumption one could impose on tax salience.   
 Finally, future work should inform what reasonable ex-ante restrictions on tax salience 
one can impose when observing aggregate data.  Our empirical results show widespread 
uncertainty as to what deadweight loss might be with aggregate data in the absence of 
restrictions on tax salience. In fact, we still assume that tax salience is non-negative with 
probability one.  Relaxing this assumption could yield an even greater upper bound for 
deadweight loss. 
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Appendix for Chapter 1 
A. Additional Proofs and Theoretical Results 
A.1  Additional Proofs and Results from Section 2 
 We first demonstrate a generalization of the Gabaix representation, in which multiple 
goods may be taxed. We consider a general setting with 𝑁 goods, consumption set 𝑋 ≡
𝑋𝑇 × 𝑋𝑁𝑇 ⊆ ℝ+
𝑁, with consumption vector 𝒒 = (𝒒𝑇 , 𝒒𝑵𝑻) ∈ 𝑋.  Here 𝑋𝑇 is the consumption set 
for taxed goods, while 𝑋𝑁𝑇  is the consumption set for non-taxed goods.  We assume that either 
𝑋𝑁𝑇 ⊆ ℝ+ or 𝑋
𝑁𝑇 is convex. 
 The agent has preferences ≽ on 𝑋.  Informally, we want to assume preferences such 
that agents smoothly prefer moderation. To say that they prefer moderation, one generally 
assumes convex preferences.  However, we do not want to assume a convex consumption set 
𝑋. We might alternatively assume that preferences are pseudo-convex, in that for any 𝒒 ∈ 𝑋 
and any finite 𝑛: 
𝒒𝑘 ∈ 𝑋, 𝒒𝑘 ≻ 𝒒, 𝜆𝑘 ≥ 0 ∀𝑘 = 1,… , 𝑛, ∑ 𝜆𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
= 1, ∑ 𝜆𝑘𝒒𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
∈ 𝑋 ⇒ ∑ 𝜆𝑘𝒒𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
≻ 𝒒 
However, we also want some smoothness to preferences. More formally, we want to figure 
that if 𝒒′ ≻ 𝒒, then there is an epsilon ball around 𝒒′ such that the agent would prefer any 
element in that epsilon ball to 𝒒 if that element were also in the consumption set.
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 Furthermore, any convex combination of points in these epsilon balls should yield a point that, 
if contained in 𝑋, is also strictly preferred to 𝒒.  We refer to this assumption on preferences as 
continuous pseudo-convexity (CPC). 
Assumption 2: For any 𝒒 ∈ 𝑋, define the set of strictly preferred allocations: 
𝒜 ≡ {𝒒′ ∈ 𝑋| 𝒒′ ≻ 𝒒} 
There exists some function 𝜖:𝒜 → ℝ++ such that for any 𝑛 ∈ ℕ, for any 𝜆1, … , 𝜆𝑛 ≥ 0 and 
𝒒1, … , 𝒒𝑛 ∈ 𝒜, if ∑ 𝜆𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1 = 1, then: 
∃𝒒1
′ , … , 𝒒𝑛
′ ∈ ℝ𝑛: ‖𝒒𝑘
′ − 𝒒𝑘‖ < 𝜖(𝒒𝑘) ∀𝑘, ∑ 𝜆𝑘𝒒𝑘
′
𝑛
𝑘=1
∈ 𝑋 ⇒ ∑ 𝜆𝑘𝒒𝑘
′
𝑛
𝑘=1
≻ 𝒒 
 We provide this description of CPC preferences to facilitate intuition, but we 
demonstrate our main result using an equivalent, yet more geometric, description of CPC.   
Lemma 4: Preferences ≽ are CPC if and only if for every 𝒒 ∈ 𝑋 with corresponding set of strictly 
preferred bundles 𝒜 there is an open and convex set 𝒪 ⊆ ℝ𝑁 such that 𝒪 ∩ 𝑋 = 𝒜.44 
Proof: For one direction, the convex hull of the union of open sets 𝜖(𝒒′) balls around 𝒒′ ∈ 𝒜 is 
open, and by assumption does not contain any elements of 𝑋 ∖ 𝒜.  For the other direction, for 
any 𝒒′ ∈ 𝒜, define 𝜖(𝒒′) as a positive value such that 𝒒′′ ∈ ℝ+
𝑁: ‖𝒒′′ − 𝒒′‖ < 𝜖(𝒒′) ⇒ 𝒒′′ ∈ 𝒪.  
We can do so because 𝒪 is open.  For any such 𝒒′′, if 𝒒′′ ∈ 𝑋, then 𝒒′′ ≻ 𝒒′. ∎ 
 Let 𝒑 = (𝒑𝑇 , 𝒑𝑁𝑇) ∈ ℝ+
𝑁 denote a generic price vector, where 𝒑𝑇 and 𝒑𝑁𝑇  are price 
vectors for taxed and non-taxed goods respectively.  Let ?̅? = (?̅?𝑇 , ?̅?𝑁𝑇) denote the vector of 
sticker prices.   
                                                          
44 Note that 𝒪 is open in ℝ𝑁, so that 𝒪 ∩ 𝑋 is open in 𝑋. 
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 Let 𝝉 denote the vector of (per-unit) taxes of dimension 𝑁.  The consumption vector 
𝒒(?̅?, 𝝉) = (𝒒𝑇(?̅?, 𝝉), 𝒒𝑁𝑇(?̅?, 𝝉)) ∈ 𝑋 satisfies the following properties: 
?̅? ∗ 𝒒𝑁𝑇(?̅?, 𝝉) ≤ 𝑊 − 𝒑𝑇 ∗ 𝒒𝑇 
(𝒒𝑇 , 𝒒𝑁𝑇) ≻ (𝒒𝑇 , ?̂?𝑁𝑇) ∀?̂?𝑁𝑇 ∈ 𝑋𝑁𝑇: ?̅?𝑁𝑇 ∗ ?̂?𝑁𝑇 ≤ 𝑊 − 𝒑𝑇 ∗ 𝒒𝑇  
𝒒(?̅?, 𝟎) ∈ argmax
?̂?∈𝑋:𝒑∗?̂?≤𝑊
≽ 
In words, consumption of the non-taxed goods is always optimally determined upon choosing 
consumption of the taxed goods, and consumption is optimally determined when the agent 
correctly perceives prices, i.e. when there are no taxes. We also restrict the domain of sticker 
prices and taxes so that expenditure on non-taxed goods is positive, i.e.: 
?̅? ∗ 𝒒𝑁𝑇(?̅?, 𝝉) > 0 
The claim is that for any ?̅? and 𝝉 in this domain, there is a Gabaix representation for 𝒒(?̅?, 𝝉). 
Proof of Generalization of Proposition 1: Define 𝒒 = (𝒒𝑇 , 𝒒𝑁𝑇) = 𝒒(?̅?, 𝝉), and: 
𝒜𝑒 ≡ {(𝒒𝑇′, 𝑒𝑁𝑇′)| 𝒒𝑇
′
∈ 𝑋𝑇 , ∃𝒒𝑁𝑇
′
∈ 𝑋𝑁𝑇: ?̅?𝑁𝑇 ∗ 𝒒𝑁𝑇
′
= 𝑒𝑁𝑇
′
, (𝒒𝑇
′
, 𝒒𝑁𝑇
′
) ∈ 𝒪} 
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that (𝒒𝑇 , ?̅?𝑁𝑇 ∗ 𝒒𝑁𝑇) ∈ 𝐶𝑜(𝒜𝑒), i.e. that ∃𝑛 ∈ ℕ, 
(𝒒𝑘
𝑇 , 𝑒𝑘
𝑁𝑇) ∈ 𝒜𝑒, and 𝜆𝑘 ≥ 0 ∀𝑘 = 1,… , 𝑛 such that ∑ 𝜆𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1 = 1 and: 
∑ 𝜆𝑘(𝒒𝑘
𝑇 , 𝑒𝑘
𝑁𝑇)
𝑛
𝑘=1
= (𝒒𝑇 , ?̅?𝑁𝑇 ∗ 𝒒𝑁𝑇) 
Since (𝒒𝑘
𝑇 , 𝑒𝑘
𝑁𝑇) ∈ 𝒜𝑒 ∀𝑘, that means that: 
∀𝑘 ∃𝒒𝑘
𝑁𝑇: 𝑒𝑘
𝑁𝑇 = ?̅?𝑁𝑇 ∗ 𝒒𝑘
𝑁𝑇 , 𝒒𝑘 ≡ (𝒒𝑘
𝑇 , 𝒒𝑘
𝑁𝑇) ⇒ 𝒒𝑘 ∈ 𝒪 
If 𝑋𝑁𝑇 ⊆ ℝ+, then ∑ 𝜆𝑘?̅?
𝑁𝑇 ∗ 𝒒𝑘
𝑁𝑇𝑛
𝑘=1 = ?̅?
𝑁𝑇 ∗ 𝒒𝑁𝑇 implies that ∑ 𝜆𝑘𝒒𝑘
𝑁𝑇𝑛
𝑘=1 = 𝒒
𝑁𝑇 because 
positive non-tax expenditure requires that ?̅?𝑁𝑇 ≠ 0.  In that case: 
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∑ 𝜆𝑘𝒒𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
= 𝒒 ⇒⇐ ∑ 𝜆𝑘𝒒𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
∈ 𝒪 
This is a contradiction arising from 𝒒 ∉ 𝒪. 
 If 𝑋𝑁𝑇 is not a subset of ℝ+, then 𝑋
𝑁𝑇 is convex.  This means that ∑ 𝜆𝑘𝒒𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1 ∈ 𝑋.  
Pseudo-convexity of preferences implies that: 
∑ 𝜆𝑘𝒒𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
≻ 𝒒 
Yet the weighted average of taxed goods is the desired taxed good consumption bundle, 
whereas the weighted average of non-taxed goods is affordable: 
∑ 𝜆𝑘𝒒𝑘
𝑇
𝑛
𝑘=1
= 𝒒𝑇 
?̅?𝑁𝑇 ∗ ∑ 𝜆𝑘𝒒𝑘
𝑁𝑇
𝑛
𝑘=1
= ∑ 𝑒𝑘
𝑁𝑇
𝑛
𝑘=1
= ?̅?𝑁𝑇 ∗ 𝒒𝑁𝑇 
Thus, the agent could not have optimally chosen 𝒒𝑁𝑇, another contradiction.  We conclude that 
(𝒒𝑇 , 𝒑𝑁𝑇 ∗ 𝒒𝑁𝑇) ∉ 𝐶𝑜(𝒜𝑒). 
 Now, we can apply the Separating Hyperplane Theorem to say that there is a vector 
(𝒑𝑇𝑠, 1), where 𝒑𝑇𝑠 has as many elements as 𝒒𝑇, such that: 
(𝒑𝑇𝑠, 1) ∗ (𝒒𝑇 , ?̅?𝑁𝑇 ∗ 𝒒𝑁𝑇) ≤ (𝒑𝑇𝑠, 1) ∗ (𝒒𝑇 , 𝑒𝑁𝑇
′
) ∀(𝒒𝑇
′
, 𝑒𝑁𝑇
′
) ∈ 𝐶𝑜(𝒜𝑒) 
Defining 𝒑𝑠 ≡ (𝒑𝑇𝑠, ?̅?𝑁𝑇), this implies that for any bundle 𝒒′ = (𝒒𝑇
′
, 𝒒𝑁𝑇′) ∈ 𝒪: 
𝒑𝑠 ∗ 𝒒′ ≥ 𝒑𝑠 ∗ 𝒒 
Since 𝒪 is open, the above expression can never be satisfied with equality.  To see this, suppose 
otherwise, i.e. that ∃𝒒′ ∈ 𝒪 such that: 
𝒑𝑠 ∗ 𝒒′ = 𝒑𝑠 ∗ 𝒒 
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Note that ?̅?𝑁𝑇 > 𝟎 implies that we can choose 𝒒′′ within 𝜖(𝒒′) of 𝒒′ by slightly reducing a 
component of 𝒒′ for which the corresponding perceived price is positive.  Thus, 𝒒′′ ∈ 𝒪, yet 
𝒑𝑠 ∗ 𝒒′′ < 𝒑𝑠 ∗ 𝒒.  This yields our desired contradiction.  Therefore: 
𝒑𝑠 ∗ 𝒒′ > 𝒑𝑠 ∗ 𝒒  ∀𝒒′ ∈ 𝒪 
 We conclude by defining 𝑊𝑠 ≡ 𝒑𝑠 ∗ 𝒒 and noting that ∀𝒒′ ∈ 𝑋: 
𝒒′ ≻ 𝒒 ⇒ 𝒒′ ∈ 𝒪 ⇒ 𝒑𝑠 ∗ 𝒒′ > 𝑊𝑠 
Therefore, the Gabaix model has rationalized consumption because no preferred consumption 
bundle is perceived to be affordable. ∎ 
 Now that we’ve gone through the proof, we can make a couple of observations.  One, 
the assumption of CPC preferences is satisfied when preferences are represented by a lower 
semi-continuous and quasi-concave function 𝑢 on ℝ𝑁, so that: 
∀𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋: 𝑥 ≽ 𝑦 ⇔ 𝑢(𝑥) ≥ 𝑢(𝑦) 
This makes it clear that we have, in fact, generalized Proposition 1. Also, note that it may be 
easier in practice to check to see that preferences have such a utility representation than to 
check that they satisfy continuous pseudo-convexity. 
 Two, it may appear strange that we needed to assume that 𝑋𝑁𝑇 is concave specifically if 
it has dimension greater than one.  This is because a discrete grid for consumption of nontaxed 
goods can create a lumpy evaluation of non-tax expenditure, thwarting the existence 
of a separating hyperplane. For example, consider a consumption set ℝ+ × {0,1}
2, where there 
is one taxed good chosen continuously and two on-taxed goods chosen from {0,1}.  The sticker 
price vector is ?̅? = (1,1,1).  The consumer has preferences rationalized by the function: 
𝑢(𝒒) = 𝑞1 + min{𝑞2, 𝑞3} 
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In words, the taxed good is perfect substitutes with the minimum consumption of the two 
non-taxed goods (which are perfect complements). Consider consumption bundle: 
𝒒 = (0,1,0) 
If the agent perceived income 𝑊𝑠 ≥ 2, they could do better by consuming (0,1,1).  Supposing 
otherwise, if the agent perceives a positive tax-inclusive price of the taxed good, then optimally 
𝑞1 > 0 and 𝑞2 = 𝑞3 = 0.  Finally, there is no optimal consumption bundle if 𝑝1
𝑠 ≤ 0.  Thus, the 
consumption bundle cannot be rationalized. 
Details from Table 1: Let ?̅? = 𝜏 = 𝑝𝑁𝑇 = ?̅? = 1, 𝑋𝑇 = {0,1}, and 𝑢(𝑞𝑇 , 𝑞𝑁𝑇; 𝜃𝑖) = 𝜃𝑖 ∗ 𝑞
𝑇 +
𝑞𝑁𝑇.  In words, the marginal cost of the taxed good is zero, the tax-inclusive prices 
are one, salience is between zero & one, the choice of the taxed good is either zero or one, 
and the taxed & non-taxed goods are symmetric perfect substitutes. Suppose: 
𝐹𝜃(𝜃𝑖) = 0.5𝕀(𝜃𝑖 ≥ 1) + 0.5𝕀(𝜃𝑖 ≥ 0) 
This says that 𝜃 ∈ {0,1} with equal probability.  We consider two distinct methods of 
distributing the perceived prices on {0,1} dependent on preference type to rationalize an 
aggregate demand of 0.5.  First, suppose that 𝜃𝑖 = 1 ⇒ 𝑝𝑖
𝑠 = 1, 𝜁𝑖 = ℎ, and 𝜃𝑖 = 2 ⇒ 𝑝𝑖
𝑠 = 2,
𝜁𝑖 = 𝑙.  Then: 
𝐷𝑊𝐿 = 0.5[𝑒(1; 1) − 𝑒(1; 1) − 0] + 0.5[𝑒(2; 2) − 𝑒(1; 2) − 0] = 0.5 
Second, suppose that 𝜃𝑖 = 1 ⇒ 𝑝𝑖
𝑠 = 1, 𝜁𝑖 = 𝑙 and 𝜃𝑖 = 2 ⇒ 𝑝𝑖
𝑠 = 2, 𝜁𝑖 = ℎ.  Then: 
𝐷𝑊𝐿 = 0.5[𝑒(1; 1) − 𝑒(1; 1)] + 0.5[𝑒(2; 2) − 𝑒(1; 2) − 1] = 0 
Proposition 4: Assume a continuously differentiable and strictly increasing aggregate supply 
function 𝑄𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦, as well as continuously differentiable compensated demand functions ℎ𝑖  and 
subjective price functions 𝑝𝑖
𝑠 ∀𝑖.  Subjective price functions change one-for-one with 
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sticker prices, so that: 
𝑝𝑖
𝑠(?̅?, 𝜏) = ?̅? + 𝑝𝑖
𝑠(0, 𝜏) ∀?̅? ∀𝜏 ∀𝑖 
Subjective prices also agree with sticker prices when there is no tax: 
𝑝𝑖
𝑠(?̅?, 0) − ?̅? ∀?̅? ∀𝑖 
We implicitly define the pre-tax sticker price ?̅?𝑜𝑙𝑑  by:45 
𝑄𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦(?̅?𝑜𝑙𝑑) = ∑ℎ𝑖(?̅?
𝑜𝑙𝑑, 𝓋𝑖)
𝑖
 
and the new sticker price ?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤 after imposing the tax 𝜏 when agents are compensated by: 
𝑄𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦(?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤) = ∑ℎ𝑖(𝑝𝑖
𝑠(?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤, 𝜏), 𝓋𝑖)
𝑖
 
Define deadweight loss by:46 
𝐷𝑊𝐿 ≡ ∑Δ𝐶𝑆𝑖
𝑖
+ ∫ 𝑄𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦(𝑝)𝑑𝑝
?̅?𝑜𝑙𝑑
?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤
− 𝜏 ∑𝑞𝑖
𝑐
𝑖
 
where 
Δ𝐶𝑆𝑖 = [?̅?
𝑛𝑒𝑤 + 𝜏 − 𝑝𝑖
𝑠(?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤, 𝜏)] 𝑞𝑖
𝑐 + ∫ ℎ𝑖(𝑝, 𝓋𝑖)𝑑𝑝
𝑝𝑖
𝑠(?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝜏)
?̅?𝑜𝑙𝑑
 ∀𝑖 
𝑞𝑖
𝑐 ≡ ℎ𝑖(𝑝𝑖
𝑠(?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤, 𝜏), 𝓋𝑖) ∀𝑖 
Then aggregate deadweight loss has second order approximation around 𝜏 = 0: 
𝐷𝑊𝐿 ≈ −
1
2
[
 
 
 
∑𝑚𝑖
𝜕ℎ𝑖
𝜕𝑝
𝑖
−
(∑ 𝑚𝑖
𝜕ℎ𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖 )
2
∑
𝜕ℎ𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖 −
𝜕𝑄𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦
𝜕𝑝 ]
 
 
 
𝜏2 
Proof:  
                                                          
45 𝓋𝑖 ≡ 𝑢𝑖(𝒅𝑖(𝒑,𝑊𝑖)) ∀𝑖 
46 Note that ?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤 ≤ ?̅?𝑜𝑙𝑑  ∀𝜏 ≥ 0 from the Law of Compensated Demand and the fact that supply is strictly 
increasing in price. 
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𝐷𝑊𝐿 = ∑∫ ℎ𝑖(𝑝, 𝓋𝑖)𝑑𝑝
𝑝𝑖
𝑠(?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝜏)
?̅?𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖
+ ∫ 𝑄𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦(𝑝)𝑑𝑝
?̅?𝑜𝑙𝑑
?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤
+ ∑[?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤 − 𝑝𝑖
𝑠(?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤, 𝜏)]𝑞𝑖
𝑐
𝑖
 
Note that ?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤 is a function of 𝜏.  One can easily confirm that ?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤|𝜏=0 = ?̅?
𝑜𝑙𝑑, so that 
deadweight loss is zero when 𝜏 = 0.  We can find 
𝜕?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝜕𝜏
 from the Inverse Function Theorem:47 
𝜕𝑄𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦
𝜕𝑝
𝜕?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝜕𝜏
= ∑
𝜕ℎ𝑖
𝜕𝑝
[
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝑠
𝜕?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝜕?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝜕𝜏
+
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝑠
𝜕𝜏
]
𝑖
= ∑
𝜕ℎ𝑖
𝜕𝑝
[
𝜕?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝜕𝜏
+
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝑠
𝜕𝜏
]
𝑖
 
𝜕?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝜕𝜏
=
∑
𝜕ℎ𝑖
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝑠
𝜕𝜏𝑖
𝜕𝑄𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦
𝜕𝑝 −
∑
𝜕ℎ𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖
 
We can then take the first derivative of deadweight loss with respect to the tax: 
𝜕𝐷𝑊𝐿
𝜕𝜏
= ∑[
𝜕?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝜕𝜏
+
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝑠
𝜕𝜏
] ℎ𝑖
𝑖
−
𝜕?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝜕𝜏
𝑄𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦(?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤)
− ∑[
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝑠
𝜕𝜏
ℎ𝑖 + [𝑝𝑖
𝑠(?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤, 𝜏) − ?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤]
𝜕ℎ𝑖
𝜕𝑝
 [
𝜕?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝜕𝜏
+
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝑠
𝜕𝜏
]]
𝑖
=
𝜕?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝜕𝜏
∑ℎ𝑖
𝑖
−
𝜕?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝜕𝜏
𝑄𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦(?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤)
− ∑[𝑝𝑖
𝑠(?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤, 𝜏) − ?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤]
𝜕ℎ𝑖
𝜕𝑝
 [
𝜕?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝜕𝜏
+
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝑠
𝜕𝜏
]
𝑖
= −∑[𝑝𝑖
𝑠(?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤, 𝜏) − ?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤]
𝜕ℎ𝑖
𝜕𝑝
 [
𝜕?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝜕𝜏
+
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝑠
𝜕𝜏
]
𝑖
 
Since 𝑝𝑖
𝑠(?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤, 0) = ?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤, it follows that: 
𝜕𝐷𝑊𝐿
𝜕𝜏
|𝜏=0 = 0 
                                                          
47 This claim also uses the fact that aggregate supply is strictly increasing while aggregate compensated demand is 
weakly decreasing, so that there is always a unique value for ?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤. 
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 Obtaining the second derivative would be straightforward if ℎ𝑖 ∈ ℂ
2 ∀𝑖.  Instead, we 
find the second derivative at 𝜏 = 0 from the definition: 
𝜕2𝐷𝑊𝐿
𝜕𝜏2
|𝜏=0 = lim
𝜏→0
−
∑ [𝑝𝑖
𝑠(?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤, 𝜏) − ?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤]
𝜕ℎ𝑖
𝜕𝑝  [
𝜕?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝜕𝜏 +
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝑠
𝜕𝜏 ]𝑖
𝜏
 
Note that continuity of 
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝑠
𝜕𝜏
 with respect to 𝜏 for all agents implies that 
𝜕?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝜕𝜏
 is continuous.  
Since 
𝜕𝑄𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦
𝜕𝑝
 and 
𝜕ℎ𝑖
𝜕𝑝
 are also continuous: 
𝜕2𝐷𝑊𝐿
𝜕𝜏2
|𝜏=0 = −∑
𝜕ℎ𝑖
𝜕𝑝
|𝜏=0 [
𝜕?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝜕𝜏
+
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝑠
𝜕𝜏
] lim
𝜏→0
𝑝𝑖
𝑠(?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤, 𝜏) − ?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝜏
𝑖
 
𝜕2𝐷𝑊𝐿
𝜕𝜏2
|𝜏=0 = −∑
𝜕ℎ𝑖
𝜕𝑝
|𝜏=0 [
𝜕?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝜕𝜏
+
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝑠
𝜕𝜏
]
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝑠
𝜕𝜏
|𝜏=0
𝑖
 
Using the fact that 𝑚𝑖 ≡
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝑠
𝜕𝜏
|𝜏=0, we can note that: 
𝜕?̅?𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝜕𝜏
|𝜏=0 =
∑ 𝑚𝑖
𝜕ℎ𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝜕𝑄𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦
𝜕𝑝 −
∑
𝜕ℎ𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖
 
And so: 
𝜕2𝐷𝑊𝐿
𝜕𝜏2
|𝜏=0 = −
[
 
 
 
∑𝑚𝑖
2 𝜕ℎ𝑖
𝜕𝑝
𝑖
+
(∑ 𝑚𝑖
𝜕ℎ𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖 )
2
𝜕𝑄𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦
𝜕𝑝 −
∑
𝜕ℎ𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖 ]
 
 
 
 
Now we can find the second order approximation for deadweight loss: 
𝐷𝑊𝐿 ≈ 𝐷𝑊𝐿|𝜏=0 + [
𝜕𝐷𝑊𝐿
𝜕𝜏
|𝜏=0] 𝜏 +
1
2
[
𝜕2𝐷𝑊𝐿
𝜕𝜏2
|𝜏=0] 𝜏
2 
𝐷𝑊𝐿 ≈ −
1
2
[
 
 
 
∑𝑚𝑖
2 𝜕ℎ𝑖
𝜕𝑝
𝑖
+
(∑ 𝑚𝑖
𝜕ℎ𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖 )
2
𝜕𝑄𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦
𝜕𝑝 −
∑
𝜕ℎ𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖 ]
 
 
 
𝜏2       ∎ 
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A.2  Additional Proofs and Results from Section 3 
Proof of Lemma 1: Note that there must be values 𝑞𝑁𝑇 and 𝑞𝑁𝑇′ such that: 
(𝑞(𝑝; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑙), 𝑞
𝑁𝑇) ∼𝜃𝑖 (𝑞(𝑝
′; 𝜃𝑖 , ℎ), 𝑞
𝑁𝑇′) 
From local non-satiation: 
𝑝 ∗ 𝑞(𝑝; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑙) + 𝑝
𝑁𝑇 ∗ 𝑞𝑁𝑇 ≤ 𝑝 ∗ 𝑞(𝑝′; 𝜃𝑖 , ℎ) + 𝑝
𝑁𝑇 ∗ 𝑞𝑁𝑇′ 
𝑝′ ∗ 𝑞(𝑝′; 𝜃𝑖 , ℎ) + 𝑝
𝑁𝑇 ∗ 𝑞𝑁𝑇
′
≤ 𝑝′ ∗ 𝑞(𝑝; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑙) + 𝑝
𝑁𝑇 ∗ 𝑞𝑁𝑇 
Rearranging yields: 
𝑝 ∗ [𝑞(𝑝; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑙) − 𝑞(𝑝
′; 𝜃𝑖 , ℎ)] ≤ 𝑝
𝑁𝑇 ∗ [𝑞𝑁𝑇
′
− 𝑞𝑁𝑇] ≤ 𝑝′ ∗ [𝑞(𝑝; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑙) − 𝑞(𝑝
′; 𝜃𝑖 , ℎ)] 
Thus, 𝑝′ > 𝑝 ⇒ 𝑞(𝑝; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑙) ≥ 𝑞(𝑝
′; 𝜃𝑖 , ℎ). ∎ 
Proof of Proposition 3: From lemma 1 and prices being bounded away from zero, we can always 
find a value of ?̂?𝑠 such that: 
∫ 𝑞(?̂?𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑙)𝑑𝐹𝜃(𝜃𝑖)
𝜃𝑖
≤ ∫ 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁(𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
≤ ∫ 𝑞(?̂?𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , ℎ)𝑑𝐹𝜃(𝜃𝑖)
𝜃𝑖
 
Pick 𝜆 ∈ [0,1] such that: 
𝜆 ∫ 𝑞(?̂?𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , ℎ)𝑑𝐹𝜃(𝜃𝑖)
𝜃𝑖
+ (1 − 𝜆)∫ 𝑞(?̂?𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑙)𝑑𝐹𝜃(𝜃𝑖)
𝜃𝑖
= ∫ 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁(𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
 
Define 𝐹𝜃,𝜁
′  so 𝐹𝜃
′ = 𝐹𝜃 and 𝜁 = ℎ with probability 𝜆, 𝜁 = 𝑙 with probability 1 − 𝜆, 𝜃 ⊥ 𝜁.  Then: 
∫ 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁(𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
= ∫ [𝜆𝑞(?̂?𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , ℎ) + (1 − 𝜆)𝑞(?̂?
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑙)]𝑑𝐹𝜃(𝜃𝑖)
𝜃𝑖
= ∫ 𝑞(?̂?𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝜃,𝜁(𝜃𝑖, 𝜁𝑖)
𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
       ∎ 
Proof of Theorem 2: From lemma 2 and rationalizability of the data: 
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∫ [𝑑𝑤𝑙(𝑝𝑏(𝑝𝑖
𝑠); 𝜃𝑖) + [𝑝𝑖
𝑠 − ?̅?] 𝑞(𝑝𝑏(𝑝𝑖
𝑠); 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)]𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁
′′ (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖
≥ ∫ [𝑑𝑤𝑙(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖) + [𝑝𝑖
𝑠 − ?̅?] 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)] 𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁(𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
 
∫ [𝑑𝑤𝑙(𝑝𝑏(𝑝𝑖
𝑠); 𝜃𝑖) + 𝑝𝑖
𝑠  𝑞(𝑝𝑏(𝑝𝑖
𝑠); 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)]𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁
′′ (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖
≥ ∫ [𝑑𝑤𝑙(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖) + 𝑝𝑖
𝑠 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)] 𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁(𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
 
∫ [𝑑𝑤𝑙(𝑝𝑏(𝑝𝑖
𝑠); 𝜃𝑖) + [𝑝𝑖
𝑠 − 𝑝𝑠] 𝑞(𝑝𝑏(𝑝𝑖
𝑠); 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)]𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁
′′ (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖
≥ ∫ [𝑑𝑤𝑙(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖) + [𝑝𝑖
𝑠 − 𝑝𝑠] 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)] 𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁(𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
 
Rearranging yields: 
∫ 𝑑𝑤𝑙(𝑝𝑏(𝑝𝑖
𝑠); 𝜃𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁
′′ (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖
≥ ∫ 𝑑𝑤𝑙(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁(𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
− ∫ [𝑝𝑖
𝑠 − 𝑝𝑠] 𝑞(𝑝𝑏(𝑝𝑖
𝑠); 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁
′′ (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖
+ ∫ [𝑝𝑖
𝑠 − 𝑝𝑠] 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁(𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
 
We can show from lemma 1 and 𝑝𝑖
𝑠 ∈ [?̅?, ?̅? + ?̅?𝜏] = 𝒫 ∀𝑖 that the last two terms total to a a 
non-negative value.  Formally, for any 𝑝𝑖
𝑠 ∈ (?̅?, ?̅? + ?̅? 𝜏), 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖
′: 
𝑝𝑖
𝑠 > 𝑝𝑠 ⇒ 𝑝𝑏(𝑝𝑖
𝑠) > 𝑝𝑠 ⇒ 𝑞(𝑝𝑏(𝑝𝑖
𝑠); 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖
′) ≤ 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) 
𝑝𝑖
𝑠 ≤ 𝑝𝑠 ⇒ 𝑝𝑏(𝑝𝑖
𝑠) < 𝑝𝑠 ⇒ 𝑞(𝑝𝑏(𝑝𝑖
𝑠); 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖
′) ≥ 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) 
Either way: 
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[𝑝𝑖
𝑠 − 𝑝𝑠] 𝑞(𝑝𝑏(𝑝𝑖
𝑠); 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖
′) ≤ [𝑝𝑖
𝑠 − 𝑝𝑠] 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) 
Thus: 
∫ [𝑝𝑖
𝑠 − 𝑝𝑠] 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁(𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
= ∫ [𝑝𝑖
𝑠 − 𝑝𝑠] 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁(𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠∈𝑖𝑛𝑡(𝒫),𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
+ ∫ [𝑝𝑖
𝑠 − 𝑝𝑠] 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁(𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠∈𝜕𝒫,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
≥ ∫ [𝑝𝑖
𝑠 − 𝑝𝑠] 𝑞(𝑝𝑏(𝑝𝑖
𝑠); 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁
′′ (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠∈𝑖𝑛𝑡(𝒫),𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
+ ∫ [𝑝𝑖
𝑠 − 𝑝𝑠] 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁(𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠∈𝜕𝒫,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
= ∫ [𝑝𝑖
𝑠 − 𝑝𝑠] 𝑞(𝑝𝑏(𝑝𝑖
𝑠); 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁
′′ (𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖
 
∫ 𝑑𝑤𝑙(𝑝𝑏(𝑝𝑖
𝑠); 𝜃𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁(𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖
≥ ∫ 𝑑𝑤𝑙(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁(𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
       ∎ 
 We now proceed to proving Theorem 3, i.e. that deadweight loss is maximized given the 
available data and distribution 𝐹𝜃
∗ by having a cutoff value Δ such that the ratio of 
𝑑𝑤𝑙(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖 , ℎ) to 𝑞(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑙) − 𝑞(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖 , ℎ) is greater (less than) Δ for those we 
assign a perceived price of ?̅? + ?̅?𝜏 (respectively ?̅?).  However, we must also consider the choice 
of conditional distribution of 𝜁.  Toward that end, we note that deadweight loss is bounded by 
the product of the reduction in demand and ?̅? 𝜏. 
Lemma 5: If 𝑝𝑖
𝑠 ∈ [?̅?, ?̅? + ?̅?𝜏], then 𝑑𝑤𝑙(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) ≤ [𝑞(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) − 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)] ?̅?𝜏 ∀𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖 .   
Proof: Using lemma 2: 
0 = 𝑑𝑤𝑙(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) ≥ 𝑑𝑤𝑙(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) − [𝑝𝑖
𝑠 − ?̅?] ∗ [𝑞(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) − 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)] 
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𝑑𝑤𝑙(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) ≤ [𝑞(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) − 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)] ∗ [𝑝𝑖
𝑠 − ?̅?] ≤ [𝑞(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) − 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)] ?̅?𝜏     ∎ 
Proof of Theorem 3: The outline of the proof is as follows. First, we use lemma 5 to show that 
the maximal deadweight loss consistent with aggregate demand and 𝐹𝜃
∗ comes from a data-
generating process in which agents perceiving the price ?̅? + ?̅?𝜏 choose the lowest quantity 
consistent with preference maximization, whereas the other agents choose the largest such 
quantity. Then, we show that distributions satisfying such a property yield deadweight loss 
no larger than the proposed distribution, which exists. 
 First, consider an arbitrary distribution 𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁  (yielding well-defined aggregate demand 
and deadweight loss) such that 𝐹𝜃 = 𝐹𝜃
∗ and: 
𝐹𝑝𝑠 = {
0, 𝑝𝑖
𝑠 < ?̅?
𝐹𝑝𝑠(?̅?), 𝑝𝑖
𝑠 ∈ [?̅?, ?̅? + ?̅?𝜏)
1, 𝑝𝑖
𝑠 ≥ ?̅? + ?̅?𝜏
 
In words, the above expression says that the support of 𝑝𝑠 is contained in {?̅?, ?̅? + ?̅?𝜏}.  By 
Theorem 2, the maximal value of deadweight loss consistent with aggregate demand and 𝐹𝜃
∗ 
must satisfy this property.  Consider some value 𝜌 ∈ [0,1] such that: 
𝜌 ∫ 𝑞(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑙) 𝑑𝐹𝜃|𝑝𝑠≠?̅?(𝜃𝑖)
𝜃𝑖
+ (1 − 𝜌)∫ 𝑞(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖 , ℎ)𝑑𝐹𝜃|𝑝𝑠=?̅?(𝜃𝑖)
𝜃𝑖
= ∫ 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁(𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
(10)
 
Such a value of 𝜌 must exist by the Intermediate Value Theorem, since by the definitions of 𝑙 & 
ℎ and the CLD as expressed in lemma 1: 
∫ 𝑞(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑙)𝑑𝐹𝜃|𝑝𝑠≠?̅?(𝜃𝑖)
𝜃𝑖
≤ ∫ 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁(𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
≤ ∫ 𝑞(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖 , ℎ)𝑑𝐹𝜃|𝑝𝑠=?̅?(𝜃𝑖)
𝜃𝑖
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In words, we are constructing an alternative distribution that rationalizes aggregate demand 
such that 𝑝𝑠 = ?̅? + ?̅?𝜏 & 𝜁 = 𝑙 with probability 𝜌, and otherwise 𝑝𝑠 = ?̅? & 𝜁 = ℎ.  We now 
show that this alternate distribution yields at least as much deadweight loss, thus showing 
that the maximal value of deadweight loss consistent with aggregate demand and 𝐹𝜃
∗ must arise 
from a distribution in which almost surely (𝑝𝑠, 𝜁) = (?̅?, ℎ) or (𝑝𝑠, 𝜁) = (?̅? + ?̅?𝜏, 𝑙).   
 From the definition of deadweight loss: 
∫ ?̅?𝜏 [𝑞(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) − 𝑞(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑙)] 𝑑𝐹𝜃,𝜁|𝑝𝑠≠?̅?(𝜃𝑖, 𝜁𝑖)
𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
= ∫  [𝑑𝑤𝑙(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑙) − 𝑑𝑤𝑙(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)] 𝑑𝐹𝜃,𝜁|𝑝𝑠≠?̅?(𝜃𝑖, 𝜁𝑖)
𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
 
From here, the definition of 𝑙, and using the fact that 𝑑𝑤𝑙(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖) = 0 ∀𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖, we have 
that 𝜌 ≥ 1 − 𝐹𝑝𝑠(?̅?) implies that: 
𝜌 ∫ 𝑑𝑤𝑙(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑙)𝑑𝐹𝜃|𝑝𝑠≠?̅?(𝜃𝑖)
𝜃𝑖
+ (1 − 𝜌)∫ 𝑑𝑤𝑙(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖 , ℎ)𝑑𝐹𝜃|𝑝𝑠=?̅?(𝜃𝑖)
𝜃𝑖
= 𝜌 ∫ 𝑑𝑤𝑙(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑙)𝑑𝐹𝜃|𝑝𝑠≠?̅?(𝜃𝑖)
𝜃𝑖
≥ [1 − 𝐹𝑝𝑠(?̅?)]∫ 𝑑𝑤𝑙(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑙)𝑑𝐹𝜃|𝑝𝑠≠?̅?(𝜃𝑖)
𝜃𝑖
= [1 − 𝐹𝑝𝑠(?̅?)]∫ 𝑑𝑤𝑙(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝜃,𝜁|𝑝𝑠≠?̅?(𝜃𝑖)
𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
+ 𝐹𝑝𝑠(?̅?)∫ 𝑑𝑤𝑙(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝜃,𝜁|𝑝𝑠=?̅?(𝜃𝑖, 𝜁𝑖)
𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
= ∫ 𝑑𝑤𝑙(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝜃,𝜁(𝜃𝑖)
𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
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The inequality follows from 𝜌 ≥ 1 − 𝐹𝑝𝑠(?̅?) by assumption.  This shows that whenever 𝜌 ≥ 1 −
𝐹𝑝𝑠(?̅?), the proposed alternative distribution yields at least as much deadweight loss. Now 
suppose instead 𝜌 < 1 − 𝐹𝑝𝑠(?̅?).  From lemma 5: 
∫ 𝑑𝑤𝑙(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝜃,𝜁|𝑝𝑠≠?̅?(𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
≥ ?̅?𝜏 ∫ [𝑞(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖 , ℎ) − 𝑞(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)] ?̅?𝜏𝑑𝐹𝜃,𝜁|𝑝𝑠≠?̅?(𝜃𝑖, 𝜁𝑖)
𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
 
In addition, we find it convenient to rewrite the aggregate demand-rationalizing equation as: 
∫ 𝑞(𝑝𝑖
𝑠; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑝𝑠,𝜃,𝜁(𝑝𝑖
𝑠, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝑝𝑖
𝑠,𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
= [1 − 𝐹𝑝𝑠(?̅?)]∫ 𝑞(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖  , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝜃,𝜁|𝑝𝑠≠?̅?(𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
+ 𝐹𝑝𝑠(?̅?)∫ 𝑞(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝜃,𝜁|𝑝𝑠=?̅?(𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
 
And so, using equation (10) and rearranging terms: 
𝜌 ∫ [𝑞(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖  , 𝜁𝑖) − 𝑞(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖  , 𝑙)]𝑑𝐹𝜃,𝜁(𝜃𝑖, 𝜁𝑖)
𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
= (1 − 𝜌)∫ 𝑞(?̅?; 𝜃𝑖 , ℎ)𝑑𝐹𝜃|𝑝𝑠=?̅?(𝜃𝑖)
𝜃𝑖
− [1 − 𝐹𝑝𝑠(?̅?) − 𝜌]∫ 𝑞(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝜃,𝜁|𝑝𝑠≠?̅?(𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
− 𝐹𝑝𝑠(?̅?)∫ 𝑞(?̅? + ?̅?𝜏; 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝜃,𝜁|𝑝𝑠≠?̅?(𝜃𝑖 , 𝜁𝑖)
𝜃𝑖,𝜁𝑖
 
Using lemma 5 and plugging in yields: 
ρ∫
θi
dwl(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, l)dFθ|ps 6=p¯(θi) + (1− ρ)
∫
θi
dwl(p¯; θi, h)dFθ|ps=p¯(θi)
= ρ
∫
θi
dwl(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, l)dFθ|ps 6=p¯(θi)
= ρ
∫
θi,ζi
[
dwl(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, ζi)− q(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, l) + q(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, ζi)
]
dFθ,ζ|ps 6=p¯(θi, ζi)
= ρ
∫
θi,ζi
dwl(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, ζi)dFθ,ζ|ps 6=p¯(θi, ζi)
+ ρ
∫
θi,ζi
[q(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, ζi)− q(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, l)]dFθ,ζ(θi, ζi)
= ρ
∫
θi,ζi
dwl(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, ζi)dFθ,ζ|ps 6=p¯(θi, ζi) + (1− ρ)
∫
θi
q(p¯; θi, h)dFθ|ps=p¯(θi)
− [1− Fps(p¯)− ρ]
∫
θi,ζi
q(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, ζi)dFθ,ζ|ps 6=p¯(θi, ζi)
− Fps(p¯)
∫
θi,ζi
q(p¯; θi, ζi)dFθ,ζ|ps=p¯(θi, ζi)
= ρ
∫
θi,ζi
dwl(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, ζi)dFθ,ζ|ps 6=p¯(θi, ζi) + Fps(p¯)
∫
θi
q(p¯; θi, h)dFθ|ps=p¯(θi)
+ [1− Fps(p¯)− ρ]
∫
θi,ζi
[
q(p¯; θi, h)− q(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, ζi)
]
dFθ,ζ|ps 6=p¯(θi, ζi)
− Fps(p¯)
∫
θi,ζi
q(p¯; θi, ζi)dFθ,ζ|ps=p¯(θi, ζi)
≥ ρ
∫
θi,ζi
dwl(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, ζi)dFθ,ζ|ps 6=p¯(θi, ζi) + Fps(p¯)
∫
θi
q(p¯; θi, h)dFθ|ps=p¯(θi)
+ [1− Fps(p¯)− ρ]m¯τ
∫
θi,ζi
dwl(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, ζi)dFθ,ζ|ps 6=p¯(θi, ζi)
− Fps(p¯)
∫
θi,ζi
q(p¯; θi, ζi)dFθ,ζ|ps=p¯(θi, ζi)
≥ ρ
∫
θi,ζi
dwl(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, ζi)dFθ,ζ|ps 6=p¯(θi, ζi)
+ [1− Fps(p¯)− ρ]m¯τ
∫
θi,ζi
dwl(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, ζi)dFθ,ζ|ps 6=p¯(θi, ζi)
= [1− Fps(p¯)]
∫
θi,ζi
dwl(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, ζi)dFθ,ζ|ps 6=p¯(θi, ζi) + Fps(p¯)
∫
θi,ζi
dwl(p¯; θi, ζi)dFθ,ζ|ps=p¯(θi, ζi)
Thus, we know that the maximal deadweight loss consistent with aggregate demand and F ∗θ
is generated by a distribution in whichwith probability one either (ps, ζ) = (p¯, h) or (ps, ζ) =
(p¯+ m¯τ, l). We refer to distributions of this sort as binary distributions.
Now, we show that the proposed distributionmaximizes deadweight loss among all binary
70
distributions, and thus among all distributions, that rationalize aggregate demand such that
Fθ = F
∗
θ . Towards that end, we first show that the proposed distribution exists. Note by
lemma 5 and the CLD as in lemma 1:
∫
θi
q˜m¯τ,1(θi)dF
∗
ps,θ(p
s
i , θi) ≤
∫
psi ,θi,ζi
q(psi ; θi, ζi)dF
∗
ps,θ,ζ(p
s
i , θi, ζi) ≤
∫
θi
q˜0,0(θi)dF
∗
ps,θ(p
s
i , θi)
In words, aggregate demand is contained between when all agents perceive a high price &
have type h and when all agents perceive a low price & have type l. Furthermore, one can
confirm that for any∆,∆′, γ, γ′ such that 0 ≤ ∆ < ∆′ ≤ m¯τ and 0 ≤ γ < γ′ ≤ 1:
∫
θi
q˜∆,γ′(θi)dF
∗
ps,θ(p
s
i , θi) ≤
∫
θi
q˜∆,γ(θi)dF
∗
ps,θ(p
s
i , θi)
∫
θi
q˜∆′,γ′(θi)dF
∗
ps,θ(p
s
i , θi) ≥
∫
θi
q˜∆,γ(θi)dF
∗
ps,θ(p
s
i , θi)
Thus, we can pick∆ such that:
∫
θi
q˜∆,1(θi)dF
∗
ps,θ(p
s
i , θi) ≤
∫
psi ,θi,ζi
q(psi ; θi, ζi)dF
∗
ps,θ,ζ(p
s
i , θi, ζi) ≤
∫
θi
q˜∆,0(θi)dF
∗
ps,θ(p
s
i , θi)
If both sides hold with equality, we can define γ arbitrarily. Otherwise, we define γ so that
the market clears:
γ ≡
∫
psi ,θi,ζi
q(psi ; θi, ζi)dF
∗
ps,θ,ζ(p
s
i , θi, ζi)−
∫
θi
q˜∆,0(θi)dF
∗
ps,θ(p
s
i , θi)∫
θi
q˜∆,1(θi)dF ∗ps,θ(p
s
i , θi)−
∫
θi
q˜∆,0(θi)dF ∗ps,θ(p
s
i , θi)
We now have the values∆ and γ such that themarket clears. Suppressing∆ and γ subscripts
from q˜, we can say that:
∫
θi
q˜(θi)dF
∗
ps,θ(p
s
i , θi) =
∫
psi ,θi,ζi
q(psi ; θi, ζi)dF
∗
ps,θ,ζ(p
s
i , θi, ζi)
Finally, to show that the proposed distribution maximizes deadweight loss, consider ar-
bitrary binary distribution Fps,θ,ζ that rationalizes aggregate demand. Defining PF (ps 6=
p¯|θi) ≡ 1− Fps|θ=θi(p¯+ m¯τ) as the probability that (ps, ζ) = (p¯+ m¯τ, l) conditional on θi,
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rationalizing aggregate demand with Fθ = F ∗θ means that:
∫
θi
[
PF (ps 6= p¯|θi) q(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, l) + Fps|θ=θi(p¯) q(p¯; θi, h)
]
dF ∗θ (θi)
=
∫
psi ,θi,ζi
q(psi ; θi, ζi)dF
∗
ps,θ,ζ(p
s
i , θi, ζi)
We can now write the difference in generated values of aggregate deadweight loss as:
∫
θi
[ q˜(θi)− q(p¯; θi, h)
q(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, l)− q(p¯; θi, h) − PF (p
s 6= p¯|θi)
]
dwl(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, l)dF
∗
θ (θi)
=
∫
θi:dwl(p¯+m¯τ)>∆[q(p¯;θi,h)−q(p¯+m¯τ ;θi,l)]
[1− PF (ps 6= p¯|θi)]dwl(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi)dF ∗θ (θi)
+
∫
θi:dwl(p¯+m¯τ)=∆[q(p¯;θi,h)−q(p¯+m¯τ ;θi,l)]
[γ − PF (ps 6= p¯|θi)]dwl(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi)dF ∗θ (θi)
−
∫
θi:dwl(p¯+m¯τ)<∆[q(p¯;θi,h)−q(p¯+m¯τ ;θi,l)]
PF (ps 6= p¯|θi)dwl(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi)dF ∗θ (θi)
≥ ∆
∫
θi:dwl(p¯+m¯τ)>∆[q(p¯;θi,h)−q(p¯+m¯τ ;θi,l)]
[1− PF (ps 6= p¯|θi)] [q(p¯; θi, h)− q(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, l)]dF ∗θ (θi)
+ ∆
∫
θi:dwl(p¯+m¯τ)=∆[q(p¯;θi,h)−q(p¯+m¯τ ;θi,l)]
[γ − PF (ps 6= p¯|θi)] [q(p¯; θi, h)− q(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, l)]dF ∗θ (θi)
−∆
∫
θi:dwl(p¯+m¯τ)<∆[q(p¯;θi,h)−q(p¯+m¯τ ;θi,l)]
PF (ps 6= p¯|θi)[q(p¯; θi, h)− q(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, l)]dF ∗θ (θi)
We complete the proof by showing the right-hand side of the last inequality is zero. Since
both distributions rationalize the same aggregate demand:
∫
θi:dwl(p¯+m¯τ)>∆[q(p¯;θi,h)−q(p¯+m¯τ ;θi,l)]
q(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, l)dF
∗
θ (θi)
+
∫
θi:dwl(p¯+m¯τ)=∆[q(p¯;θi,h)−q(p¯+m¯τ ;θi,l)]
[γq(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, l) + (1− γ)q(p¯; θi, h)]dF ∗θ (θi)
+
∫
θi:dwl(p¯+m¯τ)<∆[q(p¯;θi,h)−q(p¯+m¯τ ;θi,l)]
q(p¯; θi, h)dF
∗
θ (θi)
=
∫
θi
[
PF (ps 6= ps|θi) [q(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, l)− q(p¯; θi, h)] + q(p¯; θi, h)
]
dF ∗θ (θi)
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Subtracting both sides from
∫
θi
q(p¯; θi, h)dF
∗
θ (θi) yields:
∫
θi:dwl(p¯+m¯τ)>∆[q(p¯;θi,h)−q(p¯+m¯τ ;θi,l)]
[q(p¯; θi, h)− q(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, l)]dF ∗θ (θi)
+
∫
θi:dwl(p¯+m¯τ)=∆[q(p¯;θi,h)−q(p¯+m¯τ ;θi,l)]
γ[q(p¯; θi, h)− q(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, l)]dF ∗θ (θi)
=
∫
θi
PF (ps 6= ps|θi) [q(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, l)− q(p¯; θi, h)]dF ∗θ (θi)
Finally, subtracting the right-hand side from the left-hand size and multiplying by zero yields
the desired result. Thus:
∫
θi
[ q˜(θi)− q(p¯; θi, h)
q(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, l)− q(p¯; θi, h) − PF (p
s 6= p¯|θi)
]
dwl(p¯+ m¯τ ; θi, l)dF
∗
θ (θi) = 0
In words, deadweight loss from the proposed distribution is at least as great as the dead-
weight loss from any binary distribution that also rationalizes aggregate demand and with the
true distribution of preference types. From the first part of the proof, any distribution that
rationalized aggregate demand and had the support of perceived prices contained in ∂dP
yielded deadweight loss no greater than what one could obtain with a binary distribution
that rationalized aggregate demand with Fθ = F ∗θ . Theorem 2 noted that any distribution
that rationalized aggregate demand with Fθ = F ∗θ yielded deadweight loss no greater than
that one could obtain with a distribution that had the support of perceived prices contained
in ∂dP , rationalized aggregate demand, and had Fθ = F ∗θ . Therefore, any distribution that
rationalizes aggregate demand and with Fθ = F ∗θ yields deadweight loss no greater than the
proposed distribution.
Claim: If mit ⊥ βit, βit ≤ 0 with probability one, and mit has an exponential distribution,
then:
mˆ ≤ 0.5⇒ E[dwlit|τ ] ≤ −1
2
E[β˜it]τ2 ∀τ
Proof : Since the variance of an exponentially-distributed random variable is its squared ex-
pected value:
E(m2it) = V ar(mit) + (E[mit])2 = 2(E[mit])2
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Also, from the independence of salience and sticker price responsiveness: 
?̂? =
𝔼[𝛽𝑖𝑡]
𝔼[𝛽𝑖𝑡]
=
𝔼[𝑚𝑖𝑡]𝔼[𝛽𝑖𝑡]
𝔼[𝛽𝑖𝑡]
= 𝔼[𝑚𝑖𝑡] 
Combining these results and again using 𝑚𝑖𝑡 ⊥ 𝛽𝑖𝑡 yields: 
?̂? ≤ 0.5 ⇒ 𝔼[𝑑𝑤𝑙𝑖𝑡|𝜏] = −
1
2
𝔼[𝑚𝑖𝑡
2 ]𝔼[𝛽𝑖𝑡]𝜏
2 = −
1
2
(2(𝔼[𝑚𝑖𝑡])
2)𝔼[𝛽𝑖𝑡]𝜏
2 ≤ −
1
2
𝔼[𝑚𝑖𝑡]𝜏
2 
This inequality uses the fact that 𝔼[𝛽𝑖𝑡] ≤ 0 ≤ 𝔼[𝑚𝑖𝑡].  ∎ 
A.3  Additional Proofs and Results from Section 4 
Proof of Theorem 4: Pick any 𝜆1 ≠ 0 and 𝜆2 ∈ ℝ.  Pick a sequence (?̅?𝑘, 𝜏𝑘)𝑘=1
∞  contained within 
the support of (?̅?, 𝜏) that blows up in magnitude such that 
𝜏𝑘
?̅?𝑘
→
𝜆2
𝜆1
.  Then for each 𝑘 ∈ ℕ, since 
price and consumption are observable, one can identify the distribution of: 
𝑞
?̅?𝑘
=
𝛼 + 𝜖
?̅?𝑘
+ 𝛽 + 𝛽
𝜏𝑘
?̅?𝑘
 
Taking the limit as 𝑘 → ∞ and multiplying both sides by 𝜆1, we can identify the distribution of: 
𝜆1 lim
𝑘→∞
𝑞
?̅?𝑘
= 𝜆1 [ lim
𝑘→∞
𝛼 + 𝜖
?̅?𝑘
+ 𝛽 + 𝛽
𝜏𝑘
?̅?𝑘
] 
Since ?̅?𝑘 blows up in magnitude as 𝑘 → ∞: 
𝜆1 lim
𝑘→∞
𝑞
?̅?𝑘
= 𝜆1𝛽 + 𝜆2𝛽 
Note that we can alternatively pick a sequence (?̅?𝑘, 𝜏𝑘)𝑘=1
∞  contained within the support 
of (?̅?, 𝜏) so that ?̅?𝑘 remains bounded while 𝜏𝑘 blows up.  In this case, we can identify: 
lim
𝑘→∞
𝑞
𝜏𝑘
= lim
𝑘→∞
𝛼 + 𝜖
𝜏𝑘
+ 𝛽
?̅?𝑘
𝜏𝑘
+ 𝛽 = 𝛽 
Multiplying both sides by arbitrary 𝜆2 ∈ ℝ yields: 
𝜆2 lim
𝑘→∞
𝑞
𝜏𝑘
= 𝜆2𝛽 
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Thus, we can identify the distribution of 𝜆1𝛽 + 𝜆2𝛽 for any (𝜆1, 𝜆2) ∈ ℝ
2.  By the Cramèr-Wold 
theorem, we can identify the joint distribution of (𝛽, 𝛽), and so can identify 𝔼[𝑑𝑤𝑙𝑖] =
−
1
2
𝔼 [
?̃?2
𝛽
] 𝜏2 for any 𝜏. ∎ 
B. Empirical Application of Linear Model 
 We apply the linear specification of section 3.3 to data gathered by CLK (2009) on the 
aggregate consumption of beer in U.S. states between 1970 and 2003. First, we translate 
their model (in logs) to our linear specification. Second, we estimate the same equation of 
interest under different sets of controls: 
𝑦𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝜏𝑠𝑡
𝑒 + 𝛽𝜏𝑠𝑡
𝑠 + 𝛾𝑋𝑠𝑡 + 𝜖𝑠𝑡 
For each linear specification, we compute ?̂? =
?̃?
𝛽
, which gives us the ratio of upper bound of 
deadweight loss to lower bound of deadweight loss if ?̅? = 1, i.e. agents never overreact to 
taxes.  Results are presented in table 3.  We also estimate various other specifications, again 
following CLK (2009), presented in table 4, meant to address concerns for spurious results – in 
particular, it could be the case that consumers react differently to the two tax rates as while 
sales taxes affect a variety of goods, excise taxes on beer affect only beer prices. The second 
last column of table 4 shows estimates for a regression only for those states that exempt food 
(a likely substitute of beer) from sales tax, demonstrating that even in this restricted sample 
beer consumption is quite insensitive to sales tax. Finally, the last column addresses the 
potential concern that people might be substituting toward other alcoholic beverages when 
they face a beer tax increase, and not when they face a sales tax increase. The share of ethanol 
people consume in the form of beer is insensitive to either tax rate. 
Baseline Business cycle Alcohol regulations Region trends
∆(excise tax) -.08 -.11 -.1 -.07
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
∆(sales tax) -.05 -.02 -.02 -.03
(0.07) (.07) (.07) (.07)
∆(population) -.0002 -.0002 -.0001 -.0002
(0.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
∆(income per cap.) .0002 .0002 .0002
(.00006) (.00006) (.00006)
∆(unemployment) -.09 -.1 -.09
(.03) (.03) (.03)
Alcohol reg. controls X X
Year FE X X X X
Region FE X
mˆ .67 .2 .23 .46
(.87) (.62) (.65) (.99)
Sample size 1,607 1,487 1,487 1,487
Table 3: Estimating mˆ with several sets of controls, following the specifications in Chetty et al.
(2009) in the context of a linear model.
We repeat the exercise for Goldin and Homonoff (2013), who have a similar set-up with
individual-level, cross-sectional data on cigarette consumption. The ratio of average respon-
siveness to sales taxes relative to the average responsiveness to excise taxes of about zero,
although the estimate quite uncertain (see table 5 for details). Rosen (1976) uses a linear
model, so we directly use his estimates from table 1 of his paper, reporting these results in
table 6.
76
Policy IV 3-Year differences Food exempt Dep. var.: share of
for excise tax ethanol from beer
∆(excise tax) -.12 -.24 -.1 .0003
(.06) (.1) (.04) (.0005)
∆(sales tax) -.02 -.03 -.05 .001
(.07) (.07) (.07) (.001)
∆(population) -.0001 -.002 -.00002 -.0000
(0.0002) (.0015) (.0002) (.0000)
∆(income per cap.) .0001 .0002 .0002 .0000
(.00006) (.00007) (.00007) (.0000)
∆(unemployment) -.09 -.03 -.06 -.0001
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.0004)
Alcohol reg. controls X X X X
Year FE X X X X
mˆ .17 .11 .52
(.54) (.3) (.68)
Sample size 1,487 1,389 937 1,487
Table 4: Estimating mˆ following the strategy of CLK (2009) in the context of a linear model. As in
CLK, we use nominal excise tax rate divided by the average price of a case of beer from 1970 to
2003 as an IV for excise tax to eliminate tax-rate variation coming from inflation erosion. Next,
we run the same regression in 3-year differences. Next, we run it only for states where food is
exempt from sales-tax, to address concerns about whether consumers react differently to changes
in the two taxes only because sales taxes apply to a broad set of goods. Finally, the last column
addresses the concern that beer taxesmay induce substitionwith other alcoholic products, biasing
the coefficient on excise tax relative to the one on sales tax. It shows that beer excise taxes have
no discernable effect on the share of ethanol consumed from beer.
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Specification
1 2 3
Excise Tax -4.85 -4.73 -4.87
(.92) (.92) (.94)
Sales Tax -.72 .42 .32
(4.89) (5.25) (5.26)
Demographic controls X X X
Econ. conditions controls X X
Income trend controls X
State,year, and month FE X X X
mˆ .15 -.09 -.07
(1.01) (1.11) (1.10)
Sample size 274,137 274,137 274,137
Table 5: Estimating mˆ based on the intensive response of cigarette consumption to sales taxes
(not included in sticker price) and excise taxes (included in the sticker price). The specifications
are a linearized version of the specifications in Goldin and Homonoff (2013).
Hours/Year Hours/Year Hours/Week Hours/Week
MTR at zero hours MTR at full time MTR at zero hours MTR at full time
Wage 990.4 1218.1 18.8 21.96
(74.88) (106.3) (1.75) (2.48)
MTR*Wage -950.7 -1480.7 -21.1 -26.58
(269.7) (324.5) (6.29) (7.58)
mˆ 0.96 1.21 1.12 1.21
(.217) (.175) (.257) (.227)
Sample size 2,545 2,545 2,545 2,545
Table 6: We report regression results directly from Table 1 of Rosen (1976).
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CHAPTER 2 
Tax Remittance Invariance 
by Benjamin Glass and Joel Slemrod* 
 
 
Abstract 
 In partial equilibrium, conventional wisdom holds that the impact of a sales tax does not 
depend on whether the buyer or the seller remits the tax to the government.   We extend this 
result to a general setting.  Equilibrium non-transfer activity depends only on the total tax 
liability, regardless of who bears the statutory remittance liability.  In a competitive setting, this 
result applies when all agents must pay each other for sales and purchases.  However, changing 
the remittance obligation may transfer wealth lump-sum, depending on legal production and 
consumption rights.  Thus, the remittance neutrality of taxes is a variation on Coase’s Theorem. 
                                                          
* University of Michigan 
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1. Introduction 
All but lump-sum taxes affect production, trade, and consumption by altering incentives.  
Yet these incentives also depend on behavior-contingent transfers between agents.  For 
instance, a seller of a good may have a legal obligation to remit a sales tax, but the buyer 
provides a transfer in the form of a price contingent upon purchase of the good.  It is well 
understood that, if the market is competitive, then the price of the good would adjust in 
response to shifting the legal obligation to remit the tax to the buyer.  This new equilibrium 
would yield the same amount of the good sold, as well as the same tax burden on each agent.  
In this way, it does not matter which agent remits the tax.  Slemrod (2008) refers to this 
property as remittance invariance.  We will use this term and remittance neutrality 
interchangeably. 
We generalize this remittance neutrality result to a setting in which agents attempt to 
coordinate on taxed economic activity via action-contingent transfers.  However, there is an 
exogenous network that determines the ability of agents to transfer to each other.  This 
captures the intuition that some agents do not know each other, and so cannot pay each other 
for changing their own behavior.  Yet, if the network of relationships between agents is 
connected, altering the remittance responsibility does not affect the non-transfer actions or tax 
incidence for any agents in the network.  Intuitively, if the remittance responsibility shifts from 
agent A to agent B, agent B may require compensation from another agent, who demands 
compensation from yet another agent, until eventually agent A is required to compensate for 
the increased statutory burden on agent B. 
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In our setting, we assume a fixed payoff vector for failure to coordinate.  This means the 
change in remittance obligations does not affect the bargaining power of any agents, ruling out 
income effects.  In this environment, a redistribution of remittance obligations does not affect 
non-transfer actions or equilibrium payoffs.  For example, one may interpret failure to 
coordinate as agents consuming their initial endowments.  This requires that the tax code 
always lets one consume all initial endowments.  This would not hold, for instance, if the sale of 
a good by agent A to agent B created a remittance obligation for unrelated third-party C.  Then 
agent C might pay agent B (directly or through paying another agent to pay agent B) to not 
purchase the good from agent A.  This yields the same substitution effect of the tax as if the 
remittance obligation were directly on agent B, but now the tax impoverishes agent C to the 
benefit of agent B.   
Our result has strong similarities with Coase’s Theorem (see Coase 1960), in which any 
configuration of well-defined ownership rights yields an efficient equilibrium in an environment 
with externalities.  In either case, agents offer action-contingent transfers to modify each 
other’s behavior.  Coase emphasizes that efficiency requires agents to make contracts providing 
for action-contingent transfers.  To the degree agents cannot contract with each other, 
externalities still yield inefficiency.  We emphasize that a connected network in which any pair 
of connected agents can contract with each other has no contractibility issue.  
Our model has agents strategically cooperating, but our main result also applies to 
competitive markets.  Intuitively, the price mechanism is a coordination device, dictating to 
agents how to divide the surplus from their interactions.  More formally, any Walrasian 
equilibrium is an allocation of resources such that no coalition of agents could all be better off 
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with an alternative arrangement using their own endowed resources.1  This means no group of 
agents could agree amongst themselves upon an alternative to the equilibrium allocation.    
In Coase (1960), if agent A’s activity hurts agent B, then the same result obtains whether 
agent A requires payment from agent B to engage in that activity or agent B must pay agent A 
to desist from the activity.  But agents A and B are not indifferent as to who pays whom.  
Transferring property rights from A to B effectively transfers wealth from A to B.  But this is the 
only effect of the change in property rights; it does not distort the behavior of either agent.  
Similarly, if a producer and consumer’s transactions generate a statutory tax burden on a 
third party, then there is a substantial transfer of wealth if the third party must pay off either 
the buyer or seller to not transact with each other.  Formally, in a variant of our model in which 
agents pay each other to not buy or sell, one can redistribute wealth lump-sum corresponding 
with a change in the distribution of statutory tax liability to obtain the same non-transfer action 
profile and tax incidence when the total statutory tax liability for the same actions remains 
unchanged. We refer to this as an impure variation on remittance neutrality that includes 
income effects resulting from the change in the tax code. 
Whether an alteration in remittance responsibility affects a lump-sum transfer depends in 
practice on legal details.  For instance, suppose originally a customer remits taxes generated by 
purchases of a good using a credit card.  Subsequently, the government shifts this remittance 
obligation onto the credit card company.2  If the credit card company can demand a fee from 
                                                          
1 In fact, there is no coalition of agents who could all be at least as well off, with some strictly better off.  This is an 
extension of the First Welfare Theorem.  One can find a demonstration of this point in Mas-Colell, Whinston, and 
Green (1995).   
2 In fact, Costa Rica requires credit card companies to remit taxes.  See Brockmeyer and Hernandez (2016). 
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the customer for use of the credit card, then they will demand a fee equal to the tax obligation, 
and so the amount that the customer pays using the credit card remains unaltered.  However, if 
the credit card company legally must permit the customer to use the credit card for these 
purchases, then instead the credit card company offers a rebate to the consumer equal to the 
size of the tax obligation abated by the consumer from reducing consumption from what it 
would have been had there been no tax.3  This makes the consumer substantially wealthier 
than under the original remittance regime, yet the consumer faces the same opportunity cost 
of an additional unit of consumption.  Lump-sum transferring funds from the credit card 
company to the consumer could then yield the original equilibrium level of consumption.  
 We are not aware of any tax code in which transactions yield tax obligations on third 
parties that were not involved in some way with the transaction.  Yet we discuss the impure 
remittance invariance result for two reasons.  One, as illustrated in the credit card example, a 
party nominally involved in a transaction may have no effective say in the transaction in 
practice.  Two, even if we felt that no government currently imposed remittance obligations on 
third parties unrelated to the corresponding transaction, this would not imply that a 
government could not contemplate such a policy.4  
In terms of the theoretical focus on tax remittances, this paper is most similar with Slemrod 
(2008), which discusses the conditions under which remittance responsibility affects outcomes 
                                                          
3 This supposes two details.  One, the credit card company has sufficient profit from other sources that it does not 
seek to (or otherwise cannot) avoid these payments by shutting down.  Two, the company knows how much the 
consumer would consume in the absence of any taxes.  If the company was not sure, it could choose a liberal 
estimate of this amount.  That would yield a greater transfer of wealth from the company to the consumers. 
4 For instance, the Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism generally requires payments from agents based on the 
reports (actions) of other players.  See Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), where they refer to the VCG 
mechanism as Groves-Clark.  The VCG mechanism can be nested in our model with the mechanism designer as an 
agent connected to all other agents. 
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of economic significance.  Slemrod argues that tax remittance responsibility matters to the 
degree it affects the administrative and compliance costs of taxation, as well as and tax evasion.  
Similarly, Kopczuk et al. (2016) provide evidence that diesel tax evasion is facilitated when 
(downstream) retailors have the remittance obligation compared to when (upstream) 
wholesalers do.  But our model appears novel in considering the remittance problem beyond 
the bilateral interaction between supply and demand in a single market. 
This paper also shares some theoretical similarities with Bagwell and Bernheim (1988). One, 
they study a connected network of dynasties, where connections in their setting indicate 
altruistic concern. Two, they use their connected network to demonstrate the robustness of 
economic decisions to initial conditions. However, Bagwell and Bernheim (1988) use a 
directional connected tree (parents giving to children), whereas we use an undirected 
connected network (i.e. any connected pair of people can transfer arbitrarily to each other). 
Also, Bagwell and Bernheim (1988) demonstrate an implausible neutrality to almost all public 
redistributions, taxes, and prices. In contrast, the result in this model still allows for the 
magnitude of aggregate tax burdens generated by activity to matter.  It only precludes the 
distribution of remittance obligations from having anything more than a lump-sum effect. 
We begin by demonstrating tax remittance invariance without specifying a specific market 
structure.  Thereafter, we focus on competitive markets.  We believe our main result is also 
applicable to imperfectly competitive markets, and so relates to the work of Weyl and Fabinger 
(2013), who demonstrate tax remittance invariance in various imperfectly competitive partial 
equilibrium market structures. 
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Section 2 develops the model, formalizing the economy as a one-shot game with an 
exogenous outside option for all players. Section 3 describes the main result, while section 4 
maps this result to a competitive setting.  Section 5 extends the competitive setting to account 
for different entitlements to transact.  In section 6, we reinterpret the general model to 
consider tax administrative and compliance costs.  Section 7 concludes. 
2. Model  
We describe the game in four stages.  First, we lay out the tax environment.  Second, we 
describe the exogenous connections between players.  It is while describing these connections 
that we define what it means for the network of agents to be connected.  Third, we describe 
the choice sets of agents.  Finally, we define the payoff functions of the agents.  It is only when 
we describe the payoff functions that the formal relationship between connections and 
transfers becomes clear. 
First, let 𝒩 denote the finite network of agents indexed by 𝑖, and let 𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇 denote the 
period.  In each period 𝑡, agents 𝑖 have non-transfer choice sets 𝐴𝑖𝑡.  We think of these actions 
as production, trade, and consumption.  An agent 𝑖 may not have a meaningful choice in a 
period 𝑡, in which case the cardinality of 𝐴𝑖𝑡 is one.  Let 𝐴𝑖 ≡ ∏ 𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1  denote the set of 
streams of non-transfer choices of agent 𝑖, and let 𝐴 ≡ ∏ 𝐴𝑖𝑖∈𝒩  denote the set of non-transfer 
action profiles.  These action profiles yield tax remittance responsibility 𝜏𝑖: 𝐴 → ℝ for each 
agent 𝑖.  These taxes do not depend on transfers, ruling out taxes on transfers.5   
                                                          
5 This precludes inheritance taxes and taxes on gifts.  For instance, even if agent A had to remit one dollar to the 
government for every dollar given to agent B, agent A may still wish to transfer funds to agent B.  However, that 
calculus changes dramatically if for every dollar agent A gives agent B, agent B must give that dollar to the 
government. 
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Second, agents are restricted in their transfer choices by their network connections.  As we 
will make clear, these connections and the timing of the choice of transfer functions are 
exogenous.  Because agents must mutually agree to an action-contingent transfer scheme, 
getting to choose the transfer function first has a strategic advantage.  Formally, let 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∈ {0,1} 
denote whether agent 𝑖 is connected to agent 𝑗 and able to choose the transfer function at 
time 𝑡.  We assume that each agent 𝑖 can make the choice of transfer function for agent 𝑗 at 
most one time, and each agent can agree to the proposed transfer scheme.  In other words, an 
offer is an ultimatum, not subject to renegotiation. 
 
Assumption 1: For any 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝒩, if ∃𝑡: 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 1, then: 
(1) 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡′ = 0 ∀𝑡
′ ≠ 𝑡 
(2) ∃𝑡′: 𝑐𝑗𝑖𝑡′ = 1 
 
Negotiations are one-shot, and every agent to whom terms are dictated has one opportunity to 
either take it or leave it.  If 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑐𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 1, then both agents must simultaneously agree at 
period 𝑡 to an action-contingent transfer scheme.  If 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 0 ∀𝑡, then agent 𝑖 cannot transfer to 
agent 𝑗 or vice versa.   
We assume that the network of agents is connected, meaning that there is a finite path of 
connections between all agents.   
 
Assumption 2: For any agents 𝑖 and 𝑖′ there exists a sequence of agents {𝑘𝑗}𝑗=1
𝐿
⊆ 𝒩, 
with 𝑘0 = 𝑖 & 𝑘𝐿 = 𝑖
′, and a function 𝑡(𝑗) ∈ {1, … , 𝑇} such that: 
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∏𝑐𝑘𝑗−1,𝑘𝑗,𝑡(𝑗)
𝐿
𝑗=1
= 1 
 
In words, agent 𝑖 can transfer to agent 𝑘1, who can transfer to agent 𝑘2, and so on to agent 𝑖’. 
Third, we describe the strategy space.  Letting 𝑁 ≡ |𝒩| denote the number of agents 
and ℱ𝑡 denote the set of functions mapping from 𝐴 to ℝ
𝑁 ∀𝑡, each agent 𝑖 in any period 𝑡 
chooses from 𝐶𝑖𝑡 ≡ 𝐴𝑖𝑡 × ℱ𝑡.  We let agents choose functions 𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑎) ≡ (𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡(𝑎))
𝑗∈𝒩
∈ ℱ𝑡 for 
all agents in all periods for modeling simplicity.  However, the payoff functions will clarify that 
the only choices of transfer functions  𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡 that matter are those for which 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 1.  The 
interpretation is that agent 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 offers in period 𝑡 ∈ {1, … , 𝑇} to pay 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡(𝑎) to agent 𝑗 ∈
𝒩 conditional on action profile 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴.  This offer is also contingent on all connected agents 
agreeing on transfers.  In every period 𝑡, all agents 𝑖 choose from 𝐶𝑖𝑡 knowing the choices of all 
agents in all previous periods. 
Finally, we describe the payments of agents under two cases.  To start, suppose that: 
∀𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝒩 ∀𝑡, 𝑡′ ∈ {1,… , 𝑇} 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑐𝑗𝑖𝑡′ = 1 ⇒ 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡(𝑎) + 𝑔𝑗𝑖𝑡′(𝑎) = 0 ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 
In words, this says that the agents agree on the transfer of wealth between each other.  For 
instance, if agent 𝑖 offers to pay ten dollars to agent 𝑗 contingent on action profile 𝑎, then agent 
𝑗 agrees to receive ten dollars from agent 𝑖.  If all agents agree, then each agent 𝑖 receives 
payoff from action profile 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴: 
𝓋𝑖 (𝑎,∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑔𝑗𝑖𝑡(𝑎)
𝑗∈𝒩
− 𝜏𝑖(𝑎)) 
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Here 𝓋𝑖 maps from the action profile and net increase in wealth for agent 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 to the payoff 
for that agent 𝑖.6  The payoff of an agent depends on the non-transfer action profile and the net 
tax-inclusive transfer of wealth.   
Now suppose otherwise, i.e.: 
∃𝑎 ∈ 𝐴, 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝒩, 𝑡, 𝑡′ ∈ {1,… , 𝑇}: 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑐𝑗𝑖𝑡′ = 1, 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡(𝑎) + 𝑔𝑗𝑖𝑡′(𝑎) ≠ 0 
This is to say that some pair of agents 𝑖 and 𝑗 fail to agree on transfers.  In this case, each agent 
receives an outside option payoff of 𝑢?̅?.  In words, agents in this network engage in certain 
economic activity and transfers if and only if all agents in the economy agree to those activities 
and transfers, so that net transfers from agent 𝑖 to agent 𝑗 are opposite and equal to the net 
transfers from agent 𝑗 to agent 𝑖.  In this sense, every agent must cooperate for the market to 
function.  For instance, in perfect competition all agents must be at least as well off as they 
would be without engaging the market.7   
In short, letting 𝕀 denote the indicator function mapping true statements to one and false 
statements to zero, payoff functions 𝑉𝑖: ((𝐶𝑖′𝑡)𝑖′∈𝒩)𝑡=1
𝑇 → ℝ can be defined by: 
𝑉𝑖(((𝑎𝑖′𝑡 , 𝑔𝑖′𝑡)𝑖′∈𝒩)𝑡=1
𝑇 )
≡ 𝕀(𝑐𝑖′𝑗𝑡 = 𝑐𝑗𝑖′𝑡′ = 1 ⇏ 𝑔𝑖′𝑗𝑡(𝑎) + 𝑔𝑗𝑖′𝑡(𝑎) ≠ 0)?̅?𝑖
+ 𝕀(𝑐𝑖′𝑗𝑡 = 𝑐𝑗𝑖′𝑡′ = 1 ⇒ 𝑔𝑖′𝑗𝑡(𝑎) + 𝑔𝑗𝑖′𝑡(𝑎) = 0)𝓋𝑖 (𝑎,∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑔𝑗𝑖𝑡(𝑎)
𝑗∈𝒩
− 𝜏𝑖(𝑎)) 
                                                          
6 When we consider general equilibrium environments without transfers, we can assume that for any 
consumers 𝑖, 𝓋𝑖  always maps 𝐴 × [0,∞) to greater values than to which it maps 𝐴 × (−∞, 0).  Furthermore, for 
any 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴  and 𝑟 > 0, we will assume that 𝓋𝑖(𝑎, 𝑟) = 𝓋𝑖(𝑎, 0) for such consumers 𝑖.  Thus, agents never choose 
allocations that they cannot afford, and do not directly benefit from having leftover funds after all transactions 
occur.  This all says that agents do not obtain direct utility from money, but must afford what they consume. 
7 This phrasing rules out lump-sum taxes.  Alternatively, we could define 𝑢?̅? as the utility of agent 𝑖 when not 
buying or selling, and yet paying lump-sum taxes.  Then we would define 𝜏𝑖  as the net-of-lump-sum tax function. 
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Implicitly, we assume that the failure of some agents to negotiate precludes the other agents 
from attempting to coordinate amongst themselves.  One can interpret the contract offers as 
all being contingent on the cooperation of all other agents, so that there is no meaningful 
communication between agents once some agents fail to agree.  However, our results survive 
alterations to the non-cooperative payoff structure so long as one restricts attention to Nash 
equilibrium.8   
In summary, this is a game with perfect information in which every agent 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 in every 
period 𝑡 ∈ {1, … , 𝑇} chooses from 𝐶𝑖𝑡.  All players 𝑖 have payoff functions 𝑉𝑖, which depend on 
players’ choices and exogenous connections.  In the next section, we define equilibrium and 
provide a formal description of our headline result. 
 
3. Main Result 
Our principle finding pertains to the equilibrium notion of a subgame-perfect Nash 
equilibrium (SPNE).  In words, the result holds that, if we replace one tax code with another tax 
code that yields the same aggregate tax burden for each action, then the same SPNE obtains.  
To state this result more formally, we first need to define strategies.  Toward that end, let 𝐶𝑡 ≡
∏ 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑖∈𝒩  denote the set of all period 𝑡 choice profiles, and let 𝐻𝑡 ≡ ∏ 𝐶𝑡′
𝑡−1
𝑡′=1  denote the set of 
histories possibly observed in period 𝑡, where 𝐻1 = {∅}.  Let 𝐻 ≡ ⋃ 𝐻𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1  denote the set of all 
possible histories.   
                                                          
8 Gale, Binmore, and Samuelson (1995) argue that agents playing the Ultimatum Game may learn to play Nash 
equilibria that are not subgame-perfect.  In any case, our concern is to avoid a history with only some agents 
cooperating, where the actions of this set of cooperating agents yields tax burdens on non-cooperative agents.  
We also want to avoid the set of cooperating agents not being connected.  We are unware of any real-world 
example of our theoretical concerns.  We also believe our result would hold if 𝑇 = ∞, and if agents can provide 
counteroffers. 
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For any 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝒩 and 𝑡 ∈ {1, … , 𝑇}, a transfer strategy function 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑔 : 𝐻 → ℱ𝑡 satisfies ∀?̃? ≥
𝑡 and (𝑎𝑖′𝑡′ , 𝑔𝑖′𝑡′)𝑡′=1
?̃? ∈ 𝐻?̃?: 
𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑔 ((𝑎𝑖′𝑡′ , 𝑔𝑖′𝑡′)𝑡′=1
?̃? ) = 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡 
In words, the transfer strategy function cannot assert past offers distinct from what the agent 
has already chosen.  Agent 𝑖 has already offered 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡 to agent 𝑗 in period 𝑡 ≤ ?̃?, and so cannot 
choose to have made any different offer to agent 𝑗 in period 𝑡.  Let 𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑔(ℎ) ≡ (𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑔 (ℎ))
𝑗∈𝒩
 
denote the period 𝑡 transfer strategy of agent 𝑖 ∀ℎ, 𝑖, 𝑡.  An action strategy 𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑎 :ℋ → 𝐴𝑖𝑡 also 
does not contradict the past, i.e. ∀𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑡, ?̃? ≥ 𝑡 and (𝑎𝑖′𝑡′ , 𝑔𝑖′𝑡′)𝑡′=1
?̃? ∈ 𝐻?̃?: 
𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑎((𝑎𝑖′𝑡′ , 𝑔𝑖′𝑡′)𝑡′=1
?̃? ) = 𝑎𝑖𝑡 
Let 𝑠𝑖𝑡(ℎ) ≡ (𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑎(ℎ), 𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑔(ℎ)) denote a period 𝑡 (total) strategy for agent 𝑖.  Let 𝑠𝑖(ℎ) ≡
(𝑠𝑖𝑡(ℎ))𝑡=1
𝑇
 denote an overall strategy of agent 𝑖.  Let 𝑠(ℎ) ≡ (𝑠𝑖(ℎ))𝑖∈𝒩  denote a strategy 
profile.  Finally, it will prove convenient to let 𝑠𝑎(ℎ) ≡ ((𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑎(ℎ))
𝑡=1
𝑇
)
𝑖∈𝒩
 denote the non-
transfer action strategy profile and 𝑠−𝑖 ≡ (𝑠𝑖
′)𝑖′≠𝑖 denote the profile of strategies of agents who 
are not agent 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩. 
 
Definition: A strategy profile 𝑠∗ is a SPNE if for all agents 𝑖, for any history ℎ ∈ 𝐻, and any 
strategy 𝑠′ ≡ (𝑠𝑖′
′ )
𝑖′∈𝒩
 with 𝑠−𝑖
′ = 𝑠−𝑖
∗ : 
𝑉𝑖(𝑠
∗(ℎ); (𝜏𝑖′)𝑖′∈𝒩) ≥ 𝑉𝑖(𝑠
′(ℎ); (𝜏𝑖′)𝑖′∈𝒩) 
 
In words, an SPNE has all agents optimizing in response to any history. 
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Our main result states that, for any redistribution of tax remittance obligations such that 
the total tax obligation from an action profile 𝑎 remains unchanged, there is an SPNE with the 
same equilibrium action profile and tax incidence.  In the appendix, we constructively define a 
mapping from old to new equilibrium strategy profiles.  The new SPNE provides the same 
financial incentives to all agents. 
Theorem 1: Suppose 𝑠∗ is a SPNE of a game with tax functions 𝜏𝑖 ∀𝑖.  Let 𝑔𝑖𝑗
∗ (𝑎) denote the 
corresponding equilibrium transfer functions.  Now consider a new game with altered tax 
functions 𝜏𝑖
′ such that: 
∑𝜏𝑖(𝑎)
𝑖
=∑𝜏𝑖
′(𝑎)
𝑖
 ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 
Then there exists a SPNE of this new game 𝑠′.  Letting 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡
′ (𝑎) denote a new equilibrium transfer 
function, and 𝑠𝑎′ denote the new equilibrium non-transfer action strategy profile, the following 
hold ∀𝑎, 𝑖, ℎ: 
∑𝑐𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑔𝑗𝑖𝑡
′ (𝑎)
𝑗∈𝒩
− 𝜏𝑖
′(𝑎) = ∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑔𝑗𝑖𝑡(𝑎)
𝑗∈𝒩
− 𝜏𝑖(𝑎) 
𝑠𝑎′(∅) = 𝑠𝑎(∅) 
𝑉𝑖 (𝑠
′(ℎ); (𝜏𝑖′
′ )
𝑖′∈𝒩
) = 𝑉𝑖(𝑠(ℎ); (𝜏𝑖′)𝑖′∈𝒩) 
The idea of this proof is to consider an arbitrary connected network of agents.  For such a 
network and for any action profile, one can find some agent 𝜅(1) who can be compensated by 
some agent 𝜆(1) ≠ 𝜅(1) for the change in the tax remittance obligation, such that the network 
of agents 𝒩 ∖ {𝜅(1)} remains connected.  One can continue this process so that, for any 𝑛 <
𝑁, agents 𝒩 ∖ {𝜅(1), … , 𝜅(𝑛)} remains connected while 𝜆(𝑛) ∉ {𝜅(1),… , 𝜅(𝑛)}.  We depict a 
connected network with such functions in figure 2.1.  Because the aggregate tax burden of the 
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action profile remains unchanged, the last agent 𝜅(𝑁) also faces the same burden as before the 
tax remittance policy change.  Thus, for any action profile, the net transfer to each agent 
remains unchanged.  This leaves all agents with the same incentives as before the tax change. 
 
4. Competitive Equilibrium 
We now turn our focus towards the relationship between our main result and the 
competitive market environment most frequently studied in public economics.  The standard 
remittance invariance result concerns changing the tax code between buyers and sellers of a 
good remitting the tax.  Instead, we wish to apply our general result to a price-taking 
environment in which the tax code changes from one’s transactions creating a remittance  
obligation for oneself to a new tax code in which the same transactions create that remittance 
obligation for someone else.  This is as if before buyer A remitted the sales tax after purchasing 
from a seller B, but now that specific seller B had to remit the tax even if the buyer purchased 
the good from some other vender C.   
An apparent tension arises from the cooperative setting of our main result, where any one 
agent can choose to end cooperation.  In contrast, competitive equilibrium has a price 
mechanism that automatically coordinates the actions of agents.  We resolve this difficulty by 
noting that one can consider prices to be set by an agent often referred to as a Walrasian 
auctioneer.9 The Walrasian auctioneer, denoted by 𝑤, sets prices to minimize the sum of 
squared differences between supply and demand.  Prices are then transfers between 
agents 𝑖 ≠ 𝑤 and 𝑤. 
                                                          
9 As in Arrow and Debreu (1954).   
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Figure 2.1 
 
 
Figure 2.1: An example of a connected network with functions 𝜅 and 𝜆, mappings from {1, … , 𝑁} to 𝒩, such that 
for any action profile, agents 𝜅(𝑛) are compensated by agents 𝜆(𝑛) so that they have the same net transfers as in 
the old equilibrium.  We show in the appendix that 𝜅 is a bijection (with 𝜅−1 a well-defined function on 𝒩), 
while 𝜆(𝑛) is connected to 𝜅(𝑛) for 𝑛 = 1,… , 𝑁 − 1.  For completeness, we define 𝜆(𝑁) ≡ 𝜅(𝑁).  Note that 𝜆 is 
not a bijection, so that it’s possible that 𝜆(𝑛) = 𝜆(𝑛′) for 𝑛 ≠ 𝑛′. 
 
Another challenge comes from the limitations of the transfer function that agent 𝑤 can use.  
These transfer functions must be linear in quantities bought and sold.10  That the transfer 
functions are linear requires us to limit our attention to linear changes in the tax code.  But 
more substantially, we must consider a greater domain on which these functions may be 
defined than is traditional in competitive equilibrium.  This alteration is a resolution of a 
contractibility problem of statutory remittance obligation for the actions of others. 
For example, consider an economy with one producer, one consumer, and some third 
agent.  If there is a sales tax triggered by the sale of the good, then a standard competitive 
model has economic tax incidence borne by both the producer and the consumer.  However, if 
the statutory burden of the sale of the good falls upon the additional agent, then the standard 
                                                          
10 By linear, we mean transfers are additive and homogeneous of degree one with respect to quantities traded.  
This is as in the Arrow-Debreu model. 
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competitive model has the additional agent take the tax burden as given and immutable, 
whereas neither consumer nor producer internalize the burden created by their behavior.11  
Thus, shifting the statutory responsibility to the third party both alleviates the distortionary 
impact of the tax and shifts the economic tax incidence.   
But suppose the third agent could charge the first two agents for their transaction of the 
taxed good.  Then the third agent could charge an amount equal to the per unit tax rate, thus 
being made whole from the statutory obligation to remit the sales tax.  Meanwhile, supposing 
the third agent charged the producer, the producer would deduct the price charged by the 
third agent from the price charged to the consumer to get the marginal revenue of selling a unit 
of the good.  If the third agent instead charged the consumer, then the consumer would sum 
the charged prices to obtain the marginal cost of purchasing a unit of the good.  Either way, the 
price charged by the third agent equals the sales tax, and so both economic activity and tax 
incidence remain unchanged. 
A difficulty remains with the above story, depending on the setting.  This seems quite 
plausible if the third agent were a credit card company whose role was essential to the 
transaction.  But if the third party had no relationship with the transactions, then we may not 
think it plausible that the third agent can charge the first two agents for their commerce; 
perhaps instead the third agent should be paying them to not trade with each other.  If so, then 
the change in the statutory liability will have created a lump-sum transfer from the third agent 
to the first two.  All the same, if no income effects obtain for the producer or consumer, then 
                                                          
11 Here we intend the “standard competitive model” to refer to a setting where agents face prices only for their 
own consumption, taking the actions of all other agents as given. 
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economic activity and tax incidences remain unchanged.  More broadly, if the producer and 
consumer were forced to compensate the third agent via lump-sum payments that all agents 
take as given, then the imposition of the tax would have no impact on tax incidence or 
economic activity. 
We address this point in the next section.  For now, we lay out a competitive model in 
which all agents take prices for the economic decisions of all agents as given.  We then 
demonstrate that a linear change in the statutory burden of taxes results in a new equilibrium 
in which both tax incidence and real economic activity remain the same. 
Let 𝐿 denote a finite number of goods.  In the spirit of general equilibrium, let 𝑧𝑖𝑙: 𝐴 →
ℝ denote the excess demand function for good 𝑙 = 1, … , 𝐿 from the choice of agent 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩.12  
Negative values of 𝑧𝑖𝑙 denote net supply.  We always allow agents to choose to not produce: 
∀𝑖 ∀𝑎−𝑖 ∃𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐴𝑖: 𝑧𝑖(𝑎𝑖, 𝑎−𝑖) = 𝟎 
Here 𝟎 ∈ ℝ𝐿  denoting the zero vector.  Market-clearing requires that: 
∑𝑧𝑖(𝑎)
𝑖∈𝒩
= 𝟎 
As a modeling convenience, we let 𝑇 = 2.  This merely captures the idea that first the 
Walrasian auctioneer sets prices, and then agents make their decisions.  One agent is the 
Walrasian auctioneer, denoted 𝑤, who sets the prices such that the market clears.  This agent 
seeks to minimize the sum of squared differences between supply and demand: 
𝑢𝑤 = −‖∑𝑧𝑖(𝑎)
𝑖∈𝒩
‖ 
                                                          
12 Note that 𝑧𝑖  taking in arguments from 𝐴−𝑖  permits externalities.  Also, while we express our results in general 
equilibrium terms, our example at the end of the section makes clear that our analysis also applies for a single 
market in partial equilibrium. 
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But the Walrasian auctioneer cannot produce or consume any goods: 
𝑧𝑤(𝑎) = 𝟎 ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 
We set 𝑐𝑤𝑖1 = 𝑐𝑖𝑤2 = 1 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ∖ {𝑤}, so the Walrasian auctioneer gets to set transfers first.  
Furthermore, 𝑐𝑖𝑗1 = 𝑐𝑖𝑗2 = 0 ∀𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝒩 ∖ {𝑤}.  Thus, the transfers are exactly as determined by 
the Walrasian auctioneer.  For simplicity, we suppress 𝑡 subscripts, denoting 𝑔𝑤𝑖1 as 𝑔𝑤𝑖  and 
𝑔𝑖𝑤2 as 𝑔𝑖𝑤 ∀𝑖 ≠ 𝑤.  Finally, there is a tax profile (𝜏𝑖(𝑎))𝑖∈𝒩, where 𝜏𝑤
(𝑎) = 0 ∀𝑎.  
Suppose there is a SPNE of a game with the above structure yielding a non-transfer action 
profile 𝑎∗ with vectors 𝑝𝑖𝑗 ∈ ℝ
𝐿  ∀𝑖, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑤 such that ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴: 
𝑔𝑖𝑤(𝑎) = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑧𝑗(𝑎)
𝑗≠𝑖,𝑤
− [∑ 𝑝𝑗𝑖
𝑗≠𝑖,𝑤
] ∗ 𝑧𝑖(𝑎) + 𝑝𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑧𝑖(𝑎) 
𝑔𝑖𝑤(𝑎) + 𝑔𝑤𝑖(𝑎) = 0 
𝑔𝑖𝑗(𝑎) = 0 ∀𝑖, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑤 
In words, each agent 𝑖 ≠ 𝑤 accept linear tax-exclusive price vectors (𝑝𝑖𝑗)𝑗≠𝑤 imposed by the 
Walrasian auctioneer.  This means each agent 𝑖 transfers 𝑝𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑧𝑗(𝑎) to agent 𝑗 for net 
demand 𝑧𝑗(𝑎).  In a standard Walrasian equilibrium, 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 𝟎 ∀𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, and there would be some 
vector 𝑝∗ such that 𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝
∗ ∀𝑖 ≠ 𝑤.  Thus, 𝑝∗ would denote the tax-exclusive price vector that 
agent 𝑖 faces for choice of net demand 𝑧𝑖(𝑎).  Here, we allow for far more flexibility, so that 
agents 𝑖 and 𝑗 can contract to avoid the transactions of agent 𝑗 creating a remittance obligation 
for agent 𝑖.  However, our results would survive assuming ∃𝑝∗ = 𝑝𝑖𝑖 ∀𝑖 ≠ 𝑤.
13  Regardless, as in 
a standard Walrasian equilibrium, we assume the SPNE clears all markets: 
                                                          
13 One can check that if ∃𝑝∗ = 𝑝𝑖𝑖  ∀𝑖 ≠ 𝑤 in the old SPNE, then still 𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝
∗ for all consumers 𝑖 in the new SPNE. 
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∑𝑧𝑖(𝑎
∗)
𝑖
= 𝟎 
Finally, regarding the SPNE, we assume the outside option utility values are defined as:14 
?̅?𝑖 = sup
𝑎𝑖:𝑧𝑖(𝑎𝑖,𝑎−𝑖
∗ )=0
𝓋𝑖 (𝑎𝑖, 𝑎−𝑖
∗ , ∑ [𝑝𝑗𝑖 ∗ 𝑧𝑖(𝑎𝑖, 𝑎−𝑖
∗ ) − 𝑝𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑧𝑗(𝑎𝑖, 𝑎−𝑖
∗ )]
𝑗≠𝑖,𝑤
− 𝜏𝑖(𝑎𝑖, 𝑎−𝑖
∗ )) 
This says that agents can choose to consume only what they have, subject to taxes and their 
own prices for other transactions.  While agents may well choose to benefit from negative 
values of 𝑝𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑧𝑗(𝑎𝑖, 𝑎−𝑖
∗ ), it may appear excessively strong to suppose that a decentralized 
marketplace can require agents to pay positive values of 𝑝𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑧𝑗(𝑎𝑖, 𝑎−𝑖
∗ ) contrary to the wishes 
of the agent 𝑖; compelling involuntary payment is generally considered the domain of the tax 
authority.  We return to this point in the next section. 
Consider a new remittance responsibility regime (𝜏𝑖
′(𝑎))
𝑖∈𝒩
 with 𝜏𝑤
′ (𝑎) = 0 ∀𝑎 such 
that ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴: 
∀𝑖 ≠ 𝑤 ∃Δ𝜏𝑖𝑗 = (Δ𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑙)𝑙=1
𝐿
 ∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑤: 𝜏𝑖
′(𝑎) − 𝜏𝑖(𝑎) = ∑[Δ𝜏𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑧𝑗(𝑎) − Δ𝜏𝑗𝑖 ∗ 𝑧𝑖(𝑎)]
𝑗≠𝑤
 
This says that remittance liabilities have been rearranged amongst buyers and sellers of goods, 
but the overall tax liability resulting from the same aggregate production and consumption 
remains unchanged: 
∑𝜏𝑖(𝑎)
𝑖
=∑𝜏𝑖
′(𝑎)
𝑖
 ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 
The rearranging of statutory liability is linear in net demand to maintain linear pricing. 
                                                          
14 One may note that, contrary to standard general equilibrium analysis, we allow for net payments to directly 
enter the utility function.  One might have some value 𝑢 such that ∀𝑖 𝑢𝑖(𝑎,𝑚) ≥ 𝑢 ⇔ 𝑚 ≥ 0, so that no agent can 
ever choose to owe more money than they are worth. 
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We say that the new tax schedule (𝜏𝑖
′)𝑖∈𝒩  with the same values ?̅?𝑖 ∀𝑖 yields an equilibrium 
with identical economic activity and tax incidence if it yields a new SPNE with the same non-
transfer action profile 𝑎∗ and new (tax-exclusive) prices 𝑝𝑖𝑗
′ ∈ ℝ𝐿 ∀𝑖, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑤 such that: 
𝑔𝑖𝑤
′ (𝑎) = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑗
′ ∗ 𝑧𝑗(𝑎)
𝑗≠𝑖,𝑤
− [∑ 𝑝𝑗𝑖
′
𝑗≠𝑖,𝑤
] ∗ 𝑧𝑖(𝑎) + 𝑝𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑧𝑖(𝑎) 
𝑔𝑖𝑤
′ (𝑎) + 𝑔𝑤𝑖
′ (𝑎) = 0 
𝑔𝑖𝑗
′ (𝑎) = 0 ∀𝑖, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑤 
In words, the prices adjust so that each agent has the same budget constraint as they would 
have faced if the tax code had not changed.   
 
Theorem 2: There is a new equilibrium with transfers from the new tax code (𝜏𝑖
′(𝑎))
𝑖∈𝒩
 
yielding the same real economic outcomes and tax incidence with: 
𝑝𝑖𝑗
′ ≡ 𝑝𝑖𝑗 − Δ𝜏𝑖𝑗 ∀𝑖, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑤: 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 
𝑝𝑖𝑖
′ ≡ 𝑝𝑖𝑖 ∀𝑖 ≠ 𝑤 
Proof: Note that one can write the statutory burden on the Walrasian auctioneer in the initial 
equilibrium as: 
𝜏𝑤(𝑎) = 0 = ∑[τ𝑖
′(𝑎) − 𝜏𝑖(𝑎)]
𝑖≠𝑤
= ∑∑Δ𝜏𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑧𝑗(𝑎)
𝑗≠𝑤𝑖≠𝑤
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Then, by the previous theorem, there is a new SPNE from the tax profile (𝜏𝑖
′(𝑎))
𝑖∈𝒩
 with the 
same non-transfer action profile 𝑎∗, so that ∑ 𝑧𝑖(𝑎
∗)𝑖 = 𝟎, and such that for any 𝑖 ≠ 𝑤 and 
any 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴:15 
𝑔𝑖𝑤
′ (𝑎) = ∑ [𝑝𝑖𝑗 + Δ𝜏𝑖𝑗] ∗ 𝑧𝑗(𝑎)
𝑗≠𝑖,𝑤
− ∑ [𝑝𝑗𝑖 + Δ𝜏𝑗𝑖] ∗ 𝑧𝑖(𝑎)
𝑗≠𝑖,𝑤
+ 𝑝𝑖𝑖 ∗ zi(𝑎) 
𝑔𝑖𝑤
′ (𝑎) + 𝑔𝑤𝑖
′ (𝑎) = 0 
𝑔𝑖𝑗
′ (𝑎) = 0 ∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑤 
Furthermore, this SPNE yields the same outside option utility as in the old equilibrium ∀𝑖: 
sup
𝑎𝑖:𝑧𝑖(𝑎𝑖,𝑎−𝑖
∗ )=0
𝓋𝑖 (𝑎𝑖, 𝑎−𝑖
∗ , ∑[𝑝𝑗𝑖
′ ∗ 𝑧𝑖(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑎−𝑖
∗ ) − 𝑝𝑖𝑗
′ ∗ 𝑧𝑗(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑎−𝑖
∗ )]
𝑗≠𝑤
− 𝜏𝑖
′(𝑎𝑖, 𝑎−𝑖
∗ ))
= sup
𝑎𝑖:𝑧𝑖(𝑎𝑖,𝑎−𝑖
∗ )=0
𝓋𝑖 (𝑎𝑖, 𝑎−𝑖
∗ , ∑ [[𝑝𝑗𝑖 − Δ𝜏𝑗𝑖] ∗ 𝑧𝑖(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑎−𝑖
∗ ) − [𝑝𝑖𝑗 − Δ𝜏𝑖𝑗] ∗ 𝑧𝑗(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑎−𝑖
∗ )]
𝑗≠𝑤
− 𝜏𝑖(𝑎𝑖, 𝑎−𝑖
∗ ) −∑[Δ𝜏𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑧𝑗(𝑎)− Δ𝜏𝑗𝑖𝑧𝑖(𝑎)]
𝑗≠𝑤
)
= sup
𝑎𝑖:𝑧𝑖(𝑎𝑖,𝑎−𝑖
∗ )=0
𝓋𝑖 (𝑎𝑖 , 𝑎−𝑖
∗ , ∑[𝑝𝑗𝑖 ∗ 𝑧𝑖(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑎−𝑖
∗ ) − 𝑝𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑧𝑗(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑎−𝑖
∗ )]
𝑗≠𝑤
− 𝜏𝑖(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑎−𝑖
∗ )) = ?̅?𝑖 
Thus, defining 𝑝𝑖𝑗
′ ≡ 𝑝𝑖𝑗 + Δ𝜏𝑖𝑗 ∀𝑖, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑤 yields the desired result.  ∎ 
As a concrete example, consider agents 𝒩 ≡ {1,2,3, 𝑤} with 𝐿 = 1.  We can think of agent 
1 as a seller, agent 2 as a buyer, agent 3 a third party such as a credit card company.  Formally, 
𝐴1 = 𝐴2 = {0,1}, 𝐴3 = 𝐴𝑤 = {0}, and 𝑐𝑖𝑤1 = 𝑐𝑤𝑖2 = 1 ∀𝑖 = 1,2,3, 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 0 otherwise.  
                                                          
15 This claim also uses the fact that the choices of 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡  are payoff-irrelevant when 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 0, so without loss of 
generality one can adjust those values so that 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡  is always the same function. 
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Let 𝑧1(𝑎) = −1 if and only if 𝑎1 = 1, 𝑧2(𝑎) = 1 if and only if 𝑎2 = 1, and 𝑧3(𝑎) = 𝑧𝑤(𝑎) =
0 ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴.  In words, agent 1 can decide to sell one unit to agent 2, and agent 2 can decide to 
buy one unit from agent 1, where prices are moderated by the Walrasian auctioneer.  Suppose 
originally there is no tax, yielding a trading equilibrium action profile 𝑎∗ so that: 
𝑎1
∗ = 𝑎2
∗ = 1 
In words, agent 1 sells one unit of the good to agent 2.  Suppose for simplicity that 𝑝11 =
𝑝22 and otherwise 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 0, so that the only exchange of funds is an amount 𝑝11 =
𝑝22 transferred (via the Walrasian auctioneer 𝑤) from agent 1 to agent 2 for the sale of one unit 
of the good.  Note that agent 3 does not demand any payments from the trading agents, 
reflecting the absence of any statutory remittance obligation generated by the trade.  In fact, 
agent 3 makes no meaningful decisions at all. 
Now, suppose that the transfer of the good yields a tax burden of Δτ11 = 10 and Δ𝜏31 =
−10.  In words, trading the good causes the third party to pay the government ten dollars, 
while causing the government to pay the seller of the good ten dollars.16  Then setting 𝑝31
′ = 10 
and 𝑝𝑖𝑗
′ = 𝑝𝑖𝑗 otherwise yields the same trading equilibrium 𝑎
∗ and the same values 𝑉𝑖 ∀𝑖.  Now 
the third party demands payment from the seller of the ten dollars that the trade obligates the 
third party to remit.  This realigns the incentives of all agents as in the original equilibrium.  
 
 
 
                                                          
16 Recall that selling the good means 𝑧1 = −1.  This means that selling the good yields a remittance obligation for 
agent 1 of 10 ∗ −1 = −10, i.e. the government pays agent 1 ten dollars.  
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5. Variation in Entitlements 
In the previous section, we permitted agents to demand payments from each other for each 
other’s actions at prices set competitively.  This may not be realistic.  For instance, if a 
consumer purchase from a producer induces a statutory burden on a third party, one might 
imagine the third party paying the consumer to not purchase the good.  In a sense, this 
variation transfers the entitlement to decide purchases entirely onto the consumer.  We now 
explicitly model this process, finding that this redefinition of rights effectively transfers wealth 
towards the consumer.  Different rules for determining choice sets that affect a change in 
statutory remittance obligation contain a lump-sum tax component, so that a transfer of wealth 
between agents corresponding with the change in statutory obligations is both necessary and 
sufficient to make the new tax code yield the same non-transfer action profile and utility levels 
for all agents.  This is analogous to Coase’s Theorem, where the distribution of property rights 
affects the distribution of utilities, but not efficiency.  This is not remittance invariance as 
usually intended, but rather an invariance result with income effects. 
For simplicity, we say that the original equilibrium has 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 𝟎 ∀𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.  But now the new 
equilibrium has values 𝑧?̅?𝑗 = (𝑧?̅?𝑗𝑙)𝑙=1
𝐿
 ∀𝑖, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑤 such that each agent taking prices 𝑝𝑖𝑗
′  as given 
maximizes: 
𝑢𝑖 (𝑎,∑𝑝𝑗𝑖
′ ∗ [𝑧𝑖(𝑎) − 𝑧?̅?𝑖]
𝑗≠𝑖
−∑𝑝𝑖𝑗
′ ∗ [𝑧𝑗(𝑎) − 𝑧?̅?𝑗]
𝑗≠𝑖
− 𝑝𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑧𝑖(𝑎) − 𝜏𝑖
′(𝑎)) 
The vectors 𝑧?̅?𝑗  denote baseline values of net demand to which agent 𝑗 is entitled without 
payment to agent 𝑖.  The amount that agent 𝑖 pays agent 𝑗 is then a linear function of the 
deviation of agent 𝑗’s net demand from this baseline.  This contains our model from the 
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previous section, specifically when 𝑧?̅?𝑗 = 𝟎 ∀𝑖, 𝑗.  But as 𝑧?̅?𝑗𝑙 increases for 𝑙 such that 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑙
′ > 0, 
agent 𝑖 receives less money from agent 𝑗.  If 𝑧?̅?𝑗 > 𝑧𝑗(𝑎) and 𝑝𝑖𝑗
′ > 𝟎, then agent 𝑖 is then paying 
agent 𝑗 for not increasing net demand.17    
If 𝑝𝑖𝑗
′ = −Δ𝜏𝑖𝑗 ∀𝑖, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑤 as in the previous section, then each agent 𝑖 ≠ 𝑤 would maximize: 
𝑢𝑖 (𝑎,∑Δ𝜏𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑧?̅?𝑗
𝑗≠𝑖
−∑Δ𝜏𝑗𝑖 ∗ 𝑧?̅?𝑖
𝑗≠𝑖
− 𝑝𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑧𝑖(𝑎) − 𝜏𝑖(𝑎)) 
Note that now the tax and corresponding price changes the income of each agent 𝑖 ≠ 𝑤 by 
∑ Δ𝜏𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑧?̅?𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 −∑ Δ𝜏𝑗𝑖 ∗ 𝑧?̅?𝑖𝑗≠𝑖 .  In words, the change in statutory remittance obligations can 
have a lump-sum transfer impact because the change in the tax code now changes the wealth 
of agents even in the absence of any market transactions.  If there were no income effects, 
then there could be a new equilibrium from the tax code (𝜏𝑖
′)𝑖∈𝒩  with the same economic tax 
incidence and non-transfer action profile.  More generally, define lump-sum transfers: 
𝑇𝑖 ≡∑Δ𝜏𝑗𝑖 ∗ 𝑧?̅?𝑖
𝑗≠𝑖
−∑Δ𝜏𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑧?̅?𝑗
𝑗≠𝑖
 ∀𝑖 ≠ 𝑤 
For completeness, define 𝑇𝑤 ≡ 0. 
Corollary: A new tax schedule (𝜏𝑖
′ + 𝑇𝑖)𝑖∈𝒩  has the same aggregate statutory obligation 
as (𝜏𝑖)𝑖∈𝒩.  Furthermore, there is a new equilibrium with the same real economic activity and 
tax incidence as the old equilibrium.18 
Proof: Defining 𝑝𝑖𝑗
′ = Δ𝜏𝑖𝑗 ∀𝑖, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑤 yields the same optimization problem for all agents.  Note 
that ∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 0. ∎ 
                                                          
17Put differently, if ∀𝑙 𝑧?̅?𝑗𝑙 ≥ 𝑧𝑗𝑙(𝑎) and 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑙
′ > 0, with 𝑧?̅?𝑗 ≠ 𝑧𝑗(𝑎), then 𝑝𝑖𝑗
′ ∗ [𝑧𝑗(𝑎) − 𝑧?̅?𝑗] < 0. 
18 Formally, (𝜏𝑖
′ +𝑇𝑖) (𝑎) = 𝜏𝑖
′(𝑎) + 𝑇𝑖  ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 ∀𝑖. 
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For concreteness, consider the example from the end of section 4, but now let 𝑧3̅1 = −1.  
This means agent 3 must pay agent 1 to not make the trade, rather than agent 1 paying agent 3 
for the right to make the trade.  Then setting 𝑇1 = −10, 𝑇2 = 0, and 𝑇3 = 10, with 𝑝31
′ =
10 and 𝑝𝑖𝑗
′ = 𝑝𝑖𝑗 otherwise yields trade in the new equilibrium.  In words, the government first 
transfers ten dollars from agent 1 to agent 3.  Then, agent 3 pays agent 1 ten dollars if agent 1 
does not sell the good.  However, because this provides all agents the same incentives as the 
original equilibrium, agent 1 still sells the good to agent 2 in the new equilibrium. 
6. Tax Administrative and Compliance Costs 
Finally, we want to introduce considerations of imperfections in the tax collection 
technology.  We do so to formalize a dual variant of the claim in Slemrod (2008) that the 
government should structure remittance obligations to minimize compliance and 
administrative costs.  The most straightforward way to formalize and demonstrate this point is 
to reinterpret the model, so that now 𝜏𝑖(𝑎) denotes the cost to agent 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 of the remittance 
responsibility generated by non-transfer action profile 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴.  We now refer to 𝜏𝑖 as the 
remittance cost function for agent 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩. 
The government chooses the profile of tax functions (𝜏𝑖)𝑖∈𝒩  from some family 𝒯 of 
remittance cost functions, subject to a revenue correspondence 𝑅: 𝒯 × 𝐴 ⇉ ℝ.  The 
correspondence 𝑅(𝜏, 𝑎) is the amount of money that the government knows it can obtain from 
non-transfer action profile 𝑎 and profile of remittance cost obligations 𝜏(𝑎), netting out tax 
administrative costs.  There is some function 𝑉𝑔𝑜𝑣: ℝ𝑁 × ℝ → ℝ that the government 
maximizes subject to 𝒯 and 𝑅: 
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(𝜏∗, 𝑟∗) ∈ argmax
𝜏∈𝒯,𝑟∈𝑅(𝜏,𝑠𝑎(∅))
𝑠 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑛 𝑆𝑃𝑁𝐸 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜏
𝑉𝑔𝑜𝑣 ((𝑉𝑖(𝑠(∅); 𝜏))𝑖∈𝒩 , 𝑟) 
In words, the government policy to maximize its objective, understanding that agents will 
choose an SPNE thereafter.19   
This lets us make our formal claim.  Suppose the government optimally chooses (𝜏∗, 𝑟∗) as 
previously described.  Then, taking the resulting SPNE non-transfer action profile 𝑠𝑎(∅) as 
given, the government chooses to maximize revenue conditional on the non-transfer actions of 
agents and the aggregate remittance cost obligation. 
 
Proposition: If 𝑉𝑔𝑜𝑣 is strictly increasing in its last argument, then for any solution (𝜏∗, 𝑟∗) to 
the government’s optimization problem: 
𝑟∗ ∈ argmax
𝜏∈𝒯: ∑ 𝜏𝑖(𝑎)=∑ 𝜏𝑖
∗(𝑎) ∀𝑎∈𝐴𝑖𝑖
𝑠 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑛 𝑆𝑃𝑁𝐸 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜏∗
𝑅(𝜏, 𝑠𝑎(∅)) 
 
Proof: For some SPNE 𝑠∗ with corresponding non-transfer action profile 𝑠𝑎∗, the choice of 
(𝜏∗, 𝑟∗) must satisfy: 
𝑟∗ ∈ argmax
𝜏∈𝒯,𝑟∈𝑅(𝜏,𝑠𝑎∗(∅))
𝑉𝑔𝑜𝑣 ((𝑉𝑖(𝑠
∗(∅); 𝜏))
𝑖∈𝒩
, 𝑟) 
Since 𝑉𝑔𝑜𝑣 is strictly increasing in its last argument: 
𝑟∗ ∈ argmax
𝜏∈𝒯: 𝑉𝑖(𝑠(∅);𝜏)=𝑉𝑖(𝑠
∗(∅);𝜏∗)
𝑠 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑛 𝑆𝑃𝑁𝐸 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜏
𝑅(𝜏, 𝑠𝑎(∅)) 
                                                          
19 Note that the formalism allows for the government to choose the SPNE.  This would be in line with the 
mechanism design and principal-agent literatures.  We impose the assumption to avoid issues of equilibrium 
selection in the government optimization problem. 
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The desired result follows from Theorem 1. ∎ 
For a concrete example, suppose for every dollar that agent 𝑖 is obligated by the tax code to 
pay, it costs that agent 𝜙𝑖
𝑐  dollars total to remit that dollar to the government, i.e. it costs each 
agent 𝑖 a compliance cost of 𝜙𝑖
𝑐 − 1 to then remit one dollar to the government.  In addition, 
the government must pay a tax administrative cost of 𝜙𝑖
𝑎 − 1 to process 𝜙𝑖
𝑎 dollars, so that 
agent 𝑖 must remit 𝜙𝑖
𝑎  dollars for the government to increase revenue, net of tax administrative 
costs, by one dollar.  Thus, each agent 𝑖 who bears a remittance cost obligation of 𝜙𝑖
𝑎𝜙𝑖
𝑐 remits 
𝜙𝑖
𝑎  to the government, who pays tax administrative costs to be left with one dollar.  This yields 
a definition of a revenue function:20 
𝑅(𝜏, 𝑎) ≡ ∑
𝜏𝑖(𝑎)
𝜙𝑖
𝑎𝜙𝑖
𝑐
𝑖∈𝒩
 
From the previous proposition, we know that any solution (𝜏∗, 𝑟∗) to the government’s 
optimization problem with corresponding SPNE action profile 𝑠𝑎∗ has: 
𝜏𝑖
∗(𝑠𝑎∗(∅)) = 0 ∀𝜙𝑖
𝑎𝜙𝑖
𝑐 > min{𝜙𝑖′
𝑎𝜙𝑖′
𝑐 } 
In words, the government requires remittances only from the one agent for whom the resulting 
remittance cost obligation is minimal. 
7. Conclusion 
We formalize the conditions under which, in an environment without administrative or 
compliance costs of taxation or tax evasion, only aggregate statutory tax obligations matter for 
real economic behavior; the distribution of statutory remittance obligations does not affect 
                                                          
20 We assume that 𝜙𝑖
𝑎, 𝜙𝑖
𝑐 > 0 ∀𝑖.  If we wanted, we could keep 𝑅 a correspondence with 𝑅(𝜏, 𝑎) ≡
[0, ∑
𝜏𝑖(𝑎)
𝜙𝑖
𝑎𝜙𝑖
𝑐𝑖∈𝒩 ], at least so long as the government does not remit funds to consumers, i.e. 𝜏𝑖(𝑎) ≥ 0 ∀𝑖 ∀𝑎. 
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these outcomes.  There can be lump-sum components to changing remittance obligations, but 
not when all agents must agree to any transactions.   
One might consider objectives regarding the procedure of how taxes are collected, 
independent of the welfare impact these tax remittance obligations have on agents.  Kaplow 
and Shavell (2001) argue that such considerations of horizontal equity necessarily make a social 
planner prefer some outcomes over Pareto-superior alternatives.  This result largely precluded 
future work on horizontal equity, but we think our result suggests hope for future work in this 
area.  After all, any restructuring of the tax code that increases some notion of “fairness” while 
leaving the aggregate remittance obligation of any action profile (as well as tax administrative 
costs and incentives to evade taxes) unchanged yields the same tax revenue.   This suggests one 
might separate fairness and efficiency considerations analogously to the traditional distinction 
between concerns for equity and efficiency. 
Future work should also focus on the effect of altering remittance obligations on tax 
administrative and compliance costs.  In addition, none of these results account for information 
asymmetries.  Surely imposing a tax remittance obligation on retailers has a distinct effect from 
imposing this obligation on consumers if consumers will not notice taxes excluded from sticker 
prices, as in Chetty et al. (2009), yet would notice taxes that they must pay.   
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Appendix for Chapter 2 
Here we demonstrate the main result of this paper.  To do so, we must first prove the 
lemma described in the intuition from section 3.  This lemma is a result from graph theory, so 
we use notation from graph theory to express the result. 
Definition: For any finite set 𝑉, for any set 𝐸 of two-element subsets of 𝑉, the (undirected) 
graph 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸) is connected if for every distinct 𝜈, 𝜈 ∈ 𝑉 ∃{𝑣𝑘}𝑘=1
𝐾 ,for some finite 𝐾 > 1 such 
that defining 𝑒𝑘 ≡ {𝑣𝑘, 𝑣𝑘+1} for 𝑘 = 1,… , 𝐾 − 1 yields: 
𝑒𝑘 = 𝑒𝑘′ ⇒ 𝑘 = 𝑘
′ 
𝑣0 = 𝜈, 𝑣𝐾 = 𝜈 
𝑒𝑘 ∈ 𝐸 ∀𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾 − 1 
In words, a graph is connected if every two distinct vertices have a path connecting them.  Our 
lemma is that for any connected graph of multiple vertices, we can always remove any one of at 
least two of the vertices and still have a connected graph. 
Lemma: If 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸) is connected and |𝑉| > 1, then there are at least two distinct points 
𝑣1, 𝑣2 ∈ 𝑉  such that for 𝑛 = 1,2, the induced subgraph from removing point 𝑣𝑛, denoted 
𝐺[𝑉 ∖ {𝑣𝑛}], is also connected.
21 
                                                          
21 Given graph 𝐺, then 𝐺[𝑉 ∖ 𝑉′] ≡ (𝑉 ∖ 𝑉′, 𝐸 ∩ ((𝑉 ∖ 𝑉′) × (𝑉 ∖ 𝑉′))) for any 𝑉′ ⊂ 𝑉. 
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Proof: We prove this by induction on the cardinality of |𝑉|.  If |𝑉| = 2, the claim is trivial.  
Suppose the claim holds up to cardinality |𝑉| − 1.  Pick arbitrary 𝑣∗ ∈ 𝑉.  One can show that 
there are disjoint subsets 𝑉𝑘 for 𝑘 = 1,… , 𝐾, with 𝐾 < |𝑉|, such that 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉𝑘, 𝑣
′ ∈ 𝑉𝑘′, and 𝑘 ≠
𝑘′ implies that no path connects 𝑣 and 𝑣′, yet:22 
⋃𝑉𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1
= 𝑉 ∖ {𝑣∗} 
One can pick points 𝑣1
′  and 𝑣2
′  such that 𝐺(𝑉1 ∖ {𝑣𝑛
′ }) is connected for 𝑛 = 1,2.  If {𝑣𝑛
′ , 𝑣∗} ∉ 𝐸 
for 𝑛 = 1,2, then we can define 𝑣𝑛 ≡ 𝑣𝑛
′  for 𝑛 = 1,2.  If {𝑣𝑛
′ , 𝑣∗} ∈ 𝐸 for 𝑛 = 1,2, then we can 
similarly define 𝑣𝑛 ≡ 𝑣𝑛
′  for 𝑛 = 1,2.  Finally, assume there is one point, say 𝑣2
′ , connected 
to 𝑣∗ by a path, then define 𝑣1 ≡ 𝑣1
′ .  If in this case 𝐾 = 1, then define 𝑣2 ≡ 𝑣
∗.  Otherwise, we 
can perform the same exercise with 𝑉2 to get 𝑣2.  ∎ 
Proof of Theorem: First, we want to map our notion of a connected network of agents into the 
definition of a connected graph.  Formally, defining 𝐸 ≡ {{𝑖, 𝑗}| 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, ∃𝑡: 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 1}, we want to 
show that the graph (𝒩, 𝐸) is connected.  Toward that end, take any 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝒩.  Then by 
assumption, there is a finite sequence {𝑘𝑙}𝑙=0
𝐿  and function 𝑡(𝑙) ∈ {1,… , 𝑇}, such that 𝑘0 = 𝑖, 
𝑘𝐿 = 𝑗, and: 
𝑐𝑘𝑙−1𝑘𝑙𝑡(𝑙) = 1 ∀𝑙 = 1,… , 𝐿 
We inductively define a function: 
𝑙(0) ≡ max
𝑘𝑙′=𝑖
𝑙′ 
                                                          
22 One can also demonstrate this claim inductively on the cardinality of |𝑉|.  The claim is trivial for |𝑉| = 2.  
Supposing it holds up to cardinality |𝑉| − 1, adding one additional point ?̃? means that the union of {?̃?} with all old 
subsets that have points connected to ?̃? via a path form one such set 𝑉1, whereas the other old subsets remain 
unaltered. 
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𝑙(𝑙) ≡ max
𝑘𝑙′=𝑘?̃?(𝑙−1)+1
𝑙′  ∀𝑙 = 1,… , 𝐿 
Define ?̃? ≡ min
𝑙(𝑙)=𝐿
𝑙; this value exists and 𝑙 is invertible because 𝑙(𝑙) maps to {1, … , 𝐿} and is 
strictly increasing.  Thus, we can define: 
Note that defining 𝑣𝑙 = 𝑘𝑙(𝑙), the sequence of points {𝑣𝑙}𝑙=0
?̃? ⊆ 𝒩 such that: 
𝑣0 = 𝑘max
𝑘
𝑙′
=𝑖
𝑙′ = 𝑖 
𝑣?̃? = 𝑘
𝑙( min
?̃?(𝑙)=𝐿
𝑙)
= 𝑘𝐿 = 𝑗 
{𝑣𝑙 , 𝑣𝑙+1} = {𝑘𝑙(𝑙), 𝑘𝑙(𝑙+1)} = {𝑘𝑙(𝑙), 𝑘 max
𝑘
𝑙′
=𝑘
?̃?(𝑙)+1
𝑙′} = {𝑘𝑙(𝑙), 𝑘𝑙(𝑙)+1} ∈ 𝐸 ∀𝑙 = 1,… , ?̃? − 1 
In addition, suppose for values 𝑙, 𝑙′ ∈ {1,… , ?̃? − 1} we had: 
{𝑣𝑙 , 𝑣𝑙+1} = {𝑣𝑙′ , 𝑣𝑙′+1} 
That would imply: 
𝑣𝑙+1 = 𝑣𝑙′+1 ⇒ 𝑘𝑙(𝑙+1) = 𝑘𝑙(𝑙′+1) 
From the definition of 𝑙: 
𝑣𝑙 = 𝑣𝑙′ ⇒ 𝑙(𝑙 + 1) = 𝑙(𝑙
′ + 1) 
Finally, since 𝑙 is strictly increasing: 
𝑙 = 𝑙′ 
Thus, we have that ∀𝑙, 𝑙′ ∈ {1,… , ?̃?}: 
{𝑣𝑙 , 𝑣𝑙+1} = {𝑣𝑙′ , 𝑣𝑙′+1} ⇒ 𝑙 = 𝑙
′ 
We conclude that {𝑣𝑙}𝑙=0
?̃?  is a path connecting 𝑖 to 𝑗.  Since 𝑖 and 𝑗 were arbitrarily chosen, 
(𝒩, 𝐸) is connected. 
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Second, we can inductively define 𝜅 and 𝜆, confirming in the process that they satisfy 
properties sufficient for describing a compensating transfer scheme.  To start, the lemma 
indicates that ∃𝜅(1) ∈ 𝒩 such that 𝐺[𝒩 ∖ {𝜅(1)}] is connected.  Since (𝒩, 𝐸) is connected, 
∃𝜆(1): {𝜅(1), 𝜆(1)} ∈ 𝐸.  This means that: 
∃𝑡: 𝑐𝜆(1)𝜅(1)𝑡 = 1 
𝜅(1) ≠ 𝜆(1) 
Now suppose by inductive hypothesis that for some value 𝑛 ∈ {1, … , 𝑁 − 2}, we have already 
defined  ∀𝑛′ = 1,… , 𝑛 values 𝜅(𝑛′) and 𝜆(𝑛′) such that, defining 𝒩𝑛′ ≡ {𝜅(1),… , 𝜅(𝑛
′)}: 
∃𝑡: 𝑐𝜆(𝑛′)𝜅(𝑛′)𝑡 = 1 
𝜆(𝑛′) ∉ 𝒩𝑛′  
That furthermore: 
∀𝑛′, 𝑛′′ ∈ {1,… , 𝑛}, 𝜅(𝑛′) = 𝜅(𝑛′′) ⇒ 𝑛′ = 𝑛′′ 
And finally, the graph 𝐺[𝒩 ∖𝒩𝑛] is connected.  We can define 𝜅(𝑛 + 1) ∈ 𝒩 ∖𝒩𝑛 such that 
the graph 𝐺[𝒩 ∖𝒩𝑛+1] is connected.  Since 𝐺[𝒩 ∖𝒩𝑛] is connected, ∃𝜆(𝑛 + 1) ∈ 𝒩 ∖
𝒩𝑛 such that: 
∃𝑡: 𝑐𝜆(𝑛+1)𝜅(𝑛+1)𝑡 = 1 
𝜅(𝑛 + 1) ≠ 𝜆(𝑛 + 1) 
Thus, 𝜆(𝑛 + 1) ∉ 𝒩𝑛 ∪ {𝜅(𝑛 + 1)} = 𝒩𝑛+1.  Finally, since 𝜅(𝑛 + 1) ∉ 𝒩𝑛: 
∀𝑛′′ ∈ {1,… , 𝑛, 𝑛 + 1}, 𝜅(𝑛 + 1) = 𝜅(𝑛′′) ⇒ 𝑛 + 1 = 𝑛′′ 
We can conclude that all claims continue to hold with the definitions of 𝜅 and 𝜆 extended to the 
domain {1, … , 𝑛 + 1}.  By induction, we can define 𝜅 and 𝜆 on {1, … ,𝑁 − 1} satisfying the 
112 
 
above claims.  We complete the definition of 𝜅 and 𝜆 on {1, … ,𝑁} with having Κ(𝑁) and 𝜆(𝑁) 
both take on the last remaining value: 
𝜅(𝑁) = 𝜆(𝑁) ∈ 𝒩 ∖𝒩𝑁−1 
Note that 𝜅 is a bijection from {1, … ,𝑁} to 𝒩. 
Third, consider the incentives of agents in the proposed new SPNE corresponding with tax 
profile (𝜏𝑖
′)𝑖∈𝒩.  We show by induction that every agent 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 wants to propose the transfer 
functions 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡
′  ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝒩 and engage in the same action profile 𝑎𝑖
∗ as in the old SPNE.  We start 
with agent 𝜅(1).  Define ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩: 
𝑉𝑖(𝑠(ℎ); (𝜏𝑖′)𝑖′∈𝒩)
≡
{
 
 
 
 
?̅?𝑖, ∃𝑖
′, 𝑗, 𝑡, 𝑡′: 𝑐𝑖′𝑗𝑡 = 𝑐𝑗𝑖′𝑡′ = 1, 𝑠𝑖′𝑗𝑡
𝑔 (ℎ) + 𝑠
𝑗𝑖′𝑡′
𝑔 (ℎ) ≠ 0
𝓋𝑖 (𝑠
𝑎(ℎ),∑∑𝑐𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑔 (ℎ)
𝑇
𝑡=1𝑗∈𝒩
− 𝜏𝑖(𝑠
𝑎(ℎ))) , 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
One can rewrite the definition of an SPNE strategy profile as a strategy 𝑠∗ such that ∀𝑖 ∈
𝒩 ∀ℎ ∈ 𝐻: 
𝑉𝑖(𝑠
∗(ℎ), (𝜏𝑖′)𝑖′∈𝒩) ≥ 𝑉𝑖 ((𝑠𝑖(ℎ), 𝑠−𝑖
∗ (ℎ)), (𝜏𝑖′)𝑖′∈𝒩) ∀𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖(ℎ) 
Inductively define for 𝑛 = 1,… ,𝑁 − 1 the values of transfer adjustments: 
Δ𝑔𝜆(1)𝜅(1) ≡ 𝜏κ(1) − 𝜏𝜅(1)
′  
Δ𝑔𝜅(1)𝜆(1) ≡ −Δ𝑔𝜆(1)𝜅(1) 
Δ𝑔𝜆(𝑛)𝜅(𝑛) ≡ 𝜏κ(n) − 𝜏𝜅(𝑛)
′ + ∑ Δ𝑔𝜅(𝑛)𝑖
𝑖∈𝒩:𝜆(𝜅−1(𝑖))=𝜅(𝑛)
 
Δ𝑔𝜅(𝑛)𝜆(𝑛) ≡ −Δ𝑔𝜆(𝑛)𝜅(𝑛) 
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This definition is inductive because for any value of 𝑛 for which all values Δ𝑔𝜅(𝑛)𝜆(𝑛) and 
Δ𝑔𝜆(𝑛)𝜅(𝑛) are already defined, Δ𝑔𝜅(𝑛)𝑖 is already defined ∀𝑖: 𝜆(𝜅
−1(𝑖)) = 𝜅(𝑛).23  Define all 
other values of Δ𝑔𝑖𝑗 as the zero function.  Note that ∀𝑛 = 1,… ,𝑁 − 1: 
∑Δ𝑔𝑖𝜅(𝑛)
𝑖∈𝒩
= Δ𝑔𝜆(𝑛)𝜅(𝑛) − ∑ Δ𝑔𝜅(𝑛)𝑗
𝑗∈𝒩:𝜆(𝜅−1(𝑗))=𝜅(𝑛)
= 𝜏𝑖 − 𝜏𝑖
′ 
For completeness, noting that Δ𝑔𝑖𝜅(𝑁) = 0 ∀𝑖:
24 
∑Δ𝑔𝜅(𝑁)𝑗
𝑗∈𝒩
= ∑ [𝜏𝑖
′ − 𝜏𝑖]
𝑖≠𝜅(𝑁)
 
Letting Δ𝑔𝑖 ≡ (Δ𝑔𝑖𝑗)𝑗∈𝒩  denote the profile of transfer adjustments, we can then construct 
the strategy profile of the proposed new SPNE:25 
Δ𝜏𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑔 ((((𝑎𝑖′𝑡′ , 𝑔𝑖′𝑡′))𝑡′=1
𝑇
)
𝑖′∈𝒩
) ≡ 𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑔 ((((𝑎𝑖′𝑡′ , 𝑔𝑖′𝑡′ − Δ𝑔𝑖′))𝑡′=1
𝑇
)
𝑖′∈𝒩
) + Δ𝑔𝑖 
Δ𝜏𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑎 ((((𝑎𝑖′𝑡′ , 𝑔𝑖′𝑡′))𝑡′=1
𝑇
)
𝑖′∈𝒩
) ≡ 𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑎 ((((𝑎𝑖′𝑡′ , 𝑔𝑖′𝑡′ − Δ𝑔𝑖′))𝑡′=1
𝑇
)
𝑖′∈𝒩
) 
Δ𝜏𝑠𝑖𝑡(ℎ) ≡ (Δ𝜏𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑎 (ℎ), Δ𝜏𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑔 (ℎ)) 
Δ𝜏𝑠𝑖(ℎ) ≡ (Δ𝜏𝑠𝑖𝑡(ℎ))𝑡=1
𝑇
, Δτs(ℎ) ≡ (Δ𝜏𝑠𝑖)𝑖∈𝒩
, Δ𝜏𝑠
𝑎 ≡ ((Δ𝜏𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑎 (ℎ))
𝑡=1
𝑇
)
𝑖∈𝒩
 
                                                          
23 For 𝑛′ = 1,… , 𝑛 − 1 such that 𝜆(𝑛′) = 𝜅(𝑛), for ay 𝑖 = 𝜅(𝑛′), Δ𝑔𝜆(𝑛′)𝜅(𝑛′) and Δ𝑔𝜅(𝑛′)𝜆(𝑛′) are already defined.  
24 We can prove this claim via induction for any such model.  The claim is obvious when 𝑁 = 2.  Suppose it always 
holds when |𝒩| = 𝑁 − 1 for 𝑁 > 2.  Then one can define Δ𝑔𝜅(𝑁−1)𝑗̃ = Δ𝑔κ(𝑁)𝑗, Δ𝑔𝑗𝜅(𝑁−1)̃ =
−Δ𝑔𝜅(𝑁−1)𝑗̃ , 𝑔𝜅(𝑁)𝑗 = 0, and Δ𝑔𝑗𝜅(𝑁)̃ =−Δ𝑔𝜅(𝑁)𝑗  ∀𝑗 ≠ Κ(𝑁 − 1): 𝜆(𝜅
−1(𝑗)) = 𝜅(𝑁), with Δ𝑔κ(N),κ(N−1)̃ =
𝜏𝜅(𝑁−1) − 𝜏𝜅(𝑁−1)
′ + ∑ Δ𝑔𝜅(𝑁−1)𝑗̃𝑗∈𝒩∖{κ(𝑁)} , Δ𝑔κ(N−1),κ(N)̃ =−Δ𝑔κ(N),κ(N−1)̃ and otherwise Δ𝑔𝑖?̃? = Δ𝑔𝑖𝑗 .  This system 
of changes in transfer functions, excluding those for agent Κ(𝑁), corresponds with ?̃? ≡ 𝒩 ∖ {κ(𝑁)} with all 
agents connected.  By inductive hypothesis and definition: 
∑ Δ𝑔𝜅(𝑁−1)𝑗̃
𝑗∈𝒩∖{κ(𝑁)}
= ∑ [𝜏𝑖
′ − 𝜏𝑖]
𝑖≠𝜅(𝑁−1),𝜅(𝑁)
 
Then by definition ∑ 𝛥𝑔𝜅(𝑁)𝑗𝑗∈𝒩 = ∑ 𝛥𝑔𝜅(𝑁)𝑗̃𝑗∈𝒩 = Δ𝑔κ(𝑁)𝜅(𝑁−1)̃ =∑ [𝜏𝑖
′ − 𝜏𝑖]𝑖≠,𝜅(𝑁) . 
 
25 Analogously, Δ𝜏𝑠𝑖𝑡(∅) ≡ (𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑎(∅), 𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑔(∅)) and so on. 
114 
 
In words, agents adjust their payments and otherwise respond as if other agents had not 
adjusted their payments accordingly.  It is convenient to denote the mapping from histories to 
altered histories as if the payments were not adjusted as: 
Δ𝜏𝐻 ((((𝑎𝑖𝑡, 𝑔𝑖𝑡))𝑡=1
𝑇
)
𝑖∈𝒩
) ≡ (((𝑎𝑖𝑡, 𝑔𝑖𝑡 − Δ𝑔𝑖))𝑡=1
𝑇
)
𝑖∈𝒩
 
We now claim that Δ𝜏𝑠∗  is an SPNE for (𝜏𝑖
′)𝑖∈𝒩  and for any SPNE 𝑠
∗ of tax code (𝜏𝑖)𝑖∈𝒩  
when ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴: 
∑𝜏𝑖(𝑎)
𝑖∈𝒩
= ∑ 𝜏𝑖
′(𝑎)
𝑖∈𝒩
 
This is because the above condition implies that ∀ℎ, 𝑖: 
𝑉𝑖 (Δ𝜏𝑠(ℎ), (𝜏𝑖′
′ )
𝑖′∈𝒩
) = 𝑉𝑖(𝑠(Δ𝜏𝐻(ℎ)), (𝜏𝑖′)𝑖′∈𝒩) 
This claim requires proof, but upon doing so, it’s clear that in every history every agent best 
responds to all other agents by choosing Δ𝜏𝑠𝑖
∗(ℎ) because they were best responding under the 
old tax code with some history Δ𝜏𝐻(ℎ) and equilibrium 𝑠
∗. 
Pick 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 and ℎ ∈ 𝐻.  The claim is true when ∃𝑖′, 𝑗, 𝑡: 𝑐𝑖′𝑗𝑡 = 1, 𝑠𝑖′𝑗𝑡
𝑔 (Δ𝜏𝐻(ℎ)) +
𝑠
𝑗𝑖′𝑡
𝑔 (Δ𝜏𝐻(ℎ)) ≠ 0, since then for the same values of 𝑖
′, 𝑗, and 𝑡: 
Δ𝜏𝑠
𝑖′𝑗𝑡
𝑔 (ℎ) + Δ𝜏𝑠
𝑗𝑖′𝑡
𝑔 (ℎ) = 𝑠
𝑖′𝑗𝑡
𝑔 (Δ𝜏𝐻(ℎ)) + Δ𝑔𝑖′𝑗 + 𝑠𝑗𝑖′𝑡
𝑔 (Δ𝜏𝐻(ℎ)) + Δ𝑔𝑗𝑖′ ≠ 0 
And so: 
𝑉𝑖 (Δ𝜏𝑠(ℎ), (𝜏𝑖′
′ )
𝑖′∈𝒩
) = ?̅?𝑖 = 𝑉𝑖(𝑠(Δ𝜏𝐻(ℎ)), (𝜏𝑖′)𝑖′∈𝒩) 
Suppose otherwise, i.e.: 
∀𝑖′, 𝑗, 𝑡, 𝑐𝑖′𝑗𝑡 = 1 ⇒ 𝑠𝑖′𝑗𝑡
𝑔 (Δ𝜏𝐻(ℎ)) + 𝑠𝑗𝑖′𝑡
𝑔 (Δ𝜏𝐻(ℎ)) = 0 
115 
 
This means that 𝑉𝑖(𝑠(Δ𝜏𝐻(ℎ)), (𝜏𝑖′)𝑖′∈𝒩) = 𝓋𝑖(𝑠
𝑎(Δ𝜏𝐻(ℎ)),∑ ∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑔 (Δ𝜏𝐻(ℎ))
𝑇
𝑡=1 −𝑗∈𝒩
𝜏𝑖(𝑠
𝑎(𝑗))), and also that: 
∀𝑖′, 𝑗, 𝑡, 𝑐𝑖′𝑗𝑡 = 1 ⇒ Δ𝜏𝑠
𝑖′𝑗
𝑔 (ℎ) + Δ𝜏𝑠
𝑗𝑖′
𝑔 (ℎ) = 0 
Which implies that 𝑉𝑖(Δ𝜏𝑠𝑖 , (𝜏𝑖′)𝑖′∈𝒩) = 𝓋𝑖 (Δ𝜏𝑠
𝑎(ℎ), ∑ ∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑖𝑡Δ𝜏𝑠𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑔 (ℎ)𝑇𝑡=1𝑗∈𝒩 − 𝜏𝑖
′(𝑠𝑎(ℎ))).  
Additionally: 
Δ𝜏𝑠
𝑎(ℎ) = 𝑠𝑎(Δ𝜏𝐻(ℎ)) 
Finally, we want to show that: 
∑∑𝑐𝑗𝑖𝑡Δ𝜏𝑠𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑔 (ℎ)
𝑇
𝑡=1𝑗∈𝒩
− 𝜏𝑖
′(𝑠𝑎(ℎ)) =  ∑∑𝑐𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑔 (Δ𝜏𝐻(ℎ))
𝑇
𝑡=1𝑗∈𝒩
− 𝜏𝑖(𝑠
𝑎(ℎ)) 
We show this by demonstrating that: 
∑∑𝑐𝑗𝑖𝑡 [Δ𝜏𝑠𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑔 (ℎ) − 𝑠𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑔 (Δ𝜏𝐻(ℎ))]
𝑇
𝑡=1𝑗∈𝒩
=∑Δ𝑔𝑗𝑖
𝑗
= 𝜏𝑖 − 𝜏𝑖
′ 
The left-hand equality comes from the definition of Δ𝜏𝑠𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑔 (ℎ).  The right-hand equality is 
obviously true for any 𝑖 ≠ 𝜅(𝑁).26  It is true for 𝑖 = 𝜅(𝑁) because: 
∑ 𝜏𝑖′
𝑖′∈𝒩
= ∑ 𝜏𝑖′
′
𝑖′∈𝒩
⇒ 𝜏𝑖 − 𝜏𝑖
′ = −∑[𝜏𝑖′
′ − 𝜏𝑖′]
𝑖′≠𝑖
= −∑ Δ𝑔𝜅(𝑁)𝑗
𝑗∈𝒩
=∑Δ𝑔𝑖′𝑖
𝑖′
 
Thus: 
                                                          
26 For 𝑖 ≠ 𝜅(𝑁), ∑ Δ𝑔𝑗𝑖𝑗 = Δ𝑔𝜆(𝜅−1(𝑖))𝑖 − ∑ Δ𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑗:𝜆(𝜅−1(𝑗))=𝑖 = 𝜏𝑖 − 𝜏𝑖
′ . 
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𝑉𝑖(Δ𝜏𝑠𝑖 , (𝜏𝑖′)𝑖′∈𝒩) = 𝓋𝑖 (Δ𝜏𝑠
𝑎(ℎ), ∑∑𝑐𝑗𝑖𝑡Δ𝜏𝑠𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑔 (ℎ)
𝑇
𝑡=1𝑗∈𝒩
− 𝜏𝑖
′(𝑠𝑎(ℎ)))
= 𝓋𝑖 (𝑠
𝑎(Δ𝜏𝐻(ℎ)), ∑∑𝑐𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑔 (Δ𝜏𝐻(ℎ))
𝑇
𝑡=1𝑗∈𝒩
− 𝜏𝑖(𝑠
𝑎(ℎ)))
= 𝑉𝑖(𝑠(Δ𝜏𝐻(ℎ)), (𝜏𝑖′)𝑖′∈𝒩) 
Therefore,  𝑉𝑖 (Δ𝜏𝑠(ℎ), (𝜏𝑖′
′ )
𝑖′∈𝒩
) = 𝑉𝑖(𝑠(Δ𝜏𝐻(ℎ)), (𝜏𝑖′)𝑖′∈𝒩) ∀ℎ, 𝑖, implying that Δ𝜏𝑠∗  is an 
SPNE for tax code (𝜏𝑖
′)𝑖∈𝒩. ∎ 
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Chapter 3 
Doctors Need Sleep: A Theory of Optimal Production 
by Benjamin Glass 
 A Walrasian equilibrium with production cannot exist when firms have unboundedly 
increasing returns to scale technology.  If any price-taking firm chooses to produce at all, then it 
could achieve infinite profit by producing an infinite amount.  Thus, the difficulty of increasing 
returns to scale in perfect competition results from firms acting without accounting for input 
supply constraints.   
1. Introduction 
There is no such thing as decreasing returns to scale production technology.  Any 
productive process performed once can be replicated, so that doubling inputs can easily double 
outputs.  In fact, if any resources are spent discovering improvements in productive techniques, 
then the same argument implies that returns to scale are necessarily increasing.  This paper 
offers the first general model of price-taking agents with increasing returns to scale production 
technology as a competitive benchmark for efficiency. 
The argument against decreasing returns to scale goes back to Koopmans (1959), yet 
the assumption persists.  This may be due to the usefulness of decreasing returns to scale in 
explaining such basic economic phenomena as supply curves and profit taxes.  As Kimball 
(2017) notes, there are multiple justifications for the assumption.  Empirically, we cannot
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always observe input quality, so it may appear to us that firms face decreasing returns to scale 
as they use more lower quality inputs.   Theoretically, many standard results go through with 
slight modification if we suppose that there are some factors that firms cannot trade between 
each other, even as these factors may be freely used within the firms to which they are 
attached.  For instance, if each firm has non-transferable managerial oversight that does not 
appear in the production function, then the welfare theorems should go through so long as we 
understand that we are referring to constrained Pareto efficiency subject to the immobility of 
factors between firms. 
Yet these justifications reach their limit when considering the intersection of 
competitive production and public policy.  The problems are two-fold.  One, even if we imagine 
information asymmetries or contractibility problems such that factors cannot transfer between 
firms, surely the supply of these factors tends to change with market conditions.  For instance, 
if the corporate income tax declines, one would expect managers to attempt to realize higher 
profits by supplying more managerial oversight.  Two, and perhaps more critically, the 
assumption of the immobility of factors between firms has a very natural policy implication: the 
government should force firms to merge together.  By merging together two firms with fixed 
factors, the government creates a single entity that in theory could operate as the two distinct 
firms previously had.  Thus, there is no risk to productivity, but the possibility remains that the 
newly formed firm could benefit by moving around previously fixed factors.   
Regarding the theoretical recommendation to forcibly merge firms, there are three 
counterarguments.  The first asks why these firms did not previously willingly merge.  I suggest 
that the information asymmetry or contractibility issues that keep factors fixed likely also 
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thwart firms from mutually agreeing to merge.  In any case, if it is not theoretically possible for 
the merged firm to be less productive, the failure of these firms to merge on their own does not 
introduce this possibility.  Second, one may suggest that the merged firm is more difficult to 
manage.  But this counterargument already supposes that the merged firm has lost some of its 
managerial labor.  Instead, the merged firm is free to ignore the merger and act like two firms.  
And third, merging all firms together would create an entity so large that one would expect it to 
understand how its decisions affected prices.  Thus, there may be limits to how much we can 
merge firms together without creating distortions.  For instance, if firms are all single-product 
and compete in prices, then we could imagine Bertrand competition yielding competitive prices 
so long as at least two firms remain in each market.1  In any case, so long as firms are small 
price-takers, the government can increase efficiency by forcing a small number of them to 
merge. 
In response to these theoretical difficulties, I offer a model that does away with firms 
entirely.  Instead, agents are directly endowed with production technology.  I impose no 
convexity assumption on this technology.  Instead, I allow for a set of goods that agents know 
they can supply for production but cannot purchase thereafter.  In this way, agents account for 
some feasibility constraints in the economy.  In doing so, they produce efficiently.  I show in this 
model that a price-taking equilibrium is always efficient.  Furthermore, any Pareto efficient 
allocation is supported by a price-taking equilibrium with transfers.    
For instance, imagine potential doctors deciding how to allocate their time.  On the one 
hand, there is a wage rate for their labor.  But another opportunity is to sell some time and 
                                                          
1 Such a result would hold if the merged firms had constant returns to scale up to a very large quantity.   
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other resources for training to make their labor able to produce valuable medical services.  
Potential doctors with a greater desire or capacity to practice medicine will sacrifice the 
necessary resources to obtain medical training.  In doing so, they account for the long hours 
they will choose to work afterwards, explicitly aware that their increased earning will not 
permit them to repurchase their leisure on the open market.  Upon achieving medical degrees, 
doctors may feel strong incentives to supply most of their time.  Yet most doctors, like most 
people, require some amount of sleep.  Even if they don’t, doctors only have so much time in 
the day.  Thus, even if they take all prices as given, their supply of medical care remains limited. 
Critical to this story is the fundamentally limited size of medical practices.  This model 
excludes cases of natural monopolies and public goods.  For instance, if a radio broadcast can 
be produced for free upon the payment of a fixed cost in terms of resources, then no price-
taking equilibrium can sustain the provision of public radio.2  Instead, if there is a continuum of 
doctors, then the feasible set of allocations between leisure and the provision of medical care is 
convex.  I model agents as in a continuum to ensure convexity of the set of feasible bundles. 
The notion of convexity arising from a non-atomic measure of agents extends at least to 
Aumann (1966).   Since the Second Welfare Theorem fails to hold in atomic economies with 
increasing returns to scale due to the non-convexity in the set of feasible bundles, one might 
hope that having a continuum of firms would solve this problem.  This insight partially holds.  
Any model of a natural monopoly or of public goods inherently refers to atomic producers.  For 
instance, if one must build a radio tower to produce radio broadcasts, then an appropriate 
                                                          
2 The exception is if some inputs have negative market value, such as advertising content.  Of course, advertising is 
inconsistent with a competitive economy of price-taking agents.   
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model requires a positive measure of inputs such as labor and steel to produce any amount of a 
radio broadcast.  Still, so long as we avoid fixed cost production on a large scale, one can model 
production with a continuum of firms and obtain a convex set of feasible outcomes.  See 
Hildenbrand (1969, 1974). 
It may appear strange that a continuum of agents yields the welfare theorems, since any 
firm in the continuum still cannot achieve non-negative profit while producing with increasing 
returns to scale technology in equilibrium.  The resolution of this apparent paradox is that a 
continuum of increasing returns to scale firms generally yields a set of feasible allocations that 
is not compact, and so may not have a Pareto efficient allocation.  Without any Pareto efficient 
allocations, there are no equilibria.  Intuitively, one can achieve arbitrarily more efficient 
production by having an arbitrarily small measure of firms scale up production.  Yet this process 
of increasing efficiency cannot result in the most efficient result of a single firm producing, since 
that firm cannot yield a positive measure of production.  Instead, the process of increasing 
efficiency yields a sequence of feasible allocations that approaches a boundary point not 
contained in the set of feasible bundles.  
In contrast, the model I propose does yield a compact set of feasible bundles.  If agents 
have continuous preferences, it follows that there are Pareto efficient outcomes.  The Second 
Welfare Theorem then implies that one can obtain those outcomes with an appropriate lump-
sum transfer scheme. 
The contribution of this paper is primarily normative.  The Second Welfare Theorem 
says that any Pareto efficient allocation can be realized by a decentralized price mechanism 
with transfers.  This allows the planner to obtain any desired efficient allocation without relying 
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on knowledge privately held by agents.3  The paper also modestly contributes positively to our 
understanding of why apparently more efficient resource allocations arise in more competitive 
market settings.  Walrasian equilibrium cannot explain how efficient allocations may occur in a 
price-taking environment with unboundedly increasing returns to scale production technology, 
as no such equilibrium can exist.  In contrast, I show that the non-tradability of inputs allows for 
the existence of a Pareto efficient allocation, to which there corresponds a price-taking 
equilibrium with transfers. 
This paper does not present the first model deviating from firms maximizing profits 
subject to productive technology.  Models such as Grossman and Hart (1981, 1983) formalize 
information constraints preventing efficient production.  But these considerations do not 
preserve the argument for decreasing returns to scale.  Perhaps principle-agent problems make 
each worker employed and unit of capital rented less productive than is theoretically possible.  
All the same, whatever productive process one can employ subject to both feasibility and 
incentive-compatibility constraints with a given combination of factor inputs, one can surely 
repeat this process a second time to get at least twice the outputs with twice the inputs.  Thus, 
Koopmans’s (1959) argument against decreasing returns to scale survives treating incentive 
compatibility constraints like technological constraints. 
There is substantial literature on notions of general equilibrium with increasing returns 
to scale.  One literature on monopolistic competition attempts to model inefficient equilibria 
that arise form firms exercising market power.  Another literature considers regulated 
                                                          
3 However, that equilibrium with transfers is generally not unique suggests the planner may have difficulty assuring 
that a transfer scheme will assuredly yield the desired efficient allocation. 
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monopolies subject to pricing rules.4  In contrast, I am aware of two papers that describe 
decentralized equilibria that both allow for increasing returns to scale production technology 
and at least sometimes obtains efficient equilibria.5  The paper perhaps most related to this one 
is Dehez and Drèze (1988).  They have firms set prices competitively and take as given 
constraints on how much quantity they can supply.  Thus, they also have agents taking account 
of supply constraints.  Yet their model does not necessarily yield efficient equilibria when 
production technology is not convex.  Edlin et al. (1998) consider an otherwise competitive 
economy except for a perfectly price-discriminating monopolist.  Their notion of equilibrium is 
typically efficient, but some Pareto efficient allocations cannot be sustained even with 
transfers.6   
There is also a literature on incomplete financial markets in general equilibrium.  My 
model corresponds with the notion of entrepreneurial equilibrium described in Magill and 
Quinzii (1996) when interpreting goods as consumption in various states.  I am unaware of any 
previous literature discussing the (constrained) efficiency of a competitive economy of sole 
proprietorships with incomplete markets.   
One may also conceive of my model as one of non-linear pricing, where the “price” of 
non-tradable inputs is the marginal dollar value of the utility of that input as it is utilized in 
production.  This would relate my work to Chavas and Briec (2012), who demonstrate that 
                                                          
4 See Heal (1999) for a literature review. 
5 By “decentralized”, I mean the owners of the means of production would choose the production schedule that 
results in equilibrium, taking as given the environment determined by the Walrasian auctioneer. 
6 Vazirani (2013) describes a model in which income is exogenously given, but one could reinterpret it as a small 
open economy in which agents must sell their endowments for income at international prices, and then use that 
income to buy consumption goods from a perfectly price-discriminating importer.  In this case, the welfare 
theorems obtain.  However, this model still does not allow for increasing returns to scale. 
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economic efficiency results from a non-linear price taking equilibrium even when the 
representative firm has non-convex production technology.  But my model explicitly differs 
from theirs in offering a decentralized efficient equilibria. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 lays out the model.  Section 3 defines 
Pareto efficiency and equilibrium.  Section 4 contains the welfare theorem results.  Section 5 
demonstrates existence of Pareto optima.  Section 6 discusses modeling details and plans for 
future work.  Section 7 concludes.  The proof of theorem 2 is relegated to an appendix. 
2. Model 
 Let 𝜃 ∈ Θ indicate consumer type, where Θ is finite.  For each type 𝜃, there is mass 𝜆𝜃 >
0 agents of that type.  Let 𝑙 ∈ {1, … , 𝐿} index the finite number of goods.  For each type 𝜃, there 
is a continuum of agents 𝑖 ∈ [0,1] with the same endowment vector 𝜔𝜃 ≡ (𝜔𝜃𝑙) ∈ ℝ+
𝐿  and 
production technology 𝑌𝜃 ⊆ ℝ
𝐿.  Yet some inputs ℐ ⊂ {1, … , 𝐿} cannot be purchased on the 
market.7  Instead, they can only be used as productive inputs or consumed.  Thus, an agent of 
type 𝜃 facing price vector 𝑝 chooses: 
(𝑐, 𝑦) ∈ ℝ+
𝐿 × 𝑌𝜃: 𝑝 ∗ 𝑐 ≤ 𝑝 ∗ [𝜔𝜃 + 𝑦], 𝑐𝑙 = 𝜔𝜃𝑙 + 𝑦𝑙 ∀𝑙 ∈ ℐ 
Here, 𝑐 = (𝑐𝑙)𝑙=1
𝐿  denotes a consumption vector, and for any agent of type 𝜃, I denote 
by 𝑐𝜃𝑙 and 𝜔𝜃𝑙 that agent type’s consumption and endowment respectively of good 𝑙.  Define 
the set of feasible production vectors as: 
?̃?𝜃 ≡ {𝑦 ∈ 𝑌𝜃| 𝑦𝑙 ∈ [−𝜔𝜃𝑙, 0] ∀𝑙 ∈ ℐ} 
I assume that non-purchasable inputs are essential to production.  Formally: 
 
                                                          
7 The analogue of the First Welfare Theorem implicitly assumes that ℐ ≠ {1, … , 𝐿}. 
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Assumption 1: For any 𝜃, ?̃?𝜃 is compact and 𝑦 ∈ 𝑌𝜃 ⇒ 𝑦𝑙 ≤ 0 ∀𝑙 ∈ ℐ. 
 
This precludes production technology in which a fixed expenditure of inputs permits access to 
linear production technology using inputs outside of set ℐ. 
 All consumers of type 𝜃 maximize preferences ≽𝜃 on ℝ+
𝐿 .  A result analogous to the 
Second Welfare Theorem will require that these preferences are continuous. 
 
Assumption 2: For any 𝜃, if 𝑐′ ≻𝜃 𝑐, then ∃𝜖 > 0 such that 𝑐
′′ ≽𝜃 ?̃? ∀𝑐
′′: ‖𝑐′′ − 𝑐′‖, ‖?̃? − 𝑐‖ <
𝜖. 
 
3. Equilibrium 
 To define equilibrium requires integrals of functions over the unit interval.  To ease 
notation, define for any measurable set 𝐸 ⊆ [0,1]:8 
ℙ(𝐸) ≡ ∫ 𝑑𝑖
𝑖∈𝐸
 
In words, ℙ is the probability (via a uniform distribution) that a randomly selected element 
of [0,1] is in 𝐸.   A function 𝐸(𝜃) mapping from type to (measurable) subsets of the interval 
[0,1] occurs almost everywhere, or for almost every (a.e.) agent, if: 
ℙ(𝐸(𝜃)) = 1 ∀𝜃 
                                                          
8 This is a Lebesgue integral.  The set of measurable sets 𝐸 is the Borel sigma algebra on [0,1]. 
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A feasible resource allocation is a vector of pairs of a.e. continuous functions on the unit 
interval (𝑐𝜃, 𝑦𝜃)𝜃∈Θ satisfying the feasibility constraints:
9 
1. 𝑦𝜃(𝑖) ∈ 𝑌𝜃 ∀𝑖 ∀𝜃 
2. 𝑐𝜃𝑙(𝑖) = 𝜔𝜃𝑙(𝑖) + yθl(𝑖) ∀𝑙 ∈ ℐ ∀𝑖 ∀𝜃 
3. ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃𝑙(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
= ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ [𝜔𝜃(𝑖) + 𝑦𝜃(𝑖)]𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
 
The first condition says that all production is feasible.  The second condition says that agents 
cannot buy or sell inputs ℐ.10  The third condition says that there is enough production to satisfy 
consumption.  For convenience, we denote by 𝑠𝜃(𝑖) ≡ 𝜔𝜃 + 𝑦𝜃(𝑖) the vector of supply due to 
agent 𝑖 of type 𝜃. 
 A feasible resource allocation is Pareto efficient if no alternative feasible allocation both 
makes a.e. agent at least as well off and leaves some agents strictly better off. 
 
Definition: A feasible resource allocation (𝑐𝜃, 𝑦𝜃)𝜃 is Pareto efficient if for any feasible resource 
allocation (𝑐𝜃
′ , 𝑦𝜃
′ )𝜃: 
∀𝜃 ℙ(𝑐𝜃
′ ≽𝜃 𝑐𝜃) = 1 ⇒ ∀𝜃 ℙ(𝑐𝜃
′ ∼𝜃 𝑐𝜃) = 1 
 
An equilibrium in this economy has a.e. agents choosing input supply, production, and 
consumption to maximize preferences subject to a price vector and technology constraints, as 
                                                          
9 I imposed continuity a.e. of 𝑐𝜃  and 𝑦𝜃 , rather than the weaker assumption of integrability, to avoid issues with 
the existence of non-measurable sets of agents who disagree about which allocation they prefer. 
10 If one reinterprets goods as consumption in various states in an economy with incomplete financial markets, 
then including this condition suggests a description of constrained feasible allocations.  Similarly, the subsequent 
description of Pareto efficiency would refer to constrained efficiency. 
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well as exogenous government transfers.  In addition, the choices of these agents clear all 
markets.  Formally, for any 𝑇 ∈ ℝ, define the budget set of an agent of type 𝜃 as: 
𝐵𝜃(𝑝, 𝜔, 𝑦, 𝑇) ≡ {𝑐 ∈ ℝ+
𝐿 | 𝑝 ∗ 𝑐 ≤ 𝑝 ∗ [𝜔 + 𝑦] + 𝑇, 𝑐𝑙 = 𝜔𝜃𝑙 + 𝑦𝑙  ∀𝑙 ∈ ℐ} 
The government exogenously imposes the integrable transfer functions 𝑇𝜃: [0,1] → ℝ.  We say 
these transfers satisfy the balanced budget constraint if ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑇𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
= 0.  It will be 
convenient to write the set of choices of consumption bundles available to the consumer as: 
𝐵𝜃(𝑝, 𝜔, 𝑇) ≡ {𝑐 ∈ ℝ+
𝐿 | ∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑌𝜃: 𝑐 ∈ 𝐵𝜃(𝑝, 𝜔, 𝑦, 𝑇)} 
 
Definition: An equilibrium ((𝑐𝜃, 𝑦𝜃)𝜃∈Θ, 𝑝) is made up of integrable functions and satisfies: 
1. 𝑐𝜃(𝑖) ∈ 𝐵𝜃(𝑝, 𝜔𝜃, 𝑇𝜃(𝑖)) ∀𝑖 ∀𝜃 
2. A.e.  ∀𝑐′ ∈ 𝐵𝜃(𝑝, 𝜔𝜃, 𝑇𝜃(𝑖)): 
𝑐𝜃(𝑖) ≽𝜃 𝑐
′ 
3. ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃𝑙(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
= ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑠𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
 
The first two conditions say that consumers maximize preferences subject to constraints.  The 
third condition states that all markets clear. 
 
4. The Welfare Theorems 
 We are now ready to demonstrate that the analogues of the welfare theorems hold in 
this new model, beginning with the analogue of the First Welfare Theorem.  The standard result 
uses an assumption that all agents have locally non-satiated preferences.  However, now agents 
are aware of the supply constraints of certain goods, so that certain forms of locally non-
satiated preferences may still yield inefficient equilibria.   
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For instance, suppose Θ = {1,2} and 𝐿 = 2, where agents of type 1 have preferences 
represented by 𝑢1(𝑐11, 𝑐12) = min{𝑐11, 𝑐12}, while agents of type 2 have preferences 
represented by 𝑢2(𝑐21, 𝑐22) = 𝑐22.  Let 𝜔1 = (1,0), 𝜔2 = 𝟎, and: 
𝑌1 = {(𝑦1, 𝑦2)|0 ≤ 𝑦2 ≤ 𝕀(y1 ≤ −1)} 
𝑌2 = {𝟎} 
Here 𝕀 denote the indicator function mapping true statements to one and false statements to 
zero, while 𝟎 denotes the zero vector.11  In words, agent type one can produce one unit of good 
two only by giving up their endowment of good one.   
It is Pareto inefficient for agents of the first type to consume their endowments, since 
they could be just as well off producing and giving their produced good to agents of type 2.  Yet 
for a set ℐ = {1} and a price vector 𝑝 = (0,1), agents of type 1 choose (𝑐11, 𝑐12) such that 
either 𝑐11 = 0 or 𝑐12 = 0.  They can only achieve utility of zero, and so can optimally 
choose 𝑐1 = (1,0) and 𝑦1 = 𝟎.  Meanwhile, agents of type 2 can only choose 𝑐2 = 𝟎.  Thus, it is 
an equilibrium resource allocation for all agents to consume their initial endowments, despite 
this outcome being inefficient.  Critical to this reasoning is that agent type one cannot purchase 
good 1, as otherwise they would do better to choose 𝑐1 = (1,1), violating market-clearing. 
To ensure equilibrium efficiency, we impose a stronger assumption than local non-
satiation.  Informally, it is local non-satiation with respect to tradable goods.  This condition 
remains weaker than assuming strictly monotonic preferences.   
 
First Welfare Theorem: Any equilibrium is Pareto efficient if for all 𝜃 and all 𝑐 ∈ ℝ𝐿: 
                                                          
11 I will generally use 𝟎 to denote the zero vector for an arbitrary number of goods 𝐿. 
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∀𝜖 > 0 ∃𝑐′ = (𝑐𝑙
′)𝑙=1
𝐿 : 𝑐′ ≻𝜃 𝑐, 𝑐𝑙
′ = 𝑐𝑙 ∀𝑙 ∈ ℐ, ‖𝑐
′ − 𝑐‖ < 𝜖 
In words, an arbitrarily small change in consumption of non-tradable goods can make the 
consumer better off. 
 
Proof: This proof is completely standard.  First, note that the assumption on preferences implies 
that agents spend all their income: 
𝑝 ∗ 𝑐𝜃(𝑖) = 𝑝 ∗ 𝑠𝜃(𝑖) + 𝑇𝜃(𝑖) ∀𝑖 ∀𝜃 
Then feasibility shows that ((𝑐𝜃, 𝑦𝜃)𝜃, 𝑝) is an equilibrium only if the transfers satisfy the 
balanced budget condition: 
∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ [𝑝 ∗ 𝑠𝜃(𝑖) + 𝑇𝜃(𝑖)]𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
= ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑝 ∗ 𝑐𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
= ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑝 ∗ 𝑠𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
 
∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑇𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
= 0 
Suppose that there were feasible resource allocations (𝑐𝜃, 𝑦𝜃)𝜃 and (𝑐𝜃
′ , 𝑦𝜃
′ )𝜃 such that: 
∀𝜃 ℙ(𝑐𝜃
′ (𝑖) ≽𝜃 𝑐𝜃(𝑖)) = 1 
Assume that ((𝑐𝜃, 𝑦𝜃)𝜃, 𝑝) is an equilibrium for some price vector 𝑝 ∈ ℝ
𝐿.  The assumption on 
preferences implies that 𝑝 ∗ [(𝑐𝜃
′ − 𝑠𝜃
′ ) − (𝑐𝜃 − 𝑠𝜃)] is an integrable function a.e. non-negative.  
Yet market-clearing and feasibility implies that: 
∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑝 ∗ [(𝑐𝜃
′ (𝑖) − 𝑠𝜃
′ (𝑖)) − (𝑐𝜃(𝑖) − 𝑠𝜃(𝑖))]𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
= − ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑇𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
= 0 
Thus, we know that 𝑝 ∗ (𝑐𝜃
′ (𝑖) − 𝑠𝜃
′ (𝑖)) = 𝑝 ∗ (𝑐𝜃(𝑖) − 𝑠𝜃(𝑖)) a.e., implying that a.e.: 
𝑐𝜃
′ (𝑖) ∈ argmax
𝐵𝜃(𝑝,𝜔𝜃,𝑇𝜃(𝑖))
≽𝜃  
By symmetry, I can conclude that: 
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∀𝜃 ℙ(𝑐𝜃
′ ∼𝜃 𝑐𝜃) = 1 
And so (𝑐𝜃, 𝑦𝜃)𝜃 is Pareto efficient. ∎ 
 In the proof of the analogue to the First Welfare Theorem, an equilibrium is efficient 
because the existence of any feasible Pareto improvement would induce a positive measure of 
agents to deviate from the proposed equilibrium.  However, our main concern is the ability to 
sustain an equilibrium at an arbitrary Pareto efficient allocation using the price mechanism.  
The Second Welfare Theorem traditionally argues for this possibility under assumptions of 
convex production technology.  The idea behind this result is to impose assumptions such that 
the set of feasible bundles is convex.  Then the price vector yielding equilibrium is the 
supporting hyperplane on the Pareto efficient allocation.  However, if firms have increasing 
returns to scale production technology, then the set of feasible allocations is not convex, and so 
there may not exist a supporting hyperplane.   
 Our current setup resolves this difficulty by assuming a non-atomic measure of agents.  
Each of these agents has increasing returns to scale production technology, but their supply 
constraints bound their sets of possible production vectors.  Thus, the feasible production set 
remains convex. 
 
Second Welfare Theorem: Under assumptions (1) and (2), any Pareto efficient allocation 
(𝑐𝜃, 𝑦𝜃)𝜃 has a corresponding price vector 𝑝 such that ((𝑐𝜃, 𝑦𝜃)𝜃, 𝑝) is an equilibrium with 
integrable transfers 𝑇𝜃: [0,1] → ℝ satisfying the balanced budget condition: 
∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑇𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
= 0 
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 The outline of the proof follows seven steps like the standard proof of the Second 
Welfare Theorem.  First, let 𝑉 denote the set of aggregated Pareto improvements: 
𝑉 ≡ {
𝐶 ∈ ℝ𝐿| ∃𝑐𝜃
′  ∀𝜃: 𝑐𝜃
′ (𝑖) ≽𝜃 𝑐𝜃(𝑖) ∀𝑖 ∀𝜃, ∃𝜃: ℙ(𝑐𝜃
′ (𝑖) ≻𝜃  𝑐𝜃(𝑖)) > 0, 𝐶 =
∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃
′ (𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
} 
One can show that 𝑉 is an open convex set.  Next, let 𝑅 denote the set of aggregated feasible 
allocations: 
𝑅 ≡ {𝑋 ∈ ℝ𝐿| ∃(cθ
′ , 𝑦𝜃
′ )𝜃: ∀𝜃 ∀𝑖 𝑐𝜃𝑙(𝑖) = 𝜔𝜃𝑙 + yθl ∀𝑙 ∈ ℐ ∀𝑖, 𝑦𝜃
′ (𝑖) ∈ 𝑌𝜃, 𝑋 = ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃
′ (𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
= ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ [ωθ + 𝑦𝜃
′ (𝑖)]𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
} 
One can also show that 𝑅 is convex.  Third, if 𝑉 is empty, then the set of agents who are not 
globally sated at allocation (𝑐𝜃, 𝑦𝜃)𝜃 has measure zero, so 𝑝 = 𝟎 yields an equilibrium.  We now 
assume otherwise, so that 𝑉 and 𝑅 are non-empty and disjoint.  Then the Separating 
Hyperplane Theorem implies that: 
∃𝑝 ∈ ℝ𝐿 , 𝑣 ∈ ℝ: 𝑝 ∗ 𝑋 ≤ 𝑣 ≤ 𝑝 ∗ 𝐶 ∀𝑋 ∈ 𝑅 ∀𝐶 ∈ 𝑉 
In words, there is a price vector 𝑝 such that feasible allocations have value no greater than 𝑣, 
while Pareto improvements upon (𝑐𝜃, 𝑦𝜃)𝜃 have value no less than 𝑣.  In fact, by the openness 
of 𝑉: 
𝑣 < 𝑝 ∗ 𝐶 ∀𝐶 ∈ 𝑉 
 Fourth, still assuming 𝑉 ≠ ∅, one can show that the aggregation of the Pareto efficient 
allocation (𝑐𝜃, 𝑦𝜃)𝜃 is on the boundary of the set 𝑉: 
∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
∈ 𝑐𝑙(𝑉) 
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Fifth, one can then note that the aggregation of allocation (𝑐𝜃, 𝑦𝜃)𝜃 has market value 𝑣: 
𝑝 ∗ ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
= 𝑣 
Sixth, define transfers 𝑇𝜃(𝑖) ≡ 𝑝 ∗ [𝑐𝜃(𝑖) − 𝑠𝜃(𝑖)] ∀𝑖 ∀𝜃.  Such a definition yields: 
∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑇𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
= 𝑝 ∗ ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ [𝑐𝜃(𝑖) − 𝑠𝜃(𝑖)]𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
= 0 
And seventh, we can confirm that ((𝑐𝜃, 𝑦𝜃)𝜃, 𝑝) is an equilibrium.  We already know that: 
𝑐𝜃(𝑖) ∈ 𝐵𝜃(𝑝, 𝜔𝜃, 𝑇𝜃(𝑖)) ∀𝑖 ∀𝜃 
The greater difficulty is to show that ∀𝜃: 
ℙ (𝑐𝜃(𝑖) ∈ argmax
𝐵𝜃(𝑝,𝜔,𝑇𝜃(𝑖))
≽𝜃) = 1 
To see this, suppose for the sake of contradiction that for some type 𝜃∗:12 
ℙ (𝑐𝜃∗(𝑖) ∉ argmax
𝐵𝜃(𝑝,𝜔,𝑇𝜃(𝑖))
≽𝜃∗) > 0 
Then one can show that there exists some resource allocation (𝑐𝜃
′ , 𝑦𝜃
′ )𝜃 such that for all 
agents 𝑖 of all types 𝜃: 
𝑐𝜃
′ (𝑖) ≽𝜃 𝑐𝜃(𝑖) 
Furthermore, there is a positive measure of agents of type 𝜃∗ who strictly prefer this new 
allocation: 
ℙ(𝑐𝜃∗
′ (𝑖) ≻𝜃∗ 𝑐𝜃∗(𝑖)) > 0 
                                                          
12 Really, suppose that the set {𝑐𝜃∗(𝑖) ∉ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐵
𝜃∗
(𝑝,𝜔,𝑇
𝜃∗
(𝑖))
≽𝜃∗} contains a set of positive measure.  That this is so if 
((𝑐𝜃 , 𝑦𝜃)𝜃 , 𝑝) is not an equilibrium with transfers is left to the appendix. 
   
133 
 
And the resource allocation is consistent with individual constraints: 
∃𝑦𝜃
′ (𝑖): 𝑐𝜃
′ (𝑖) ∈ 𝐵𝜃(𝑝, 𝜔, 𝑦𝜃
′ , 𝑇𝜃(𝑖)) ∀𝑖 ∀𝜃 
But then: 
𝑣 < 𝑝 ∗ ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃
′ (𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
≤ 𝑝 ∗ ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑠𝜃
′ (𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
+ ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑇𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
≤ 𝑣 
The first inequality comes from ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃
′ (𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
∈ 𝑉, the second comes from the satisfaction 
of budget constraints, and the third comes from ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑠𝜃
′ (𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
∈ 𝑅 & ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑇𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
= 0.  
Thus, we have our contradiction, demonstrating that no positive measure of agents can benefit 
from deviating from the proposed equilibrium.13  Finally, feasibility ensures that the markets 
clear: 
∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
= ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑠𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
 
We conclude that ((𝑐𝜃, 𝑦𝜃)𝜃, 𝑝) is an equilibrium with transfers (𝑇𝜃)𝜃. 
 The above outline contains the main points of the proof.  I relegate the details, including 
regarding the measurability and integrability of functions, to the appendix.  Yet the proof 
outline is sufficient to note the similarity with standard demonstrations of the Second Welfare 
Theorem.  The disjoint convexity of aggregations of feasible and Pareto improving sets, 𝑉 and 𝑅 
respectively, yields a separating hyperplane that permits the construction of budget constraints 
for all agents.   
  
                                                          
13 One can then adjust ((𝑐𝜃 , 𝑦𝜃 , 𝑇𝜃)𝜃 , 𝑝) by having the measure zero of agents not already optimizing with respect 
to their budget constraints to instead choose from 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐵𝜃(𝑝,𝜔,𝑇𝜃(𝑖))
≽𝜃 . 
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Figure 3.1 
 
The black curve delineates the boundary of the set 𝑅.  The red dashed curve delineates the boundary of the (open) 
set 𝑉.  The black dot represents the aggregation of the Pareto efficient allocation, on the boundary of 𝑅 and 𝑉.  
This yields a hyperplane, denoted by the blue line, passing through the aggregated Pareto efficient allocation and 
separating the sets 𝑅 & 𝑉.   
 
  
5. Existence of Pareto Efficient Allocations 
I have thus far performed demonstrations of results in the spirit of the classic First and 
Second Welfare Theorems.  In summation, weak assumptions ensure that the resource 
allocations supported in equilibrium are exactly those which are Pareto efficient.  The efficiency 
of equilibria comes from agents relying on prices to what degree they do not already internalize 
resource constraints.  The ability to support efficient outcomes with equilibria arises from the 
convexity of sets 𝑉 and 𝑅. 
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 The convexity of both 𝑅 and 𝑉 is due to the non-atomic measure of agents.  One can 
perform similar derivations using a continuum of firms as in the classic welfare theorems.  But 
while a continuum of agents ensures that 𝑅 is convex, it permits 𝑅 to not be compact when 
production technology has increasing returns to scale.  For instance, consider an economy with 
one type of agent and two goods.  We suppress 𝜃 subscripts for convenience.  The 
representative agent has 𝜔1 > 1 and 𝜔2 = 0.  However, their preferences have utility 
representation 𝑢(𝑐) = 𝑐2.  In words, the agent is endowed with one good, but desires the other 
good.  The production technology is: 
𝑌 ≡ {(𝑦1, max{|𝑦1 − 1|, 0})|𝑦1 ≤ 0} 
In words production of one good is linear in the other good after payment of a fixed cost of one 
unit of the input good.  If this were a description of a continuum of firms, production becomes 
increasingly efficient as a smaller measure of firms pay the fixed cost.  However, any set of firms 
of measure zero cannot produce a positive measure of any good.  Thus, the feasible values of 
good 2 are [0, |𝜔1|).  There is no Pareto efficient resource allocation. 
 But in the model of agent-endowed production technology, each agent must use their 
own endowed inputs to produce.  Thus, the set of feasible values of good 2 is [0, |𝜔1| − 1].  
One can confirm the existence of an equilibrium with price vector 𝑝 = (0,1). 
 More generally, the economy yields compact sets of feasible allocations under 
assumptions (1) and (2).  This means Pareto efficient allocations exist, resolving the remaining 
difficulty due to increasing returns to scale production technology.   
 
Theorem: Under assumptions (1) and (2), 𝑅 is compact, and so Pareto efficient allocations exist. 
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Proof: 𝑅 can be expressed as the Minkowski sum: 
𝑅 = ∑[{𝜔𝜃} + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣(?̃?𝜃)]
𝜃
 
Since ?̃?𝜃 is compact, so is 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣(?̃?𝜃).  Finally, the Minkowski sum of compact convex sets is both 
compact and convex. 
 Let 𝑢𝜃  denote a continuous utility representation of preferences ≽𝜃.  From Hildenbrand 
(1974 pg. 62 theorem 3 and corollary), the set 𝑈 ≡ {∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑢𝜃(𝑐𝜃(𝑖))𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
|  ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
∈
𝑅} of feasible aggregate utility values is 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣({∑ 𝜆𝜃𝑢𝜃(𝑐𝜃)𝜃 | ∑ 𝜆𝜃𝑐𝜃𝜃 ∈ 𝑅}).  Since 𝑅 is 
compact, {∑ 𝜆𝜃𝑢𝜃(𝑐𝜃)𝜃 | ∑ 𝜆𝜃𝑐𝜃𝜃 ∈ 𝑅} is compact, and so 𝑈 is (convex and) compact.
14 ∎ 
 The first two theorems demonstrated the bijection between Pareto efficient allocations 
and equilibrium.  This last theorem ensures that the use of a continuum of agents has not 
destroyed the existence of efficient allocations by erasing the boundary of 𝑅.  Thus, the model 
of individual agent production with the supply limits of inputs ℐ accounted for has resolved a 
theoretical difficulty with the welfare economics of increasing returns to scale. 
 
6. Discussion and Extensions 
I have shown that the welfare theorems and the existence of Pareto efficient allocations 
obtains in this model, in contrast with traditional models of increasing returns to scale 
production technology.  This section addresses the most prominent outstanding issues with this 
model, particularly in contrast with more traditional competitive general equilibrium models. 
                                                          
14 This means that any utility representations yield a closed interval of values for aggregate utility. 
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First, I have not imposed sufficient assumptions to ensure equilibrium existence for any 
transfer scheme (𝑇𝜃)𝜃.  Equilibrium existence even in an exchange economy requires 
assumptions not yet imposed.  For instance, consider Θ = {1,2}, 𝐿 = 2, 𝑌1 = 𝑌2 = 𝒥 = ∅, 
with 𝑢1(𝑐1) = 𝑐12, 𝑢2(𝑐2) = 𝑐21 + 𝑐22, 𝜔1 = (1,0), 𝜔2 = 𝟎, and 𝑇1 = 𝑇2 = 0 with 𝜆1 = 𝜆2.  In 
words, this is an endowment economy with both goods tradable, where one agent has a good 
that the other agent would benefit from consuming.  One can confirm that this example 
satisfies assumptions (1) and (2). 
For any price vector 𝑝 = (𝑝1, 𝑝2): 
𝑝1 > 0 ⇒ 𝑐11 = 𝑐21 = 0 ⇒ 𝑐11 + 𝑐21 = 0 < 𝜔11 + 𝜔21 = 1 
Thus, any positive price for good 1 makes demand for good 1 less than supply.  Yet:15 
𝑝1 ≤ 0 ⇒ 𝑐21 = ∞ > 𝜔11 + 𝜔21 = 1 
Therefore, the imposed assumptions remain insufficient for equilibrium existence even in an 
endowment economy.16  
Also, there is no “profit” function, i.e. a function of the market values of inputs and 
outputs, on which one can impose a non-distortionary tax.  For instance, consider Θ = {1,2}, 
where 𝜔1 = (1,0), 𝑢1(𝑐1) = 𝑐11 + 2𝑐12, 𝑌1 = {(𝑦11, |y11|
2)| 𝑦11 ≤ 0}, 𝜔2 = 𝟎, 𝑢2 = 𝑐22, and 
𝑌2 = {𝟎}.  In words, agent 1 has an input, say labor, that they can consume or transform into a 
consumption good.  Agent 2 has nothing, cannot produce anything, and would like some of that 
consumption good.  Finally, 𝜆1 = 𝜆2 = 1, so that there is a unit mass of agents of each type. 
                                                          
15 Technically, 𝑝1 ≤ 0 precludes any solution to the preference-maximization problem. 
16 One could trivially extend this to have a non-tradable good with 𝐿 = 3 and ℐ = {3}.  In any case, one can check 
from Gale and Mas-Colell (1975) that the missing assumption for ensuring existence in an exchange economy is a 
condition ensuring positive income. 
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One can confirm that for any 𝛽 ∈ (0,1), 𝑐1 = (0, 𝛽) and 𝑐2 = (0,1 − 𝛽) is efficient.  Yet 
imposing a tax of 𝜏 > 0.5 on output from the first agent, transferring the tax revenue to agent 
2, and with a price vector 𝑝 = (0,1) yields agent 1’s maximization problem: 
max
𝑐11∈[0,1]
2(1 − 𝜏)(1 − 𝑐11)
2 + 𝑐11 
This maximization problem yields corner solution 𝑐11 = 1 and 𝑐12 = 0.  There is no tax revenue, 
and so 𝑐2 = 𝟎.  Furthermore, note that in this equilibrium labor has no market value, and so 
there is no market value for inputs utilized.  Thus, there is no tax on the market value of inputs 
and outputs that does not distort behavior.  
 More generally, endowing agents with production technology and having them optimize 
while accounting for supply constraints entirely rules out any construct of a profit-maximizing 
firm.  Without these profit-maximizers, my model leaves no basis for considering the efficient 
boundaries of allocating resources within a managerial structure versus using the price 
mechanism.  Future work should speak to the determination of when production happens by 
direction of planners versus via prices. 
 One approach is to let agents make agreements to work together on production, still 
such that they take supply constraints as given.  For instance, consider Θ = ℐ = {1,2} with 𝜔1 =
(1,0,0), 𝜔2 = (0,1,0), 𝜆1 = 𝜆2 = 1, and 𝑌 = {(𝑦1, 𝑦2, min{|y1|, |y2|}
2)|𝑦1, 𝑦2 ≤ 0}.  Here the 
function 𝑌 refers to a technology jointly accessible by the two agent types.  Both agents have 
preferences of the form 𝑢𝜃(𝑐𝜃) = 𝑐𝜃1 + 𝑐𝜃2 + 3𝑐𝜃3.  One can imagine a Walrasian auctioneer 
specifying that for any production plan chosen, agent type 1 gets fraction 𝛽 ∈ (
1
3
,
2
3
) of the 
resulting revenue, while agent type 2 gets fraction 1 − 𝛽.  An equilibrium would have both 
agents choose the same production plan, so that they happen to always agree.  For instance, 
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at 𝑝 = (1,1,1), both agents choose to produce one unit with y1 = 𝑦2 = −1, 𝑐1(𝑖) =
(0,0, 𝛽) ∀𝑖, 𝑐2(𝑖) = (0,0,1 − 𝛽) ∀𝑖, and so all markets clear.  One can confirm that the resulting 
equilibrium is optimal. 
 This is only one example.  It does not formally demonstrate the welfare theorems or the 
existence of Pareto efficient allocations.  Furthermore, it appears such a model leaves 
undetermined the division of revenue between partners in an enterprise.  Previous work on 
shareholder equilibria do not generally achieve even constrained notions of efficiency.17  Future 
work should address these difficulties with alternative approaches to coordinating production 
in a competitive setting. 
 Finally, the production efficiency result from Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) describes 
optimal tax problems whose solutions do not permit aggregate production to reside in the 
interior of feasible aggregate consumption bundles.  This result depends critically on the 
complete taxation of firm profits.   Now there are no profits to tax.  Thus, it remains an open 
question whether some form of the production efficiency result still obtains in this new setting.  
Still, the main result holds for centrally planned production.   
I conjecture that any constrained optimal (𝑐𝜃, 𝑦𝜃)𝜃 has ((𝑦𝜃𝑙)𝑙∉ℐ) on the boundary of the 
feasible set conditional on ((𝑦𝜃𝑙)𝑙∈ℐ)𝜃, given weak assumptions as in Diamond and Mirrlees 
(1971).  I believe this holds because any agent 𝑖 of type 𝜃 who has chosen (𝑦𝜃𝑙)𝑙∈ℐ  chooses 
(𝑦𝜃𝑙)𝑙∉ℐ  to maximize profit.  This is production efficiency if one interprets the consumption by 
                                                          
17 Dreze (1974) created the canonical shareholder model with incomplete markets.  Dierker, Dierker, and Grodal 
(2005) encapsulate previous results on the constrained inefficiency of the resulting equilibrium by showing that it 
does not satisfy even a minimal notion of constrained inefficiency with arbitrarily small income effects for 
consumers. 
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agents 𝑖 and 𝑖′ ≠ 𝑖 of goods 𝑙 ∈ ℐ to be consumption of distinct goods.  For instance, my 
consumption of leisure is distinct from your consumption of leisure. 
 
7. Conclusion 
When permitting increasing returns to scale production technology, traditional general 
equilibrium models could not simultaneously yield the Second Welfare Theorem and the 
existence of Pareto efficient allocations.  But one can obtain both results by permitting agents 
to account for the limited supply of their own endowed inputs.  This mirrors the real-world 
situation of doctors in private practice deciding how much labor to supply, understanding that 
the increased marginal productivity of their time after paying substantial fixed costs will not 
permit them to purchase their leisure on the market thereafter.  Their desire for sleep and 
other leisure may limit their overall production level.  Failing that, they only have so many 
hours in a day to supply. 
These results have multiple substantial limits.  First, they do not permit considerations 
of anything one might plausible call a firm.  This precludes a substantial literature pertaining to 
optimal tax policy in general equilibrium.  To what degree versions of these results survive in 
this new environment is an open question. 
Second, the model does not allow for the consideration of public goods or natural 
monopolies.  Any enterprise that requires a positive measure of inputs as a fixed cost to achieve 
production has no representation with a model of a non-atomic continuum of productive 
agents.  There is a substantial literature on how one might regulate a natural monopoly or 
determine the optimal provision of a public good, but no result on how one might provide such 
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goods efficiently in a decentralized environment.  Of course, it is implausible that a natural 
monopoly would function as in a competitive setting.  But even if one could make the sole 
provider of a good with fixed costs of production take prices as given, it is unclear whether 
there is a decentralized competitive environment which provides such goods efficiently.  
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Appendix for Chapter 3 
Proof of Second Welfare Theorem: 
 I now fill in the gaps of the proof left from the outline presented in the main body of the 
paper.  This outline had seven steps. 
1. 𝑉 is an open and convex set. 
To see that 𝑉 is open, consider any 𝑐𝜃
′  ∀𝜃 such that 𝑐𝜃
′ (𝑖) ≽𝜃 𝑐𝜃(𝑖) ∀𝑖 ∀𝜃, and furthermore for 
some type 𝜃∗: 
ℙ(𝑐𝜃∗
′ (𝑖) ≻𝜃∗ 𝑐𝜃∗(𝑖)) > 0 
Pick 𝑖∗ such that 𝑐𝜃∗
′  and 𝑐𝜃∗  are continuous at 𝑖
∗, and 𝑐𝜃∗
′ (𝑖∗) ≻𝜃∗ 𝑐𝜃∗(𝑖
∗).  Note that continuity 
of preferences implies that there is some value 𝛿 > 0 such that in an open neighborhood 𝑁∗ 
around 𝑖∗: 
‖?̃? − 𝑐𝜃∗
′ ‖ < 𝛿 ⇒ ?̃? ≽𝜃∗ 𝑐𝜃∗(𝑖) 
Define 𝜖 ≡ 𝛿ℙ(𝑁∗), and note that 𝜖 > 0.  Pick arbitrary ?̃? such that: 
‖?̃? − ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃
′ (𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
‖ < 𝜖 
Define ?̃?𝜃∗(𝑖) ≡ 𝑐𝜃∗
′ (𝑖) + [ℙ(𝑁∗)]−1 [?̃? − ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃
′ (𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
] for those agents 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁∗.  
Since ‖[ℙ(𝑁∗)]−1 [?̃? − ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃
′ (𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
]‖ < 𝛿, we know that ?̃?𝜃∗(𝑖) ≻𝜃∗ 𝑐𝜃∗(𝑖) for these same 
agents 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁∗.  Defining ?̃?𝜃(𝑖) = 𝑐𝜃(𝑖) otherwise, we get that:
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?̃? = ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ ?̃?𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
∈ 𝑉 
Thus, we know any element of 𝑉 has an 𝜖-ball around that element also in 𝑉.   
 That 𝑉 is convex is a corollary of Liapunov’s Theorem, as demonstrated in Hildenbrand 
(1974, pg. 62 theorem 3 and the following corollary). 
2. The same result from Hildenbrand (1974) also demonstrates that 𝑅 is convex.  
Alternatively, one need only note that under assumption (1): 
𝑅 = ∑ 𝜆𝜃[{𝜔𝜃} + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣(?̃?𝜃)]
𝜃
 
This uses the fact that elements of ℐ cannot be produced, so that the constraint 𝑐𝜃𝑙 = 𝜔𝜃𝑙 +
𝑦𝜃𝑙 ∀𝑙 ∈ ℐ has no implications for aggregate consumption. 
3. This step can be decomposed into two parts: 
a. If 𝑉 = ∅, then equilibrium arises from 𝑝 = 𝟎. 
First, I want to show that 𝑉 = ∅ implies that a.e. agent is globally sated.  To show the 
contrapositive, suppose that ∃?̃? such that ∃𝑐?̃?
′ (𝑖) ≻?̃? 𝑐?̃?(𝑖) for uncountably many 𝑖 ∈ [0,1].  
Then 𝑐?̃? is continuous at some such value 𝑖̃, so that continuity of preferences implies that for 
some open neighborhood ?̃? around 𝑖̃: 
𝑐?̃?
′ (𝑖̃) ≻?̃? 𝑐?̃?(𝑖) ∀𝑖 ∈ ?̃? 
This implies that 𝑉 is not empty: 
∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0
𝜃≠?̃?
+ 𝜆?̃? [∫ 𝑐?̃?
′ (𝑖̃)𝑑𝑖
?̃?
+ ∫ 𝑐?̃?(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
[0,1]∖?̃?
] ∈ 𝑉 
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By the contrapositive, 𝑉 = ∅ implies that ((𝑐𝜃, 𝑦𝜃)𝜃, 𝟎) is an equilibrium.  We assume for the 
rest of this proof that 𝑉 ≠ ∅.  
b. If 𝑉 ≠ ∅, then ∃𝑝 ∈ ℝ𝐿,  𝑣 ∈ ℝ such that (𝑋, 𝐶) ∈ 𝑅 × 𝑉 ⇒ 𝑝 ∗ 𝑋 ≤ 𝑣 < 𝑝 ∗ 𝐶. 
In the body of the paper, I noted that by the Separating Hyperplane Theorem. 
∃𝑝, 𝑣: (𝑋, 𝐶) ∈ 𝑅 × 𝑉 ⇒ 𝑝 ∗ 𝑋 ≤ 𝑣 ≤ 𝑝 ∗ 𝐶 
Furthermore, 𝑝 ≠ 𝟎.  Suppose for the sake of contradiction that ∃𝐶 ∈ 𝑉: 𝑝 ∗ 𝐶 = 𝑣.  Then for 
any element 𝑙∗ ∈ {1, … , 𝐿} such that 𝑝𝑙∗ ≠ 0, one can consider ?̃? ≡ (𝐶𝑙 − 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑙
∗)𝕀(𝑙 = 𝑙∗)𝜖)𝑙 
for sufficiently small 𝜖 so that ?̃? ∈ 𝑉, yet 𝑝 ∗ 𝐶 < 𝑣.  This contradicts the claim of the Separating 
Hyperplane Theorem.  Therefore: 
∃𝑝 ≠ 𝟎, 𝑣 ∈ ℝ: (𝑋, 𝐶) ∈ 𝑅 × 𝑉 ⇒ 𝑝 ∗ 𝑋 ≤ 𝑣 < 𝑝 ∗ 𝐶 
4. ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
∈ 𝑐𝑙(𝑉) 
I reuse notation from the argument from step 1, since the reasoning is similar.  Since 𝑉 is not 
empty, there is an uncountable number of points 𝑖 at which 𝑐𝜃∗(𝑖) ∉ argmax
ℝ+
𝐿
≽𝜃∗  for some 
𝜃∗ ∈ Θ.  For some such 𝑖∗, 𝑐𝜃∗  is continuous at 𝑖
∗.  Pick 𝑐∗ ≻𝜃∗ 𝑐𝜃∗(𝑖
∗).  Then there is an open 
neighborhood 𝑁∗ such that 𝑐∗ ≻𝜃∗ 𝑐𝜃∗(𝑖) ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁
∗.  For any 𝜖 > 0, define 𝑁𝜖
∗ ⊂ 𝑁∗ such that 
when defining: 
𝑐𝜃
𝜖(𝑖) ≡ 𝕀(𝜃 = 𝜃∗, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝜖
∗)𝑐∗ + 𝕀(𝜃 ≠ 𝜃∗ 𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ∉ 𝑁𝜖
∗)𝑐𝜃(𝑖) 
We obtain: 
‖∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃
𝜖(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
− ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
‖ < 𝜖 
Yet ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃
𝜖(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
∈ 𝑉.  Thus, ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
∈ 𝑐𝑙(𝑉). 
5. The aggregated allocation ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
 is on the hyperplane. 
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Note that 𝑝 ∗ ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃
𝜖(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
≥ 𝑣 ∀𝜖 > 0.  By continuity of the dot product: 
𝑝 ∗ ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
≤ 𝑣 ≤ lim
𝜖→0+
𝑝 ∗ ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃
𝜖(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
= 𝑝 ∗ lim
𝜖→0+
∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃
𝜖(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
= 𝑝 ∗ ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
 
Thus, 𝑝 ∗ ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
≤ 𝑣 ≤ 𝑝 ∗ ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
⇒ 𝑝 ∗ ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
= 𝑣. 
6. 𝑇𝜃(𝑖) ≡ 𝑝 ∗ [𝑐𝜃(𝑖) − 𝑠𝜃(𝑖)] ⇒ ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑇𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
= 0 
First, note that 𝑇𝜃(𝑖) is integrable.  Second, note that: 
∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑇𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
= 𝑝 ∗ [∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
− ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ [𝜔𝜃 + 𝑦𝜃(𝑖)]𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
] = 𝑝 ∗ 𝟎 = 0 
7. ((𝑐𝜃, 𝑦𝜃)𝜃, 𝑝) is an equilibrium with integrable transfers 𝑇𝜃: [0,1] → ℝ. 
Suppose that ((𝑐𝜃, 𝑦𝜃)𝜃, 𝑝) violates the preference maximization requirement of equilibrium.  
Then ∃𝜃∗ such that for uncountably many agents 𝑖: 
𝑐𝜃∗(𝑖) ∉ argmax
𝑐∈𝐵𝜃∗(𝑝,𝜔𝜃∗ ,𝑇𝜃∗(𝑖
∗))
≽𝜃∗  
There is some such 𝑖∗ at which 𝑐𝜃∗  and 𝑇𝜃∗  are continuous.
18  Then for some neighborhood 𝑁∗ 
around 𝑖∗: 
𝑐𝜃∗(𝑖) ∉ argmax
𝑐∈𝐵𝜃∗(𝑝,𝜔𝜃∗ ,𝑇𝜃∗(𝑖))
≽𝜃∗  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁
∗ 
Since 𝑁∗ has positive measure, it follows that the set {𝑐𝜃∗(𝑖) ∉ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐵𝜃∗(𝑝,𝜔𝜃∗ ,𝑇𝜃∗(𝑖))
≽𝜃∗} contains a 
set of positive measure.   
                                                          
18 This uses the fact that 𝑇𝜃  is continuous a.e. ∀𝜃. 
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 One can pick (𝑐𝜃∗
′ (𝑖), 𝑦𝜃
′ (𝑖)) such that for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁∗: 
𝑐𝜃∗
′ (𝑖) ≻𝜃∗ 𝑐𝜃∗(𝑖) 
𝑐𝜃∗
′ (𝑖) ∈ 𝐵𝜃(𝑝, 𝜔𝜃∗ , 𝑦𝜃∗
′ , 𝑇𝜃∗(𝑖)) 
𝑦𝜃∗
′ (𝑖) ∈ 𝑌𝜃 
Otherwise, let (𝑐𝜃
′ (𝑖), 𝑦𝜃
′ (𝑖)) = (𝑐𝜃(𝑖), 𝑦𝜃(𝑖)).  As described above, this yields contradiction: 
𝑣 < 𝑝 ∗ ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑐𝜃
′ (𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
≤ 𝑝 ∗ ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑠𝜃
′ (𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
+ ∑ 𝜆𝜃 ∫ 𝑇𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0𝜃
≤ 𝑣 
Thus, we know that all consumers maximize preferences subject to their budget constraints.  ∎ 
